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CHAPTER ONE
Introduction
I. Statement of th ; Problem.
The fundamental category in .^rnst Troeltsch's philosophy
of history is the Individual Totality. Troelts;;h holds that
the Individual Totality is the real object 01 historical in-
v .tigation and the touchstone of the validity of any philos-
ophy of history, hence, in his treatraent of this principle
are centered many of the basic issues of his philosophy. The
problem of this dissertation is to investigate the nature of
the Individual Totality, and this involves the following ques-
tions: 1) /hat are Troeltsch's principles and methods of his-
toriography? 2) Vhat are the structure and function of the
Individual Totality? 3) How is development to be cone ived
of in the Individual Totality? 4) How are the norms of in-
terpretation 3nd value in the historical process to be vel-
idated in the light of the principle of the Individual To-
tality?1
II. Brief /--ocount of Troeltsch's Life. 2
A brief account of Troeltsch's life v. ill serve to show
1. All re 'erence-i to books in this dissertation will be
to the abbreviations found on the right hand margin of the
bibliography.;./ .'here no name is iven the references are to
Tro-'ltsch; in all other cases the author's name will ;ccur
either in the footnote or in the context of the dissertation.
2. Based on G8, 3-16, and on Baron von Kiigol's intro-
duction to CT.

what place the problem under consideration had in hie think-
ing. Krnst Troelt3ch was descended £MM an old bure.;her fam-
ily which had settled for centuries in the vicinity of .;wabia
and 3' varia. He was born in , ugsburg in 1365, the oldest son
of a physician in that city. From 1833 to loathe studied
Protestant Theolo? at firlangen, Got tinmen, and Berlin.^" His
2interest centered from early youth upon History, end in 18H4
he commenced the study of jurisprudence as a key to the under-
standing of that subject. He soon turned to theology, how-
ever, because it offered t that time access both to metaphys-
ics and to history and because the science of reli ion n s in-
volved in the constant interaction between hi story and philos-
ophy. Trcoltseh speaks of his early preparation as follows:
Die Theologie war darnels als historische
Theolo
;
;ie eine der irteressantesten, span-
ner dsten, revolutionarsten aissenschaften.
'ellaausen, Kuenen, Heuss, ./eizsacker, and also Boris eet, ..re-
de, Hackraann, Ounkel, and •.ichhorn served as means of in-
struction to leae him to the heart of the problem of the
religious metaphysical consciousness. Albreoht hitsehl was
one of the most influential of his earlier teachers. About
this time he came in contact al3o with Lotze and "with the
Trorks of Kant, Ficete, and chleien.iacher . He „;ays of Lotze,
1. CT, xii.
2. GS, It, 4.
i
Lotze aber wurde zunachst der ei -entliche
bestimmende Geist. Ich sollte ihn person-
lich nicht mehr kennen lernen, da er gerade,
alo ich nach Gottingen kara, nach Berlin
uebersiedelte . i ber ich habc seine Bucher
in jenen rrundlegenden Jahrem wieder und
wieder gelesen.-*-
Troeltsch served for so/ie time as an .v. n elic.- 1 (Lu-
theran) curate in Liunich. In 1891 he became a lecturer at
Gbttingen; in 1392 he be ,ame Ex ra ordinary Pro res or in Bonn
University, and in 1894 was made Ordinary (full) Professor
of Systematic Theology at Heidelberg, where he stayed for
twenty-one ye< rs and where he wrote many of his most impor-
tant books, including Lis Lie o: iailohren dor Christ lichen
Kirc h en and r.>ru • pe
n
(1911). Durin , this period he served fo
many years in the Baden Upper House,
In his formative years Trooltnch was influenced by Dil-
they, whose new psychology attracted hira especially because
of its interest in the creative individual, an interest al-
ready awakened in Troeltech by Lotze. His studies at that
time were centered in psychological theory. He leaned to -ard
the views which placed the ssence of the spiritual life se-
curely over against the physical world and which established
the self-evident ana indee ndnnt ri<;hta of ideal Lebens^e-
halte against any ulti.iate angers from Naturalism. The
proof of this self-evidence lay, he thow-li,, in the "BewusslBein
I I n
der geisteswissen haftlichen .:.:ot;.oden unci in einer grund-
satzlich idealist ischen Deutung der lCbr ; erwelt , so wie sie
Lotze und Leibniz vertraten."^
In audition to these interests he also concentrated his
attention on two closely related groups of problem;, the
science of religion and the system- tic philosophy of the de-
velopment of religion anc of mind ( Geist ) . He desired to
work out "eine allgemeine ^ntw . cklungsgejchichte dos religib-
sen Geistes auf der Grundlage seiner Verwurzelung in ellge-
meinen Leben und die basondere Stellung und Beurt ilung des
Christentums in diesor universalen . .ntwicklung. "" As the
first fruit of this intent appeared his i-iclanohthon und Jo-
ham] Gerhard , a treatise on the Reformat ion. ith this a new
problem emerged, viz., whether thu modern era be; • n with the
Reformation or at some later date. He finally concluded that
modern times first app ared in the ; uCklarung . Tro-ltsch 1 s
work in this field brought hlia into close cont.- ct with Dil-
they who influenced hi. > profoundly.
Along with ther;e historical investiga t ions , he studied
philoso hy of religion, and the latter led him into more de-
tailed research in psychology, epistemology , and philosophy
of history. Lio arose still another problem, that of the
1. 09, IV, 6. .
2. Ibid., 6.
{
Uebergang von psychologischen Besohreibungen
und Analyses u kritiscben Untersuchungen
uebur .ert und .ahrhoitsgehalt , ciamit auf
die Problome des Terhaltnisses von psycho-
logischer -analyse zu giilti -keit3theoretischer
Znerkennung. 1
Here Dilthey could help but little, for bis work seemed un-
satisfactory on this point. About this time he bcqarae ac-
:ur.inted with indelband, fienael, and Kickert. The offect of
Kickert on his thought Troeltsch describes as follows: "Nun
sah ich all diese Probleme neu.~' A lecture in 3t. Louis,
"Psychologic und Erkenntnistheorie in dsr ;eli^ianswiasen-
schaft" (1905), and a monograph on Dfljj liistorischc in Kants
Re1 i g i ons ph i lo s o pb i
e
(1904), indicate the significance of
this ne-.v influence. Die . bsol-.thoit das Christ entuns und die
Re 1 i g ionsge s ohicht e (1902) also reflects this point of view.
This last work, he says, is the germ ( Kein ) of ev rything which
followed.
Troeltsch wsa not completely satisfied, ho over, with
the ileokanti-sn standpoint.
Eine der&rtige otellung aller urkenntnis
rein auf die pitze des subjects und die
Verwandelung aller lie 11 tat in I roductionen
des .ubjekts ist dcnNueberh- upt doch das
reine Cegenteil aller natiirlichen Keclitats-
empfiii dung, i
1. G3, IV, 8.
2. Ibid., 8-9.
3. Ibid., 9.
4. Ibid., 10.
f(
Accordingly, he turned to the writings of gialebranche , Leibni
and Hegel. These theoretical investigations were supplement-
ed by practical researches in sociology prompted by Trooltsch
official political position. As ft r suit his thought took
still another turn, a shift from the ideological method of
Hegel and Dilthey to a method and point of view like that of
l.lax /eber and Marx* "Und von da her ergriff mich die f-.Iarx-
istische Unterbau-Ueberbaulchre mit der grbssten Gewalt."
Troelt-sch never became a confirmed - rxist , however. The
product of the e various influences and researches was the
famous work published in 1911, Die S i iallehren der christ-
lichen Kirchen und Crupoen . .ritten from the same standpoint
was also his Augustin, die christliche j ntike unci das „ittol-
elter (1915)
.
In the same year he transferred fro the theolo ical
faculty in Hei elborg to the philosophical faculty in Berlin,
where he regained until his death. During the war days in
Berlin Troeltsch engaged in publicity work. The war m de a
tremendous impression on him.
Andrerseits gab der Umstand, dass ich die
grossen historischen ^reignisse w. nigstens
teilweise sehr in der Ilahe ihres uellen-
ortes beobachten konnte, eincn tiefen und
lebendigen Eindruck vom esen historischer
Gchicksale, ..ntwicklungen und Katastrophen,
wie ihn kein Bucher- und kein uellenstudium
so gewahren kann. 1
1. GS, IV, 11. 2. Ibid., 13.
(<
(
At the University of Berlin he lectured on Philosophy of Re-
ligion, ethics, Philosophy of Gen.ral Civilization, Introduc-
tion to Philosophy, History of Modern Philosophy, and Philoso-
phy of History. From 1919 to 1921 ho was a member of the
Prussian Lmdtag and Und r-Jecretary of -tate in the I ini try
of Public /orship. 1
His roe. in interest in Philosophy of Religion was concen-
trated in thes: years on the problem of the essence and norms
of judgment involved in reliri ;nsgeschlchtliche Bntwic;:lung .
This interest plunged him into the midst of the problems of
ethics and of philosophy of history. Thus began a search for
a positive systematic statement of his own position in philos-
ophy of history. Eis starting-point, as the third volume of
his Ge sa ; . i fae 11 e - ch r i ft e
n
shows, was a criticism of Rickert and
indel and, whose works, nevertheless, seemed to him to be the
most profitable besis for such a philosophic 1 system.
Troelts en's studies oventu- ted in the work called Per His -
torjsmus unc seine Prob.o (1922), vrhich foams the basis of
our present investigation. In this volume the author tried
to answer the question, "wie von dem Historisch-Helat iven der
2
•eg zu geltenden ] ulturwerte zu fin den sei. n A second vol-
ume was to have followed, but Tro.itsch passed away before
it was completed. Ho-vever, in three lectures which he was to
have delivered at the University of London in 1923, we have
1. CT, xiii. 2. Go, IV, 14.
V(
(
a few anticipations of the oentral theme of the anticipated
work. These lectur s v/ith two others were edited by Baron
Friedrich von Hugel and appeared in English under the title,
Chr i g ti gn Th
o
nr.h
t
(1923); the Gorton edition, Per hj^torismus
unci seine Ueb /rwindung appeared in 1924.
III. 3u. , .;- ry of Research of Previous Investigators.
No great amount of attention has been given, as yet, to
Troeltsch's philosophy of history. The problem which e have
chosen to invest gate appears, however, in most of the essays
which have been written on the thecu. of our study. The first
Investigator to be considered is Lyman. Lyman's essay, "Ernst
Troeltsch's Philosophy of History,"^- Is largely expository.
Kis main criticism is that the concept of Individual Totali-
ties lacks the validity which is required if it is to be made
it 1 ' aWll ml VI Ni i nd hence the determiner of norms. Moreover,
says Lyman,
Troeltsch's faith th t every culture har-
its metaphysical rights is something, but
not enough, so long as he does nothing
toward thinking these cultures together.
What is commendable in Trooita h is his
combination of historical realism with the
task of e present synthesis of culture; his
appeal to penetrative insight s supplement*
ing factual knowledge; his recognition of
the creative role which spiritual meanings
and processes may play i . history; his
transcending of nationalism and his desire
to avoid uncons i us -Piropean arrogance in
!• Phil. Rev ., 41 (1932), 443-465.
2. Ibid., 463.
((
historical thinking; and his own insistence
on penotrating through historical empiricism
and episte; ology to a religious and met- physi-
cs.' 1 view. 1
Lyman* s criticism omits a specific analysis of the principle
of the Individual Totality and the discussion of points at
which ' o finds Troelt sen's view inadequate.
Baron von Hiigel, the second investigator to be consid-
ered, criticized Troelts h in two essays, the first ap earing
in the Earoh and December issues of the Constructive uartorly
(1914), and reprinted in Assays an ddresses under the title,
"On the Specific Genius and Capacities of Christianity."' The
second essay is the introduction to Troeltsch's Christian
Thought t five ssays prep- red to be delivered in England in
1923. Troeltsch died before these essays were --iven, and
Baror. von Hiigel edited them with an introduction. Most of the
first essay lies outride the inter st of the present investi-
gation, for it does not deal with any specific problem in the
Philosophy of history. Indeed, at the time of its writing,
Troelt ch had not formulated the principles of his philosophy
of history in a syst •Battle way. There is, however, a note
on Troelt nch*.; conception of ethics which is relevant. Von
Hugel agrees with Troelts:h that ethics must begin with a
general er.alyls of the fcforal, and that thus we reach the con-
ception of an end absolute, nece33ary, and valuable in it elf.
Phil. Kev ., 41 (1932), 463-464.
2. ISA, 153.
((
He also agreed with Troeltsch that the Kantian ethic oannot be
identified with the Christian ethic. 1 He disagrees with
Troeltsch, however, on the relation of the Christian ethic to
redemption. 2 Finally, he agrees with Troeltsch that an ob-
jective as ivell at) a subjective ethic is necessary if e are to
solve th'.r moral problem. 3
Von llu^el points out in his "Introduction" to Christian
Thought that Troeltsch ts point of view on many problems changed
considerably after the outbreak of the .vorld Var. He became
more anc. more individualistic and, consequently, overempha-
sized the utter uniqueness of historical events. Von liurel
critici es him for his doctrine of "polymorphous" truth and
for finding so little in common among the Individual Totalities
of history. Von Hugel firmly def<. nds the view that ''every
comparison, of no matter what two things, involves some ele-
ment common to these two things. Sr
H
Another critic is Fritz Heinemann, His ap reoiative es-
say defends Troeltsch f s principle of historical wholes. Nev-
ertheless, lie rejects Troeltsch' 3 limitation of the historical
to mere jSlnmalifkeit ^ for this precludes any possible histori-
cal norm. Heinemann also rejects tho historical a priori,
7though his reasons are not ^iven in detail.
1. Ek 9 156. 2. Ibid., 161-165. 3. Ibid., 165-169.
4. CT, xxiv. 5. MP , 209-230. 6. Ibid., 2:3.
7. Ibid., 226.
(
Fritz,*Joachim von Mntelen h s also criticized Troeltsoh
'
philosophy of hi tory. 1 Kg outlines Troeltsch's positi n and
traces the inner development of his thought. Like others, he
al30 holds that Troeltsoh succumbs logically to the historical
relativism which he strove to ov rcome. Von iiintelen outlines
possible alternatives which " e feels do not share the diffi-
cultics involved in Troelts.
h
?
; view." He criticises the ro-
llduotion of the a priori to a raere Bvl denzgefuhl t his too in-
dividualistic conception of value, and his conception of
"pol -morvhO' s" truth.^
Otto Hintze has also devoted some attention to Troeltsch*
philosophy of history. 5 Hintza is a contentious critic, and
6
we shall consider some of hi 3 views in detail later on. He
charges Troelt.s h ith confusing historical science and
philosophy of history, and he rejects much of Troeltsoh* s his-
torical logic . Hintzo would eliminate all considerations of
value from the loglo of history. Moreover, whereas Troeltsoh
recognizes the chief opponent of his own standpoint to be
naturalism, Hintze rejects this putting of the problem end
7finds the conflict to be between Historicism and Pragmatism,
1. rDer Versuch einer Ueb err;indung des Histori sums bei
Ernst Troeltsoh," Deutsche "viertel.i hrsschrift fur Literatur-
wissensehaft and Geistesgftschichte
.
3 (19.30), 524-372.
2. Ibid., 343-349. 3. Ibiu., 354. 4. Ibid., 368.
5. "Troeltoch und die Probleme des Historis us," Histor-
ischo oitschi-ift . 135 (1927), 138-239.
6. 3ee below, Ch. pter III.
7. Ibid., 195-199.
<
Then too, Hintse finds the conception of Individuality to be
va^uo and the principle of historical development in frocltsoh
to be ambiguous. Pie former insist-, on a- more realistic
formulation of the relationship between the individual pejr-
son and the Common-Spirit of the Individual Totality."*" Hintze
rejects completely Troe It sch * e attempt to find norms in his-
tory, and hoi ia that the latter's fear of rel atlTtita is un-
necessarily ex ggerated, for man is not as autonomous as
Troeltsch conceives him to be. Final Ly, Hintze declares that
the chief proMens of Troelt con's philosophy of history are
anthropomorphic illusions. ^ LtMcal and valuatinnal cate-
gories, he says, contrary to 'i'roeltaeh, do not apply to ex-
ternal reality. Historical life is hardly influenced by
5
spiritu, I forces.
till another critic of Troeitsoh ia raul Tillich. 6 His
point of view is summarized in the follo\7in: statement:
Es ist die tiefo Tragik von Troeltschs Le-
benswerk, dass er such in der letzten ge-
waltigsten .nstron^u .:;en, das Unbedin ;te
in Bedin^ten zu finden, schliesslich ver-
aagte."
Tillich does not go into detv-iled anal., sia of this problem.
1. Hintze, 0p. cit., £21. 2. Ibid., £29. 3. Ibid., 231.
4. Ibid., 233. 5. Ibid., £34.
6. "Ernst Troeltach,- Kant-otudion
.
29 (1924), 351-358.
7. Ibid., 357.
(<
As a final invest igator and critic of froeltsch's philos-
ophy of history to be included here, we may mention Arthur
Liebcrt. his e^say^- confined itself to a discussion of
Troeltsch's posthumous work, Per liis^orismus unci seine Ueber--
'"induiift . Lieb .rt stresses the Kantian str;in in Troeltsch*s
thought, 2 but also his emphasis on the necessity of co'r >ro-
raise. 3 .:h: t is insufficiently accented in Tr^elt-oh is the
belief
dass die Welt des Jeins ihren Halt und
ihren Sinn und die Stutzen ihres Lebens
nur in der Idealwelt des Pollens findet.
Liebert concludes that Troeltsch stood at the threshold of a
new metaphysics and that he prepared the WEiy for this new-
philosophy, but that he was too predominantly an historian to
5
effect the necessary r>nd desired construction.
Troelts h*s T,/orks on philosophy of religion and sociology
have received much more universal attention than his philoso-
phy of history. The critical v,rorks md essays on his philoso-
phy of religion and sociology, hovjsver, are not relevant to
the central problem of this dissertation. And yet, sorao of
the articles and books on the religious a priori should be
mentioned. Among these are discissions by Bornhausen, Diehl,
1. "Ernst Troeltsch, Der iii storis/ius und seine Uebor-
wlndunjc.* Kant-^tudien, 29 (19,;4), 359-364.
2. Ibid., 360. 3. Ibid., 362. 4. Ibid., 363.
5. Ibid., 363-364.
(<
Fellner, G-iinther, Jelke, Kaftan, Knudson, Kbhler, Leidretter,
macintosh, Jfcftgtr, l.igh, Spiess, ieneke, and /obb-rmin. 1
We shall have occasion to discuss the essay by Knud.on in some
detail in Chanter Five.
IV. Materials and Method of this Investigation.
The materials which are basic in this dissertation are
found primarily in Volume III of Troelt^ch's Gesemmelte
Schriften and in his Christian Thou ht , e are also concerned
with all other writings of his which deal with the fundamental
principles hero involved. hich are especially his articles
on "Historiography" and ''Contingency" in the iiinc./:;lo;..aedia of
Reli.^i .m and ethics , the method and philosophical conclusions
of his opziallehren der chrlsi, lichen Kirchen una Cru. pen , as
woll as essays and monographs which deal with the a priori and
the absoluteness of Chri sti- nity . Finally e are concerned
3
with r.is syteraatic treatments of ethics and value.
The method of this dissertation will be as follows:
1) Expository. N shall develop at some length
Troelt sen's own answer to thu four • uestions
which we have placed in our statement of the
problem.
2) Historic; 1 nd comparative. »Ve shell try to
show how so. e of the basic principles in
It For naries of essays and books, see Bibliography*
2. PSR, ACT, also 03, II, 754-763, 305-336.
3. S«« 03, II, 227-327, 364-385, 336-451, 525-672,
673-728.

Troelts h*s philosophy underwent a change
in the course of his research. Then wje^
shall elso i dio&te how Troeltsch's own
standpoint arcs a out of his discussion of
the Tories of others.
3) Critical nd analytic, we 3hall analyze
Troelt? h*s answers to the four u st i ns
posited above and will inquire whether the
principle of Individual Totalities achieves
the validity to w&i«h it lays claim.
V. General Plan of the Dissertation.
In the Introduction we have tried to state clearly the
problem of this investigation and its place in the developing
thought of Troeltoch. tfe have also pointed to some of the
criticisms which have been written about his philosophy of
history.
Chapter Tvro ..ill be devoted to an exposition of Troeltsch'
principles of historior.-r. :hy. It is thus en answer to ques-
tion one as stated in the problem, k.% the end of the chapter
wo shall, indicate some criticism of Troelt ch*s treatment of
historiography. Chapter Three discusses the nature of Indi-
vidual Totalities. It answers question two: hat are the
structure and function of the Individual Totality? This chap-
ter is chiefly expository and comperes Troeltsch* s position
on UfaK 1 points with that of Hegel, Ilint.'.e, and Kartmann.
The noxt chapter attempts to answer notion throe: Kow is
development to be conceived of in the Individual Totality?
Here the positions of Hegel, i^erx, the Posit ivists, and Hick-
(C
ert are made the ba Icground against which is portrayed TroGlt ^ch'
own view, at the end of tAla discussion the episteraolof/ical
founda ions of Troelt^ch's position ore analyzed and criti-
cized. The conpludin^ chapter deals with noms of interpre-
tation and value in the Individual Totality. It tries to
answer the quosti.n: How are the norms of interpretation and
value in the historical process to be validated in the light
of the Individual Totality? This is the crucial issue. After
indicating the signifies nee of the problem, the discussion de-
velops Troelt ch*s use of the principles of intuition, apri-
orism, and personality, analyzing and criticizing his presenta-
tion of these conceptions. The whole thesis is thus construct-
ed about the exposition and criticisia of Troelt ch's answer to
the four questions involved in the fundamental problem of the
nature of Individual Totalities.
(
CHAPTER TWO
Troeltsch*s Principles of Historiography
I. Historiography as a Search for Historical Causation.
Troeltsch's discussion of historiography constitutes an
introduction to his philosophy of history. Taken strictly,
histori ,o y is an empirical science which as as its one
great theoretical problem tiie determination of historic 1
causation. Neither appraisal nor judgment of history as a
whole is included in the conception. Troelt3ch says:
The sole task of history in its .pecifi-
cally theoreticj'l aspect is to explain
every movemont, process, stale, and nexus
of things by reference to the web of its
C: usr-1 relations. That is, in a word, the
whole function Df purely scientific inves-
ts \ tion. 1
The search for causes rules out, from the purely scientific
and theoretical point of view, any aesthetic or merely ouri-
ou t ro- eh to history. Hit toriogr.phy is not interested in
the ethical values of human actions in hi tory, nor in his-
tory as a m nufcl for politics or politic 1 education. Those
who seek for sociolo. ioal or economic principles as abstract-
ed from particular development s in history, or who seek for
principles which are to form the bases of society may be en-
gaged in significant problems, but they are not historiog-
raphers. "History as pure theoretical science is different
1. "Historiog -aphy, " BBBf VII, 718.
(is
<
from history as en element of belles lettres
,
politics, eco-
noitii c , Mid th < 1 ike •
The problem of cruse, however, is not a simple one. In
the field of historiography a difficulty seems to arise as
soon as the conception of psychic causation is introduced.
One may ask whether, in view of the pecu-
liar nature of psychical causation, or mo-
tivation, the insight necessary to deter-
mine and appreciate it must, not be drawn
from person 1 experience and per on 1 judg-
ment. 3uch insight, it will be said, is
always bound up with subjective estimates
of what ought to be. Thus, e. ., only
those who feel that certain ethical, po-
litical, and rtistic excellences ought
to exist will seek and discover them as
real springs of action, while those who
do not so re <• rd them will s lctom be able
to regard them as motives, and the less
so as historic 1 causes do not lie on the
surface or force themselv s into notice,
but ere, as i matter of fact, always brougnt
to light by the sympathetic imagination,
^uch a view is not wrong. Yet it does not
subvert our fundamental principle, since
the causes so discovered and realized i re,
in the sphere of historic 1 study, taken
account of as f ct- only, and not as grounds
for the corrections and criticisms of the
historian, whose subjective attitude to the
facts must, accordingly, be once more dis-
counted. 2
The 'ou ht-to-be* nust always be separated frori what really
is. Historic 1 study is inter sted only in the latter, and
all personal judgments must : ive way before the real f? cts.
The fulness, depth, and range of personal experience always
1. "Historiography," E#£, VII, 718.
2. Ibid., 713-719.
It
subjectively condition the investigator, ut the purely
scientific aim of historic 1 re lexion is not thereby surren-
dered." 1
By the very nature of the problem causation thus carries
us into the field of epistet iwlogy , and in so doinp it h- s
transcended the intere itfl of empirical science. Before we
have co<npleted what we mean by historic 1 causation we shall
find that we have had to wrestle with the main problems of a
philosophy of history. o cannot Ac 1 v/ith the question ade-
quately n the purely scientific plane. Otto ilintze points
out that Troeltseh has not succeede i ; different iating
cle; rly a purely theoretical empirica l historiography from a
philosophy of history. This is also no doubt behind the re-
mark of Fritvi Eeinemann: "Der Begriff des Historisraus als
historische /Lategorie ist nicht •Indentif**" Thus in the
very beginning of our discussion e have begun to inquire in-
to the lo ic and epist xmology of history. The general episte
Biological problems must be presented, accordingly, so that we
may the more clearly define and determine the problem of
causation.
II. Differences between Nature and History.
One of the first things which irapres es itself upon the
1. "Historiography," KB£
a
VII, 719.
2. "i'roults h unci die Problerae des ilistorismus, " Hist .
Ztsch. , 135 (1927), 189-190.
3. NWP, 220.
ex
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investi t: tor is the minuteness and almost fleet in ohan ctor
of the historic; 1 world over against the immense expanses of
nature in space and time. As Troeltsch remarks:
Die Ceschichte samt ihrer biolo^ischen Vor-
ges Lichte erect eint derage. enueber doch im-
mer vieder wie oine vollig fremdartige, ver-
schwindende kleine ICnklave, fliichtig wie •
der Haueh des Atems auf einer gefrorenen
QXasssciieibe. 1
There is u tendency among; ide:,licLs, says Troeltsch, to
solve this problem by showing the distinctive nature of his-
tory end drawing a sharp line betv/een the methods of the
natur 1 sciences and that of historical investigation. In
the natur. 1 sciences we observe o>:actiiess, clarity, n. ces-ity
predictability, extension, and size. History, on the other
ban.
,
deals with what is mobile, the creative, the responsi-
ble, the dramatic, the intuitive, and the thical.*"" Any har-
mony between these two fields is then asserted to be only a
practical question, ouch via .- essentially the Kantian solu-
tion, but the Kanti.n distinction between the theoretical
and the practical rea ;on has difficulties of it 3 own, as we
shall see below.
A more profound 3tudy reveals the f c ct that the greatest
difficulty of reconciliation lies in the thought of a "jge-
schlossenen
.
all, ;e,.o intuit i en und gleichart igen Ha { ur-
1. ds, III, 83. 2. Ibid., 84.
S. Ibid., 85
Ob'
,8
kausaj.itat; i dem Gedanken des ^esc.ilossenen Natursystem* , wozu
die Satze von der ISrhaltunp der nerpjie und der ^ntropie hin-
zukommen.' The effect of the first of the:;., concepts would
be to rule out ell interaction between mind and body. I ore-
over, everything psychical, historical
,
spiritual, and lof-i-
c: 1 becomes an epiphenoiaenal puzzle. The second idea leads
to indifference to* ard 11 value !..nd /loaning, for the uni-
verse, under that theory, is destined as a whole to e mere
..'ar^etod . If the conception of lo<;ic hero implied is postu-
lated as the only type of loyic applicable to the world as a
whole, then any unique lopic of his lory would be ruled out
2 ~
coj.t. etely from the outlet. Such a naturalistic position,
however, is "ein Phantom eingebildeten loriscuen wan ;s
,
nicut ein Srgebnis des tatsachlichen .« irklichkeitsbefundes,
der v. e linear rein von sich aus ganz anders besagt un< c'arum
fur bios 3 subjektiv e klart warden muss."
Kant and especially the Keokantians are partly responsi-
ble for the conception of a transcendent ally deduced closed
cousaJL system of nature. This, however, is not really e de-
duction, but an assumption based on the principles of New-
tonian physics. Both Kant and the Heokanti;ns exaggerate the
c eative activity of the mind in the knowing process. Though
each attempts to enhance the si^nifieance of the subject,
Troeltsch believes that the appeal to the creation of the
1. G3, III, 37. 2. Ibid., 88. 3. Ibid., 89.
Li
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object through thought, especially in the form which gives to
such construe; tion a purely matheciatici 1-causal org nization,
is really a deni; 1 of the Idealise v.'hich such at fc< B] ts seek
to establish. It denies every conception of oause which is
less rigid and which would give unique historical events
their proper place. 1
Troeltsch ;eeks to harmonize the fields of history and
of nature in three ways. The first of these is what he calls
"inetc- logic." By metalogic he means the general type of logic
which Hegel employed, in which epistemology
,
raetax^hyGics, and
formal loric are united. Ve shall see the t Troeltsch appeals
to the ketaloglo of Leibniz, whose general position he ac-
cepts on many vital issues. Sfhat Troeltsch seeks es acirlly
to make clear is that the validity of jud ment is not depen-
dent on its psychological genesi but that the norms of
thought are latent in the ps,/c olo ical t ct Itself . -*Es han-
delt sich hier um Sollgesetze, nicht um faktische Seins-
gesetze. T ' 2
Immer erwschsen die realwissenschaftlichen
Erkenntnisse nicht aus einem System der Lo-
gik, sondern umgekehrt dieses aus den Setz-
ungen, Hypothesen, una i pnissen des sich
3elbst vertrauenclen Henlerkennens. Vie
aber deii auch im einzelnen sei, an dem
Crundchc rr kter der Logik und .".ortwissen-
sch: ft en, eine ...ntscnei deride Durchbrecnung
der kausalgenetischen Kotwendigkeiten zu
sein, wird damit nichts geandert; im C-egen-
teil. Diese Durchbrechung eber ist die
1. GS, III, 90. 2. 63, III, 91
<
erste und grundlegende Befreiung von der Uaber-
gewalt des Naturalismus.*
Troeltsch is here emphasizing en important point • Behind all
description of fi ct lie the norms of thought, the principles
of logic. The latter has well been named ''die i/ioral aes Den-
kens." Uuiit is basic in all thinking. Accordingly-, a reali-
zation of the fundamental role of OUghJ in epistemoi.ofry and
in ? theory of value transcends and breaks throur:: mere
evolutionary naturalism. Thus, meaning and value arc set
free fro^n the bondage of the natu^?! sciences, for they ere
dependent on laws of ought, and not on mere laws of being.
There is a second point at which the method of the nat-
ural sciences is broken through, viz,., in psychology. Kintze
complains that Troeltsch does not give adequate attention to
g
empirical i.-syc/.olo^y . " ..evsrtheles.
,
from the point of view
of the foundations of historical method he oes give it an
important function. I is a violation of psychical ex eri-
ence to seek to reduce psychology to a pure natural science.
The mind is not an epi:phenomenon but stands in the causal
nexus. Interaction alone is an adequate solution of the mind-
body problem. A recognition of interaction, however, at once
sets free the historical process from the bonds of strict
•5
naturalistic necessity. Troeltsch car- ies the significance
of psychic processes far beyond mere independence fror; ne-
1. G£, III, 92. 2. Op. cit., 190. 3. 03, III, 94.
5S
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cessity, however.
Freilich kommt man dtdftlt auf den Gedfnken
eines verborgenen psyehischen Lebenshinter-
grundes, eines ununterbrochenen otromea psy-
ehischen Lebens, der nur :"iir das Bewusstsein
unterbroohen erscheint und aus welchen so-
wohl Individuum als geistige Produktion der
Individuen auf unberreifliche Weise torn u-
ssromenheng mlt der leiblichen Individual!--
sation und der psyehischen .echselwir3.cung
hervorgehen. Acer auf eolche mett-physische
Kintergrunde fiihrt die Psycholo* ;ie auch ohne
dies, da sie ja dem Problem des Ich und des
Unbowussten sowieso nicht aus dem ege ge-
hen kann. Mit elledem eber entferneri wir
uns weit von allem, was den Naturwis sen-
son?: ften von sich sus zuganglioh ist_ und
bekommen wir endgiiltig freien \&um fur die
relative ^iaturabhangi keit der Ilistorie,
fiir das (rat man Sehbpfung, Heuzeugung,
Durchbruch und Aktualisierung geistiger Ge-
halte nennt.-*-
More weighty still, however, ere the consiaerat ions of a
third kind, those of e philoso ;hy of nature. It is the func-
tion of philoso hy to invest! -ate the logical presupposit ions
of the sciences and their elations to the rest of reality.
Such & study shows first of all th- t what appears to bo a
priori in science, es, e. g. , the idea of cause, is not it-
self capable of being deduced s priori, but ari ,es in the
intercourse of thought with its ob.iect. Hence our appeal
must be primarily to experience, fo tho precise nature of the
a priori we shall turn later. In the second place, philoso y
of nature rev els th- t some of the so-called laws of nature
are not final.
1. GS, III, 94-95. 2. Ibid., 95
4^
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Andrersoitsr sine! die 'inergiesatze nichts
Denknotv/ondiges, sondern emplrisch gefun-
done and bestatit-te Satzo, deren Verhalt-
nisse zu etwaigen p3y6hischen und geistigen
Kraften d nit canz unbastimrat bleibt. x
Trie reel a prioris of natural science are s follows:
tie bestehen in .^ehrheit in dem Errinerungs-
vertrauen, in der viele Korabinationon und
fcirganzungen erlf;ubenden umdeutbarkeit quali-
t:: ti Tr-3in .liclier iilindrucke in quantitative
und raumlicae .substrate, in dein Eegelinassig-
keitsaxion und in dem Kaus^litatsprinzip,
daa die /erknupfung von Gleiche i ,iit Gleichem
in der uitmittelb^ren zeitlichen Sukzesaion
der ..in^elvorgange bedeutel und daher mit
deia ,egelma3Sigkeitsvertrauen nlcht icien-
t is oil ist. 2
Out of none of thes-: a prioris can one aeduce the n o-
essarily closed system of nature: nor cean the latter be dem-
onstr ted as a deduction from the prinoi ie or causation.
Thes,.- may be necessary for the practical success of scientif-
ic study, but they can in no way exclude other realms of law
Bft^flyw tnou^*V t »_ s i. * ' L^'Oir nn^wj[W5,i <trt>i* >. ft© eaoK »o c *
nor determine the nature of the world as a whole.
Das psychische Leben, die geistigen und
werthaften ;>chopfungen zu den noiokularbe-
wegungen des Oehirns als einen .'.esti-jidteil
des ge jchlossenon Naturzusaianenhangea in
ein Verhaltnio der uordnun oder der i£pi-
phanomenalitat zu bringen, ist ein nicht
bloss praktiech unlbsbares, sondern ein
theoretic ch falaoh gestelltes Problem. Das
geniigt fiir die Historie
;
urn ihr Luft und
i^bglic-hkei I zu geben, wahrend sie im ubrigen
Ja eng genug an die Katur gebunden bleibt. 5
At this point it is well to define tho two Beamingly ir-
reconcilable points of view which Troelt^ h calls Naturnlism
1. OS, III, 96. 2. Ibid., 96-97. 3. Ibid., 97.
toy « P |
and Historicisra. By Historic Ism he means "die rrundsatzliche
Historisierung olles unseren Denkens ueber den ...enschen, sei-
ne ultur unci seine >erte."^ This does not mean historical
relativism. Historic cl rel&tivism is a skeptical attitude
toi?ards all norms in history. What Troeltsch means here is
simply that no materiel v lues are absolute and that all
norms must be inner-historical. By naturalism he means
der die gesamte ..' rklicl^kei uirif t ssende ,u-
sammenhang einer von allera uelitativen und
aller unmittelbaren Er.ahrung absehenden
Yergesetalici ung. . . . T,v lit die Unterbauung
eines Jy;;tems von mbglichst matheraatisbh
ausdruckbaren, quant it a t iven Beziehungs-
ge.-.etzen unter die Alltagserfi hrung des ge-
meinen Bewuastseins, die Iteprasentction der
sinnlichen ;rfahrung:iibilder und ihres gegon-
seitigen Be^uges durch methem; tisohe Formeln,
die bus dem ..eson des bios sen Haumes flies-
sen. 2
Troeltsch tries to show that these two great creations of
modern thought
,
despite their antagonisms, go back to a com-
mon root, "der Bewus.-tseinsanalyse als '/'undament der nhiloso-
phie." In Lescartes' analytic: 1 puilosov y both tendencies
were already presont, one pointing in the direction of the
world of extension and universal law, the other pointing to
the ego I fed the historical and genetic content of conscious-
ness. Descartes ana his followers concerned themselves
chiefly with the first tendency, and yet he wrestled with the
problem of interaction. Later Splao a mizzled over psycho-
1. G3, III, 102. 2. Ibid., 103. 3. Ibid., 106.
1
physical par. llelism, Leibniz over preestablished harmony,
Pascal over the logic of the heart, and ..ale ranone over the
paradoxical relation of salvation i nd revelation to universal
law. All these seemed concerned to secure • place for the
historical ethical world, though their attempts were only
partially • 3UocessfU1."*"
A more direct analysis of consciousness took place
among; the English empiricists. Locke and his successors were
psychological and genetic in their enquiries and studied
knowledge from the point of view of the historical process of
experience. This method gleaned support from Leibniz 's phi-
losophy of continuity and from Goethe *a "*1 ;endige f Naturan-
schauung. f ' In 3chelling and Hegel the natural sciences them-
selves were aufgehoben in a logic which conceptualized his-
tory, but which tended to neutralize the physical sciences as
developed by Descartes and Newton. Since r,hen, says Troeltsci
"fben wir in einer mit iliren iMolgen und den eit sti- Mun^en
wechselnden Hivalitat von rlafcur* lismuc und llistorismus. Seit
der 3o r:iologie und dem Darwinisi.ius kann man beides oft richt
p
mehr recht unterscheiden. ,?
Genuine interest in historical processes and in the
logic of history Las come to self-consciousness only under
the greatest handicaps. At the risk of repetition, it is
1. 03, III, 105. 2. Ibid., 106.
J
Important to make this clear. The two methods, nature! science
on the one hand and historio^r. phy on the other, root in epis-
tenology. "The method," says Troeltsch, "is "determined not by
the subject matter, but by the epistemolo *ical ena in view;
for knowledge is never a mere reproduction of experience, but
always an abstract selection of particular elements of experi-
ence for e definite, intellectual end."^" The methoo of natural
science is determined rTby the interest of selecting that as-
pect of experience in which it manifests itself as absolutely
determined by tu iversal laws, and, accordingly, the method in
question abstracts from all that is qualitative and individual.
If is important to note that down to the time of herder and
Hegel modern philosophy either took no account of history at
all (with the possible exception of Vico), or else brought
historic: 1 oc urrences under a c usal conception, which was
sim ly that of notur 1 science philosophically generalized,
"Descartes surrendered hietory to the theologians and to rev-
elation; Hobbes and Spinoza treated it in a naturalistic
fashion. The natur listic view prevailed also in the ccse of
Hume and Kant, notwithstanding tie great diversity in their
n.
respective views of c usality.**
1. ERK, VII, 720. 2. Loc. cit.
3« Ibid., 719. Vico tries to understand the previous
course of human history as bhe natural development of human
nature. He sees the general natural 1 w of development mani-
festing itself in the history of peoples as well as in thr t
of individuals. Cf. Indelband, HOP, 526.
I
Within the Knnti- n school, especially in ita development
toward the Penlogism of Kegel, a different approach occurred.
The knowledge end actioio y of Nature wore
subjected to extreme violence by historical
thought, in as much as the latter becrrne
simply the application of the law of dialec-
tic, 1 movement to the co mic process and the
course of human affairs* But if this was e
violation of natur- 1 science, it was no less
a violation of historical thou "ht itself,
which by such procedure gelned only a finer
sense of order and contir 'ity, but no clear-
er comprehension of its own fundaments 1 con-
ceptions.^-
It was not until the revival of Kent's philosophy later
in the century under the £uise of Keoknnt lanisr:, together with
the influence of Vundt and ..llthey, that the differences be-
tween historic; 1 causation and causality in natural science
were carefully worked out and an adequate basis yiven to the
lo ic and episteiaology of history.
a
In an essay entitled "Moderne Geschicht -philosophie"
Troeltsch reviews one of the significant books which came from
the Neokantian School, j.ie Grenzen der naturwissen ->chaft lichen
lie^rii'fsbildunp, : eine lo ische JinlelturiK in die historischen
Jlss-jnoCiiaften
.
by Rickert. Trooltscii's extended revi w of
this work forms the basis of his own eaisteiaologioal analysis
and construction. The letter's dependence on .uickert is
obvious. On one point, however, there is radical disagreement,
for even in Rickert the problem of Caus: lity seems nocto have
1. HHa;, VII, 719. 2. 03, II, 673-728.
I
been adequately treated
EHelnes SraehtenS erfordert d^s Cuch ein wei-
tercs speziclles erk uebar den i»"ausLli tats-
begriJf , wenn es wirklich ueberzeugend und
durchdrintend rcirken soil, Denn es vrird sehr
vielon gehen wie mir, dass sie an dioscm
Punkte—und es 1st dooh ein Hauptpunkt—die
Rickertschen Andeutungen nicht gariz verste^en
und durchschauen. ie ist es mo lion den
.
jJrfaiunincjsinhalt zugleicii nomothetisch naeh
dem Prinzip der Kaussjlgleichunc und der Er-
haltun; der ;in rgie und dann doch wiluer
Ideogre phiach nach deui Prinzlp der Individual'
kausaiitet oder der Keusel-Ungieichunr. zu
verstehen? ind das wirklich nur zweierlei
Betraehtungsweisen desselben Objektes oder
sind da.; nicht doch Tellungen innerhalb der
Qbjekte, die eua einen Tell dem ersten und
zum anderen dem zweiten 3rklarungsprlnzip
unterliegen? Ich kann es mir seiwer anders
vorstallen. J-
III. Definition of Historical Causation.
The definition of historical causation thus becomes a
central problem. Tyooltsch, who believes that psycho-physical
interaction is the only v. lid solution of the mind-body enig-
ms, presents an essentially psycholo ic^l viev of this causa-
tion. In his article on "Historiogra hy" he says that his-
torical c-usation
is al ost exclusively a matter of psyc io-
lo io» 1 motivation. In the historical sphere
nearly everything oasses through the medium
of consciousness, and in the last analysis
all turns upon the constant inter ction of
conscious efforts, into which even the un-
1. OS, II, 720; III, 223-229. The uistinction between
Troeltsch's position c.nd thr t of iUckert and Kant is very
clearly brought out In the- Luotation. ,/e shall deal with it
in more detail belew; see Chapter IV.
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conscious elements tend to reoolve then-
selves. Thus the peculiar irrational quali-
ty and initiative of the indlvldu* 1 con-
sciousness make themselves felt in the ulti-
mate r suit, alike in the individual life
and in the life of the ^roup. Hero, there-
fore, it is not permissible to reduce events
into non- qualitative forces, or to explt. in
effects by c us 1 equivalence.
Moreover, there emerges continually in the historical
process the fact of the new . This is no mere transformation
of existent forces, but an element of essentially free oon-
p
tei t, due to the convergence of historical causes. ViThat is
novel and unique finds, thus, a significant place. It ap-
plies both to the individual and to the group, or Individual-
Totality, to which hi belongs. In the c se of the former
we see the creation of personality, end in the case of the
4group the creation of a new Common-Spirit, or even v. new cul-
5tural synthesis. The whole conception of historical process
is that of flux in the individual nd in the group. e
idea of personality is illustrative:
Now the end of moral ration which first ap-
pears in an obvious m nner is the attainment
of a free personality, which has its founda-
tions in itself and possess a a certain unity
of it3 own.... Jut of tho flux and confusion
of the life of instincts, the unity and
1. G3, n, 719.
2. To be discussed more fully below under Contingency.
3. Defined beloi? under Individuelle Tot:Mi tat *
4. Defined below under Qgg in^eist .
5. See Chapter Five, ect ion Two.
(f
compactness of personality h s first to be
erected and acquired. .. .freedom and creation
constitute the secret of personality. 1
The t otor3 of novelty, creation, and freedom. form pert
of the whole contingent aspect of the world which features so
largely in history. This does not mean, how ver, th t his-
torical events are wholly contingent. Jurth - more, we are not
to infer- from the discussion of psychological motivation, that
the science of history deals with this kind of cause alone.
History frequently has recourse to natur&l causation as well.
Factors like polar limitations, glacial periods, earthquakes,
famines, destructive winters, uninhal it ble regions, and the
like, play frequently a great part in determining the facts
of history. Their effects are often direct an: not purely
psychological.^ Nevertheles
,
contingency is close to the
heart of historical method.
The latter, as has been shown, centers about that v?hich
is individual and. uni .ue. OnJy in oonscious ex « ri nco are
v lues formulated, and conscious values are validated and re-
ceive clarificat ion only through historical orientation in
historical development. Natural science , on the other hand,
1. Christian Thought
. 51; the passage is moted in Eng-
lish because the lectures v ere first delivered in .n i , sh.
I he -term; n reference is, DJISU, 9.
2. EH
,,
VII, 719.
3. G3, II, 694.
sc.
(
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strives to eliminate the unique and particular; this is its
ideal. And yet, even in the most general science*?, e. ;/;.,
mechanics, it is not entirely successful, nevertheless,
science grades its subdivisions into exact and lees exact
disciplines in proportion as they approximate the ideal of
conformity to absolutely universal laws.
An adequate philosophy of history must take account of
the wealth of contingent and unique data which empirical his-
torical events present. Troeltsch appraises students of his-
tory in proportion as they account for unique events. Failure
to do this is the chief fault of the Hegelian dialectic, in
spite of its great merits. On the other hend, it wan just his
sober and realistic sense of the irrational in history v;hic.
constituted the contribution of Ritschl to historical method-
ology. The greatness of Ham ck lay in his acute awareness of
whet is living and individual in historical process."*" This,
in sort, is the problem of contingency.
IV. Contingency.
.Then we examine the question of contingency, there are
six forms in which it may be 3turfied:
1} Der Unterschied der begrifflichen Gesetze
und hotwendinkeiter von den Tatsachen, die
in ihnen verknupft , /ereinheitlicht und
1. GS, II, 694.
2. "Contingency, r* ERE, IV, . Later in German in
Z Th K
. (1910), with sli hi alterations. Reprinted in
G3, II, 769-778.
t
beharrscht warden. Diese Tatsachen selbst
sind irrational und zufalllg.l
The facts, as such, are irrational nd contingent • ;/hy this
or that should exist is incomprehensible. The truly incom-
prehensible thing, as D'Alerabert puts it, is that anything
should exist at all. Thi3 is why metaphysics reasons backfc
to the will of God; witness Augustine, the Nominalists
,
ocheliinc, and even 8* v. Hartmann.
2) Die Elemente der KontingMMI in den ratlonell-
begrifflichen isiotwendigkeiton selbst. Das
tfeitgesotz, der eltbegriff, die elteinheit
sind iiamer nur rhantasien Oder Postulate ge-
wesen ohne v/irkliche ui'weisbarkeit . 2
Particulars are explained b ihe fact that a number of lav;s
simultaneously apply to certain events. This plurality of
laws makes the i, in relati n to one another and to the ideal
of an ebsolute cosmic lav,--, contingent. Furthermore, how is
the real controlled by these lr.ws? The contingent elo ent
persi ts even though we apply the idealistic method of Kant
and Fiehte to the production and ordering of phenomena.
3) Der Begriff der Individualitat . Auch wonn
man oine allgemeine rationelie Gresetzmassig-
keit behsunten wollte, so 1st doch jedes
innerhalb dies- s Itetzw rkes sich bildende
konkrete einzolno etwas Individuelles, d.h.
stwes aus allgemeinon Osaetasxi nicht rostlos
Verstandliches, d s imner noon etwas ©us
ihnen nicht result ierendes B«sonderea und
Un^viederholbares hat.^ 3)as gilt von den
einfachsten Katurvorgangen bis zu den feinsten
seelischen Leo nskomploxen. 3
1. GG
,
II, 773. 2. Ibid., 773. 3. Ibid., 774

Even the universe as a whole is unique and individual. If we
take refuge from the contingency of the whole by en appeal to
a principle such as the theory of recurrence of cosmic cycler,
,
the latter itself becomes contingent. All radical ratio al-
ism, such as that of Spinoza, is wrecked on the f-cfc of in-
dividuation.
4) Das Problem das Neuen. $aefe den Prinzipien
jedes reinen Ratiom.li sinus koimte os in dor
>Virklichkeit nie die ii-ntstehung von etwas
Neusm geben.^
A strict rationalism would have to deny all movement and be-
coming, as did the Kleatld*. Hegel* principle of negativity
was, in reality, an attempt to rationalize the Irrational and
Contingent. Expressed in arte physical tevi a, this is the
thought, of creation and •positing* ( Setzung ) applied to the
partic .lar.
Episte) lologicaily expressed it is the idea
of a oaust lity oi1 non-eguiv- lence, &s op-
posed to the caus;- 1 equivalence with which
alone a consistent rational! an con be satis-
fied. In the causality of eaiiv: lence the
nexus signifies identity of essence, with
a mere change of form. In c usal non-
euuivalence the nexus provides a place for
the new. The endeavor to reduce all our
knowledge of causes to the former category
is Loveless, and &ccordi'i£ly an element of
contingency clings to the conception of
*« causality it-olf.^
On the principles of a purely rational system, nothing new
could ever emerge in the world of the real. This would lead
1. GS, II, 775 2. ERjS, IV, 39.

to the absurdest of materialises. But novelt/ is a fact and
must be accepted as such.
5) "Der '/.uBammenhan?; der Froiheit mit der Kontingenz. w^
The causal 'feu** 1 of the process of things, when jud- ed by
the absolute standard of ideal values, manifests itself as
something contingent. "For if these values represent the true
significance of the existent, it is impossible to see why they
should demand for their realization this particular sphere of
caus; lity.** 2 Furthermore, in relation to the ideal of uni-
vers 1 necessity, interrupted or variable laws are contingent.
Determinism, finally, is "inaner nur ein sua dem xioiri der
ebsoluten Rationalitat sich ergebendes ITola;eaxiom, aber nie-
ce
mals eine wissenschrftliche erwiesene Trtsache."
6) Die Kontin^enz in den Ideen der Freiheit.
Li©get in den Ideen der Freiheit, der
ebsoluten erto und Giilti&keiten, die
letzto erlebbare :<urzel des Gesetzes^eda.n-
kens una t -mit der unbedingten Not" endlg-
keit, so 1st doch der Inhalt de: ideellen
Gesetzgebunf- selbst nicht als etwas in
sich Notv/endiges zu orkennen. 4
Trooltsch appeals here to the exceedingly formal ;.nd content-
less ethics of Kant s an illustration of his point. Kant's
principles of ethics were divorced from concrete livii^ .
another illustration is the old hohol:stic juarrel whether
the moral comLiands are L'ood because God wills them, or
"*"Gh, II, 776, 2KR,: 9 IV, 89.
3G3, II, 776. 4Ibid., 776-777.
5Ibid., 777. This reference to Kant is not found in
the article in ERE.
oa si Jasa ofr eontiiel&i sirfT .m t .btdl*
.2H2 ni 3lo£ti& erit
whether God wills them because they are good. Thus the ques-
tion of contingency penetrates into the very deepest roots of
the thought of necessity.
Like the problem of rationalism and many Other6, contin-
gency is related to the whole field of philosophy. Its scope
is as broad si human thought and its laws, i'roeltsch summariz-
es it r^s follows:
Es ist die Frage nach dem Verhaltnis dies
Rationalen zum Irrationalen, des Tatsachlich-
en z vie Begrifflichon, der chopfung zur
Ewigkeit und Notwendigkeit der elt. Die
/^usgleiche sind unmoglich. Las wirkliche
menschliche Denlcen besteht in der fort-
wahrenden Verbindunc beider. Sin absoluter
Rational! si us mit der Konsequenz des Pan-
theismus ist ebenso unmoglich als ein abso-
luter Irrational iamus mit der IConseouenz
der . ufaliigkeit und usammenhr; ngslosi..o;keit
aller Din-re Oder das Poiytheismus. iiier
stehon Spinoza und illiam Jamsa eincnder
als Oe^enpole gegenueber. Die i.:6 *lichkeit
einer restlosen Ineinandersrbeitung beider
ist nicht gegeben. . . .Hier fuhrt jeder Ver-
such in letsflLich unheilbare .iderspriiche,
obwohl die Veroinip;un^ immer Tfiede^ von
neuem versucht werden muss.l
In the conception of contingency it would thus seem as if the
historical method v/er the contradictory of the purely scien-
tific point of view, since the latter has as it? ide?l a
closed system of nature -nd universal causality therein. But
complete contingency and naturalism are only the two necessary
poles between which thought moves. The nature of invest iga-
1. OS, II, 777-773. The favorable mention here of Wil-
liam James is significant. Troelt^oh was more and more im-
pressed by the former's radical em iricism. See below, Chap-
ter V.

tion requires it. Pure nature! science and pure historical
conceptions are on.y lo^ictil and not real extremes."*" It is
the genius of historical interpretation, however, that it r c-
ognizes the presence of contingent factors in the world end
glT«S them their rightful place with regard to history. . ith-
out contingency the historical process would be impossible and
would utterly lack meaning. Thus Jernes* s empiricism is more
nearly right than Soinoza's monism which Troeltsch definitely
re jeots.
V. Objects of the Historical Method.
The histories 1 method, then, is determined by the object
of seleoting from the flux of phenomena that which is quali-
tatively enc- uniquely individual , whether on a larger or on a
smaller scale, end of making this intelligible in its concrete
p
and sp; cific relations. In another place Troeltsch says:
Der Zweck, das ^uelitativ-lvlannigfaltige un-
te.r Gesichtspunkten individueller besonderer
Zentren zu orgsnisieren, bedin^t die ethode
de.; historischen Denkens.*
Or ago in,
Historical knowle ge selects its materials
as it may re uire - a national history, a
fttftte of civilization, e biography, an in-
tellectual development, - and seeks, by mean3
of the tmd.lv idual c, us. llty proper to history,
to make it as intelligible as if it were port
of our own experience. Even the history of
1. 03, II, 594. 2. BBS, 711, 720. 3. GS, II, 691.
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mankind, wore Ifc «lthin our rraap, v/ould b©
a freely selected and Individu- lly cone ret©
• aubjoet •>:•*, inasmuch n M;.s developnont
oould bo understood only as a p.rtlcul r con-
catenation, snd In no aonae "8 an Inst ^oe
of the opo.,- tion of universal 1 i ws • Gtttfth
purely objective erussl explanation, btHftta
in ths * upon til0 wlde8t possible ©xp©ri©nc© end the
moat methodical application of experience, .
constitutes the distinctive chF.rr.ctor pf
history is pure theoretical solonc©**
The real objecta of historical thought for 'Jroeltsch > re
the hlatorisohe ; ot rUtnten or In-llvl luoilo Vq t .'. ., z
These concopta refer to objective wholos In the historic 1
process, an examination of which constitutes the main problem
of this "is e..*t' tion, .x lea of these are "a hivisn life, a
nation, a condition of affairs, th*. spirit of ge, a
legal constitution, an eoononlcal con li tion, school of srt»"
Others listed in his Christian Thought aret the sphere of
Wsatorn culture, the aocisl class, the familyf the. free profes
a f on 1 RS ^oci ^tlons tx,e narrower circles bused on ny v.v [y v
or friendship, the communities of creed, church, nd ^©nom-
ination, and the free intellectual comunitles or schools
of thought , Those totalities c^n be conceptually combined
and r©conbined until we rchiev© th© highest conception of his-
torical totality, n'-moly, humanity* But "this conception of
ramkind as n whole, lust because mankind e nnot be brought
1. ERE, VII, 7 .
3. OS, III, 7j2.
S. ct, im-ii9.
2. Ibid*. 72C.
4* ERE, VII, 720.
to
within a single, simultaneous, and all-embracing view, con
never be more then an Incomplete work of the imasinat ion."
The characteristic difference between these Individual
Totalities and the conception of law in natural science lies
in the fact that the former are individual wholes of value
( j r. a ivi due lie e. tr. nze ) # 2
An "telle dor GesetzesbeGriffe der Natur-
wissenschaften treten die Begriffe von in-
dividuellen ertr;cr%en. Biose 'Vert; arizen
konnen au3gebreiteto Kollektiv-Ers : heinungon
sein; sie konnen in einzelnen Pcrsbnlich-
keiten kulminieren, sie konnen in ihrem
weitesten . usemmenhrr, " unc! ihrer ^echsel-
v;irkunc ^eschildert werden; sie kbnnon auf
die ksusrlen . '.usammenhange ihres ;.ufbr-:ues
hin untersucht werden. /-lies das .?ind die
Aufraben der historischen "issensclu ft , wie
sio wirklich tatic 1st, v/enn sie ihr uellen-
meteri: 1 kritisch uesichert hat unc aus ihm
die historische Yirklichkeit rekonstruicrt
.
Inner aber bleibt dabei das organisierende
Prinzip ihrer Tati ;keit die /uswchl der be-
sonderen Tatsachen unter dem Gesichtspunkt
des '"'usaramenschlusses zu individuellen ein-
mall^en -ertganzen.
Troeltsch affirms that this is a completely abjective, purely
phenonenolocic- 1 teleology, which has nothing to do with meta-
physics, but has the simple purpose of select in, out of the
infinity of facts the true historical concept. How much this
idea of historic isn implies with ," rd to eoisteuolo y and
metaphysics, we have already • dequetely indicated. At nother
place, the author himself • alts th~t the rec, r nition of the
1. ERLO
,
VII, 720.
3. Ibid., 692.
2. G3, II, 692.
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fact that the ob.1ects.of history ere Individual Totalities
shows that the problem of empirical historical rosear hi is
interrelated with the problems of a system of values, includ-
ing ethics.^" lie says:
Gegenuebor dem naturwissenschaftlichon Be-
griffe der iiaus i itat steht nicht bloss die
an ' telle er Kausalgleiehunft tretende Kau-
selun^leichunf; Oder lndlviduelle Kaus litat,
sondem noch mehr die j ufhebung der Kausali-
tat e'er ;iinzelbezu<;e in ei der Ganze
uberwaltonden Kontinuierlichkeit des irnies,
des erte -. Oder der idee, wobei dann ja auch
das Mervortreten der schopferisehen Origi-
nal! tat ftUfl einem solchen ueberhaunt ganz
umaach nlsohen usarimenhanc weni^er auf-
f licnd ist
.
The historical v/holes just indicated above are "processes,
and internally coherent congeries of phenomena," and hence the
study of them requires a third principle of reflexion, viz..,
the principle of develo ment (Lntv.icKlun^ ) . .^ntwioklun. must
not be confounded either with development in natural scienoe
or in met? physics. These distinctions must be made clear.
Troeltseh conceives scientific development to signify '"the ex-
planation of becoming by the addition of infinitesimal roechani-
oal changes. n " "The metaphysical cones tion denotes the in-
terpretation of reality as the ex ression of an absolute in-
2telli^ence which realizes itself therein." in contrast to
these,
the conception of his tori co-empirical devel-
opment denotes the progress that issues from
1. OS, III, 55-56. It is with relation to this point that
Troeltseh' s chief affinity with rticitert must be recogni zed.
2. SR^, VII, 720.
I w %• V n.
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the essential element of certain payohleal ef-
forts, the working out of the consequences
that; are latent in the earliest beginnings,
the dynamic) 1 element in psychical forces
which wo not exhausted in a single > .anifosta-
tion, but work out towards s ten ency to a
development akin to lo ict.l evolution.
Thus, e. then? is development in religious, ethloal, and
philosophical ideas; likewise in the char. otcr of individuals
end copies, as also in forms of government and economic con-
ditions, VTherever this tendency asserts itself
,
it consti-
tutes a principle that organizes the aggregates, and moves
them onward from within— a principle that absorbs and elabo-
rates ths various causes, r^nd supplies their; with 8 focus of
attraction or repulsion.
Dieser Begriff dor Bntwlokltfflg senile :st ds-
bei vollkomraen den kausa Ion usamoenkaBg der
Krelgnisss ein, nur dass ihm der Aufweifl des
Kausalausemmenjaangs bloss tliittel zur Her-
3tellun" histori acher (kmzen und nieinls
elbstzweok 1st, und dass er den Kausalzu-
s SBenhang zwischon zwei in iividuellen ICr-
tt hrungatatsachen mit .Lucksicht attf die Be-
sonderheit ausschie3scnden naturwissen-
scheft lichen Leusslbegriffes bilden wird. 2
One of the main problems of this dissertation will be to
clarify rnu criticise the principle of development. Having
introduced it bar©, vie loavs it, to diccuss it fully below.
In the problem of historical development the concept of
time is important. As used in the study of historical events,
it assumes quite ei different fom from its use in the natural
sciences. A recognition of the tremen oua disparity between
1. VII, 720 2. Go, II, 693.

time in science, i.e., physical time, and concrete duration in
history, shows a^ain the- deep cleft -.vhich exists between physi-
cal causation .nd historical c usality. Troeit oh says:
In dem Unterschied der enronometrischen .eit
und der koncreten Dauer ist der tiefste Ge-
f5©n3atz gegen die mathemaoiache-meoh; nlsche
Naturwissenscnaft erreicht.-*-
On the question of time Troeltsch rejects the position of
Kantian idealists. Rickert, for whom he holds high reg: rd,
seemed (as we have shown ebove .n page j31p to have neglected
this essential point, which invalidated much of his philosophy
of history. Kant*s view of time was that of physical time*
This was a weakness. The result was mere formal is i. The same
can be charged of Rickert, who mekes of history "ein blosses
3ystem logischer Geltungen .
"
Wir fallen in den volligen Vernunftrational-
ismus und Anti-historismus Kant a zuriick und
gewinnen nicht einmal mehr die etwas naiven
7ermittelun&en, die Kant zFfischen hisoorisch-
en antagonist ist ischer Untwicklunc und lieraus-
arbeitun^ oer Vernunft auc ihr gofanden hatte.
There are several important differences between the two
conceptions of time. Physical time is dependent on space and
motion in space and thus connected with physical cause, where-
as historical or concret . time is the time of the inner sense
( inneren Sinnes ) and of memory, which controls spatial and un-
spati 1 .nts and pl-ces them in the service of the present
or the future. "The present always c&r ies past and future
1. Go, III, 61. 2. Ibid., 154.
3. Ibid., 56-57. For an illuminating discussion of the
problem of time with a criticism of physical time, see E. S.
Brightman, nA Temporalist View of God," Jour. Bel .. 12 (1932),
544-555.
adt "to acUsvoatb saJtJenlmuXXi ae -iot .V3-dS ,.bitfl .5
,<«wi) SI ,.A«g .-a,o, ",6c, "to we« JeiX^.cnme. a .""g^^
within itself in productive fashion. wX Secondly, physical time
zerle t die J eit in genau begrenzte ilinzel-
absc 1 nitte und in diesen Abschnitten stehende
Ein^elvorgenge, was nur durch iteduktion der
..©it auT raumliche Vorg since in letzter Linie
moglich ist. 2
In contradistinction to this, historical time is like river
( Fluss ) in which nothing is ~et off or out up into units, but
everything flows into everything else. Past an future are
interpenetrating. Measurement of this tirie is impossible, #e
can have only
Zasuren, die znehr Oder minder willldirlich
nach Sinneszuseiaaenhe-.^en und grossen Sinn-
wandlungen eingelegt werden.3
The chronolo Leal redaction of these processes to sun-time is
only a very crude end external means of orientation, h ich has
nothing to do with the inner division of itself, i.e., with
its inner slowness or acceleration. We Shell see la!;er how
significant this psychological conception of time is for the
principle of historical development, for concrete dur ti n
distinguishes the latter from the ides of progress and from
the idea of natur 1 evolution.
Troeltseh considers concrete duration the most signifi-
cant contribution of Berg3on.
Das wichstigste aber 1st die mit dem Grund-
gedanken eng zuseramenhangenrie
,
ja fast iden-
tische i^tdecKung des Unterschiedes von Zeit
und D-uer, von chronomotrisch-matheiiatischer
und his torisoher
,
erlebter, gowirkter und
1. Lyman, ''Troeltsch* s Philosophy of Iiietory," nil. Rev .
41 (1932), 451. 2. GB
,
III, 56. 3. Ibid., 642-643.
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gefuhlter eit, von homop-enern ;.;edi ,m zoit-
llohe La&enordnue una inhultlich hetero-
gener, frei verbiiidendee und ve -schmelzen-
aer, schaffender unO sinkender Kontinuitat
des Lebens.^
Vvith this consideration of time we have oorae to the close of
our presentation of Troeltsnh's principles of historiography.
Troeltsch thought he presented some of these principles with-
out any necessary reference to iaetepnysical discussions of
the sane. He did not, however, avoid the fundamental problems
of epistemology, logic, and ethics. Historical causation as a
purely empirical and theoretical scionce not only has imnlica-
tions of a philosophical nature, but the clarification of the
idea of cause in history in contradistinction to physical
cause involves philosophy.
71. Criticise of Troeltsch.
TroeltSen's discussion of time is empirical and psycho-
logical. For the purposes of hi* work this may be adequate.
However, he se ;ms to regard his view of time as very si- ilar
to Hergson's, if not identical with it. Bergson's conception
of time is not only psychological bub metaphysical. The
dur6e reolle of L f ffvol ;tio Cr6atrice is a metaphysic cl doc-
trine which rule., out as an abstraction the vies,, of time as
developed in physical science. Troeltsch, on the other hend,£
nowhere clearly mckes so positive a statement, but ellows the
1. GS, III, 64P-643.
2« See above page 43.
J
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two concept ions of tine to continue peaceably in separate
realms. Though protesting against the application of physical
or spatial time to history, he does not attack the former as
an abstr ctio.. from the real nature of the world, i'inally,
Troeltsch*s vie.; of time has not ade^u.-.t uisiin, :uisued psy-
chological from metaphysical time. If he wishes his histori-
ography to be a purely empirical science, it is difficult to
understand how he can so easily and innocently accept Bergson's
metaphysical duration.
The same kind of c iticisn may be maae of Troeltsch's
whole treatment of causality, iie uses the term physical cuse
in the Nineteenth Century meaning of universal necessary con-
nection in a closed system of nature. He does not protest
against it o use in natural science. Here, apparently, it may
be use d without interference. The only objection is that one
cannot ap ly it to the facts of history. As i result there is
a sharp cleavage between science with its conception of law
and history with itr idea of development. Troelt3ch tries to
bridge this gap by an appeal to contingency. Lyman writes,
The necessity for compounding the idea of
lav/ With the ide?j of contingency makes room
for in d ivi dual it,/ and creativone3s in the
historical process, for the role of will as
underlying all tne a prtOfIs of the several
sciences, for the accidental in hi story
which is often introduced by physical causes,
and for the polarity belonging to historical
Inquiry by reason of its joint 2uest for
the factual and the meaningful. 1
!• Phil, ftev .. 41 (193?), 453.
(
Nevertheless, the two spheres ore not encompassed adequately
by a rational whole vbi*h unifies them. The breach between
history and science i3 not closed again.
Had Troelts^h made use of the new conceptions of cause in
the natur; 1 scienoea, which even in his day were being taught,
he might have had a iejs rigid conception of the spnere of
science. Contingency would have bean recognized as operating
even in the field of physios* But Trooltsch's viev/ of cause
is still narrowly Kantian in this field and narrowly determin-
istic. The writings of current scientists are different in
their points of view, idlington says,
It is a consequence of the advent of the
quantum theory that physic 3 is no longer
pled, ea to c scheme ox deterministic law .
Determinism has dropped out altogether in
the latest formula t i . nr. of theoretical
physics and it is at least open to doubt
whether it will ever be brought bock.-*-
further on he says:
The future is a combination of the causal
influences of the past together with unpre-
dictable elements - unpredictable not merely
because it is imprac icable to obtain the
data of prediction, but because no data
connect d causally with our experience exist.
....Those who maintain a deterministic
theory of mental activity must do so as the
outcome of their study of the mind itself
an,; not with the idea; that they are thereby
making it more conformable .vith our experi-
mental knowledge of the laws of inorganic
n ture. 2
In this conneetio it will not be out of place to develon two
1. The Mature of the Piiysical orid
. p. 294.
2. Ibid. , 294-295.
1.
»
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further propositions regar in.; physic; 1 cause:
In recent times some of the greatest triumphs
o: physical prediction have been furnished by
admittedly statistical laws which do not rest
on a bacla of causality. Moreover the great
laws hitherto accepted as causal appear on
minuter examination to be of statistical
character.
.Vhethor or not there is a causal scheme at
the base of atomic phenomena, modem atomic
theory is not now attempting to find it; and
it is aakiag rapid progrec because it no
longer sets this up as practical aim. tie
are in the position of holding an episte :o-
logical theory of nature 1 knowledge which
does not correspond to the actual aim of cur-
renc scientific invest igat ion.
Add to this the positive principle of Indeterminacy, 2 and the
epi-temolo^icel views of classical physics are doomed. A con-
temporary philosopher like -.hitehead rejects the whole Kantion
approach, even to science, and presents a view -vhich is thor-
oudhly temporalistic. Such a metaphysics of science avoids
the dualism inherent in Troeltoch's scheme. The fundamental
problem is one of time. If Trovlt sch had, like ..le.render
,
» 4Considered the universe to be through and through ni- tory,
the crude dualism of his treatment might have been avoided.
We can at least affirm that in modern scientific thou 'lit it is
!• The Nature of tite Physic? ! n'orld . £93-299.
2. Ibid., 220.
3. Science ana the i.odern .'.grid , ch. IX. Cf. E. S.
Brightman,' "A Tempore list View of f-oc, " cited above.
4. Cf. J. Alexander Gunn, The Problem of Time . 257.
I
not necessary to draw the 3harp lines of distinction which
Troeltsch has drawn between physics and history. With the
contingency of the physical world generally recognized by
scientists, the f i ots of historical development are more el
home than under the rigidity of the systems of the past cen-
tury which Troeltsch wao combatting .^froeltsch professed a teia-
poralistic metaphysics, but he did not show how physical time
was related to it.
At the beginning of this chcpter we indicated thr. :
Troeltsch T s historiography would serve to introduce his phi-
losophy of history. He constantly merges his empirical his-
toriography with its philosophical presuppositio s. There is
a significant passage in his essay on BarnaCk*8 Dgj v/esen
des Christentums in which he says,
Geschichte^ und GeechichtcphiloeOphis lassen
sich nur kunstlich und methodisch scheiden;
in^ tlfahrheit steckt schon in der ersterer. ein
Stuck des letzteren.l
The chief problems of philosophy of history emerge in the de-
termination of historical causation. The two concepts about
which all the other problems revolve are Individual Totalities
and the idea of development. ithin the historical totality
is constructed a system of Ti lues which must be judged by an
ide-1 system of ve.lues. It is the function of ethics to con-
struct such a system. This problem becomes extreirQjr complicat-
ed because concrete ethical values are so la cely dependent
on history. s
1. OS, II, 451. 2. ERE, VII, 722.
t
Another problem is the.t of metaphysical or ethical de-
velopment .
This must he carefully distinguished from
the concept iun of historical development in
the ompirical sense, and is not to be demon-
strated in terns of the latter. The empiri-
cal conception of historical development
shows only partial, or progressive and re- •
gressive development 9 , out not the adv. nee
of mankind as a whole towards e find and
universal/end. It certainly exhibits the
forma tio of et! jc 1 aggret t: tes , but not
their synthesis in a uniform and progressive
continuity ... ,In reality, the conception of
ethical development is a postulate of faith.
A third problem has to do with Individuation , This refers
to the approximation which any group or any individual makes
to the Ideal system of v lues. Individuation Is closely re-
lated to the problem of a cultural synthesis which we shall
discuss at length below, being but another form of the problem
with which Tro. ltsch wrestled during his whole career, "das
Ve/haltnis zv7ischen der en41osen Bewe^theit des ge-;chicht-
lichen Lebensstromes und dem Bedurfnis des menschlichen 'leistes,
inn durch feste Hornsea zu bep;renzen und zu gestalten. nS These
problems form the •.onorul outline for the remainder of this
disserts lion: the nature of Individual-Totalities, the mean-
ing of Development, and the problem of a Cultural Synthesis.
To the first of th se we now address ourselves.
1. EBiii, VII, 7^2.
2. DBSU , 1.
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The logic of history is 01 this kind. It consists of definite
logical assumptions, of principles of selection and construc-
tion, which are used at first unconsciously in the understand-
ing and criticism of experience. Tnese principles can be dis-
tinguished as the mind interacts with its object, and tney re-
quire a logical formulation. ?i
The fundamental category of the logic of nistory is, ac-
cordingly, "die Kategorie der indiviaueilen Totali tat . " . To
describe what is involved in this category is the task of this
chapter. There is no simple element analogous to the atoms or
centers of energy of natural science in tne science of history.
On the contrary there are many wholes or "zusammengesetzte
Grttssen, in denen eine Mile psycnischer xSlementarvorgange sant
gewi3sen Haturbedingungen schon jedesmal zusammengeballt ist zu
einer Lebenseinneit oder Totalitftt .
"
3
The forces operative in these totalities are thus, to a
large extent, psychical; nevertheless, the totality is not sim-
ply a psychologic 1 concept, but also logical. These logical
wholes are i.iore than mere individuals or persons". A careful
analysis of history shows that persons Fast be understood in the
setting of larger units, like the family, the sex, the class,
the folk, the conditions of the times, and the spiritual situa-
_______
2. Ibid., 32.
3. Ibid., 32-33. There is a close relationship „ere to
Ge^talt psychology
.
One might even call Troeltoch's principle
of Individual Totalities, the principle of Historical Postal ten.
S3
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The Mature of Individual Totalities
In the previous chapter we raised certain problems which we
must now investigate. The chief burden of that chapter was to
show the sharp differences existing between the assumptions and
methods of natural science and those of historical science. On
the one hand is the "nathedat i sch-mecaan i scn-phy a ikal i scn-che
-
miache Theorie der reinen Katurwissenschaft , on tne other "die
reine Historie als Srfor^chung und Daxstellung der seelischen
Bewegungen, SchOpfun^en, und Zusa- xaenn&nge des Menschentuns . nl
Troeltsch holds that the presuppositions and method of histor-
ical science demand a ty^e oi lo^ic which is different from
that assumed in natural science. The former he calls meta-
logic. 2 Uetalogic arises out of the necessity of thought to ac-
commodate itself to the particular subject matter of the Keal-
wi3senscnal ten in which it enja^es . The characteristic feature
of metalogic is:
die Lehre von der jedesmal auf den grossen
Hauptgebieten verscniedenen Art der Abstrac-
tion, die natur^eiilou von dem Stoffe abh&ngt
,
auf de;i sich die iirkenntais richtet, and von
dem besonderen Erhenntniszweck, der sich mit
tfe; der Art des ctofies selbst instinktiv dar-
bietet, mit dessen Gestaltun^; durcn eine aus
dem Stofi sclber wirliende Hotweiidi^heit ver-
buhden tflt.
1. GS, III, 29.
2. The following is only a preliminary definition of
metalogic. 5"or a fuller discussion see below Ch. IV".
4I
tion of the period. Consequently, the real objects of re-
search are:
die Kollektiv-Individualit&ten, VOlker, .
Staaten, Klassen, Stande, Kulturzeitalter
,
Kulturtendenzen
,
Religionsgemeinschaften,
Vorgangskomplexe aller Art wie Krie,,;e,
Revolutionen us'. 1
In thus ruling out mere individual persons as the objects of
his research he affirms his agreement on this point with
pHarnack.
The periphery, or limit, of 3uch a totality is hard to
determine, and Troeltsch remains very vague in treating it.
He simply says that It is a matter of intuition and a matter
"des historischen Taktes."^
Sowohl die Abgrerizung bestimmter Zeit-
strecken Oder Perioden wie die Umsciirei-
bung eines gegenstandlichen Keises sind
insofern 'subjektiv' .3
Nevertheless, says the author, the research student must be
certain that he has a totality which lie has not superimposed
upon his material, but which grows out of the data of history
itself. How this whole obtains or possesses any objectivity
of its own is a prcb-.am we shall discuss below. It suffices
for the historian, "wenn er dea von ihm herausgescimittenen
(Segenstand als einen immer noch anschauliciien Zusaomenhang zu
sehen veriaag. Sucn an object must be definable, and assimi
lable to or classified under other Individual Totalities.
I! GS, III, 33.
2. Ibid. , 33 n.
3. Ibid., 34.
4. Loc. cit.
£3
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The initial act of judging is a logical intuition. This
act of intuition is an hypothesis which must be tested "by the
sura total of causal relations which the objects manifest, both
internally and externally. After the larger totalities have
been proved, the smaller units can be examined and explained.
The larger whole comes logically first, though the size of an
Individual Totality is not its criterion.
That the representative and significant qualities of an
epoch of history are not compounded from simple elements, be
they atoms or human beings even, but consist in significant
attributes of t^e whole whose bases are rooted in tne sociolog-
ical structure of the tines, is a principle -.vh.i.ch \:c 0:0 to
Hegel. In criticizing the philosophy of history before Hegel,
Horkheimer, a contemporary German philosopher, writes:
Machiavellis Fehler besteht nicht schlechtnin
in der Behauptung von Gleichf orv.ig. eiten ira
Character der geschichtlich aufge tretenen
Menschen, sondern in dem Absehen von den ge-
sellschaftlichen Bedinguagen far die Erhaltung
Oder Veranderung psychischer Eigenschaften.
Kit Ausnahme von Hegel hat kaum ein Philosoph
der neueren Zeit den Irrtuii Kachiavellis ver-
mieden.
Hegel entire philosophy follo?/s the pattern of understanding
things by seeing their relations to, or their place in, the
wholes to which they belong. We can know nothing absolutely
unless we know the Absolute. The real is rational and ration-
ality consists in complete relatedness. Hegel 1 b philosophy of
1. For a criticism of intuition, see below Chapter V.
2. GS, III, 34.
5. ABG, 33.
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history repudiates every atomistic construction or interprets^
tion of society. The principle of historical dialectic func-
tions not among mere personal monads which are completely im-
pervious to each other, but among nations and states and peo-
ples, all of which are manifestations of the Objective Spirit
By Objective Spirit Hegel meant, says Windelband', "the
active and influential living body of individuals, which is n<
created by these, but rather forms the source from which they
proceed as regards their spiritual life." 1 The same interpre-
tation is given by Lasson. 2 Reason Kegel called substance.
Die Substanz ist sie, ntnlioh das, wodurch
H*«el«« gi«*"i worin alls Wirklichkeit ihr Sein und
Bestehen hat.*5
In the EncYclop&die he says that the Objective Spirit is the
Absolute Idea, but only as it has being an sich . 4
Aside from abstract right and morality, the fundamental
unity or totality within the Objective Spirit is the family.
5
A more nearly concrete expression of this substance is civil
society. 6 Above both family and civil society is the state. 7
Thus, not the individual person, but the state is the real.
Above the state there is no higher form, no praetor, as Hegel
expresses it,* save the process of history and its develop-
1. Windelband
,
HOP, 513.
2. "Sinleitung," GPR
, XVI.
3. VPG, 42.
4. #483.
5. Ibid., #518.
6. Ibid., ^523.
7. #535.
8. GPR, #333,
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ment. Ificolai Haxtuann Bays of Hegel:
Man darf von Hegel sogen, dasa er der JSnt-
decker des objektiven Geistes ist. Gerade
den ueberindividuellen, geschiciitiich le-
benden Geist meinte er, und fur lhn pragte
ex dieaen Terminus. Auf ihn bezog er das
ge s chi chtliche Gescliehen, in ihm erblickte
er den eigentlichen Gescnichtstrager , den
Schflpfer von Recht und Moral, Gemein-
pexev ech&ftsorgani#atiou and ataat, Bildung,
Zivili«ation und Kultur. Denn diese Ge-
bilde sind es, die Gescnichte haben. Oa-
mit hat er der Philosophic des Geistes die
Wege gewiesen.
Seine Bntdeckung war, dass er den lebenden
Geist in grossen an seinen GrundphAnomenen
auf alien Geistesgebieten erstmalig philo-
sopnisch fasste und sein Eigenleben neben
den lebenden Geist in kleinen, oder auch
ueber ihn aufzeigte.
Hegel's greatness lies partially at least in his giving wholes
like states, a significant place in the philosophy of history.
Troeltsch concedes this contribution. What he criticizes in
Hegel, however, is the regimentation of all historical facts
into a rational system,"^ wherein human beings appear as mere
marionettes under the overpowering might and progress of the
state
.
4
Hegel's predominant interest in the state and in the peo-
ple (Volk ) displays an Eighteenth Century influence in his
thought. But other Collective Totalities alongside of the
state, subordinate to it, or including it and the people are
necessary. Larger cultural unities than mere states assuredly
T. GPR, #340.
2. PGS, 170.
3. GS, III, 273.
4. Ibid., 275.
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also exist and must be recognized in historical science.
Today there is a great deal of interest in the nature of
social groups taken as wholes. MacDougall ' s The Group Mind
presents important psychological data on the problem. Laski
in The Foundati ons of Sovereignty discusses the problem of the
personality of such associations as corporations. He finds
them essentially impersonal so far as a sense of responsibility
goes. Durkheim calls society a person. But Perry, on the con-
trary, denies that society can be conceived of as a personal-
ity.^ Baldwin and Royce also recognize the significance of
wholes in society. With such interest apparent on this sub-
ject, Troeltsch's treatment assumes especial significance be-
cause of his positive contributions.
I. Originality, !Jr sprting1 i chJ ce it
.
The intuitively grasped Individual Totalities display
qualifies which require furtner elucidation. The first of
these Troeltsch calls Urspr ttn t; ;1 i chke i t und Einmal igke i
t
. One
cannot deduce or explain this principle logically, but it re-
fers to something which one understands with sympathetic intui-
tion.
Das was man in der Historic ableiten und
erklaren nennt, ist nur ein Einfflhlen in
den Terdegang, bei dem man verstehen kann,
wie, die Uranlage und Umetftnde einnal ge-
setzt, sich in der "Fechselwirkung mit Um-
gebung und Bedingungen alleo dieses Werden
nachempfinden Iftsst. Aber in allem steckt
doch eine schlechthin gegebene ursprungliche
T. CrS, III, 36.
2. "Is Society a Person," Jour. Phil ., 21 (1924) 37-91.
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Setzung, exne qualitative iSinneitlicnkeit
und Bcsonderheit , die xaan als Schicksal,
Prftdestination, Schflpfung Oder sonstwie
bezeichnen kann, die aber "bei alledem nur
die logische Kategorie der nun einrnal be- .
stehenden tats&chlichen Gesetztheit be-
deutet
.
Under this concept come all those peculiar traits of nations
and epochs which cannot be deduced, and which the historian
must simply accept. The unique qualities of the Jewish people,
e. g. , of Hellenism, of German culture are of this nature. All
of the religious, scientific, and artistic events and achieve-
ments of these peoples follow definite psychological laws, but
the mere statement and relationships of these laws do not ex-
plain the matter in hand. Troeltsch says:
Alle jene Charaktere setzen sich aus aber-
tausend Einzelvorgangen susammen, sind
aber aus der Zusamiiensetzung nicht abzu-
leiten, da in jenen I'Jinzelvorg&ngern selbst
schon jenes Besondere steckt und aus dem,
was in ihnen sciion steckt, das Oanze erst
zusammenr innt
.
There is nothing mystical about this concept of originality,
but it refers to something given. Instances foam the history
of religion illustrate what is meant. The whole 01 Troeltsch'
s
Soziallehren shows , he says
,
dass alles spezifiscu Religiflse und vor
allem die grossen Knotenpunkte religiOaex
Sntwicklungen eine selbstandige Aeusserung
des religiflsen Lebens sind. Jesus, Paulus,
0rigene3, August in, der hi. Thomas, der hi.
Franz, der hi. Bonaventure, Lutner, Calvin,
sie kOnnen in ihrem 5Tihlen und Denken nicht
1. GS, III, 38.
2. Ibid. , 33-39.
I
aus Kl&ssenkampfen unci ookonomischen Inte-
ressen hergeleitet werdeii. 1
They are einnali^ arid ur3urttn/:lich . The uniqueness of the
movements in history to which tney belonged and which they led
must be recall ised as something given*
II. Representation, Vertretong .
The second quality is that of Yertretun^ or representation.
The characteristics which an Historical whole possess ore each
a representation of an infinite number of particulars which are
united in this one concept. Without such representation any
science of historical events would be impossible.
Should one describe Caesar's politics as a democratically
based military dictatorship which tends to be an oriental the-
ocracy, then one is not using: mere historical classifications
nor concepts of law. What one is using ere Ver trctun , -;sbear i ife
which arouse thousands of details in the imagination and which
have meaning only in these details. 2 The Vertr etunr.sbe^r i ffe
select the essential characteristics of a whole find present
tneiti symbolically to the reader, wno fills in the details h.t:.-
self. Tne sy.oolical and representative function of tne con-
ceptualized Individual Totalities cannot be overlooked. More-
over, tnese representations cannot be inaccurate summaries of
causal relations, but must be pounded in the historical nove-
r.eiit itself. The function of Vertretun^sbe/^rlffe ic to make
T. 03, I, 975.
2. ©ft. III, 40.
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clear "cine uebergreifende, ueberindividuelle Zusam^enfassung
und Triebkraft der histor ischen Tendenzen. 1,1 Thus, historical
expositions are to a large extent symbolical, and hence do not
merely copy the causal successions of events. To limit the ex-
position to causal connections would result in the most fan-
tastic abstractions imaginable. It is for this reason' that in
addition to detailed Dinzeldarstellun^en there must "be repre-
sentative Zusammenfassunken .
Accurate Yer tr e tungsbesr iff
e
are, accordingly, among the
chief problems of a philosophy of history. Troeltsch says by
way of illustration:
Die Ge3amtgeschichte der Reformation und
lokale und biographische Einzelforschung
a. B. unterscheiden sich gerade durcn Ueber-
wiegen des kausalen ^lementes in den letz-
teren und des symbolischen in den ersteren.
Berflhmte Darstellungen wie Hankes Spochen
und Guizots Considerations oder Harnack 1 s
Wesen des Chri stentums und Burkhardts Welt -
^eschicntl i che Betrachtungen Bind Verket-
"
iungen von Symbolen, sind das Sxtrakt un-
zahlicher Einzelunter BUGhungen und be-
dftrfen der Prttfung an weiteren solchen.
The principle of representation is not peculiarly Troeltsch'
s
except insofar as it has historical application; for it is a
function of all logic and of all thought. Every concept is a
representative of the particular or groups of particulars to
which it refers. The idea of wholeness is implicit in every
logical concept whatever. Troeltsch has simply brought out its
1. GS, III, 41.
2. Ibid. , 41-42.

significance for the logic of historical method. It is a
weakness of empiricists , like Hume and Mill, that they do not
sufficiently recognize the representative function. of logical
conceptions. Mill's scientific ideal was an aggrenation co;.-
pounded out of inductive laws and a causal series constructed
out of the transformations of the elements within thi3 aggre-
gate.^ Fill's "belief that inference could proceed without
universals was based on an atomistic association-psychology.
On his "basis the really unique and creative qualities of his-
tory which emerge in Individual Totalities are unexplainable
.
However, all thinking whatsoever is dependent on representa-
tion and meaning.
In contradistinction to Mill we find in Hegel* s philoso-
phy of history a positive treatment of representation. 7or
him, great men and all institutions are representatives of
the Objective Spirit which works through them. Representation
here is not only logical but also metaphysical. It is by vir-
tue of universal reason operating in each individual person
and in the customs and institutions of society that history
proceeds. Hegel's treatment of great men demonstrates the
point
:
Dies Allgemeine ist ein Moment der produzier-
enden Idee, ein Moment der nach sich selbst
strebenden und treibenden "Tahrheit. Die ge-
schichtlichen Menscnen, die we It -h i s t or i sc nen
1. I>Tote that the essay wnich we are reviewing is called
"Die formale Gescnichtslogik.
"
2. CJS, III, 419; cf. below Chapter IV on Positivism.
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Individuen sind diejenigen, in dexen Zweckeu
ein solches Allgcmeine liegt.
Dies sind die grossen Menschen in der Ge-
Moreover schichte, der en eigene particulars Zveckf
das Substantielle enthalten, welches Wills
des ".Yeltgeistes ist. *
a$>
Deshalb folgen die anderen diesen Seelen-
ftlhrern, denn sie ftthlen die unwidexs&eh- |yliche Gewalt ihres eignen inneren Goistes,
do not flxiit'i A*3*!?* entgegentritt .7 const* • noes on
Troeitsch's conception of representation is not exactly
Hegel's. The metaphysical aspect of reason is laching in
Troeltsch. The latter uses Vertretun£ simply in a logical
sense and limits it to the internal structure of the totality.
He does not attempt to transcend the epistemology of history.
Tnere is no absolute dialectic or Idee which the totality
represents. We shall see that this failure to transcend the
ew-iricai historical totality constitutes one oi the chief
problem* in Xrocltsch's philosophy of history*5»e*Yt ei
r^Xal?^* Unity of leaning and Value, 7ext- odex Sinneinheit
The representative and symbolic function of an Individual
Totality points to a 7/ort- ouex Cinuei.hfei
t
. The historical
wholes are determined by an immanent value or meaning ..hich
iniieres in the whole.
Term VOlker, Staaten, Kulturkreise haupt-
aachlich sich als solche Totalitaten dar-
stellen, so liegt die Einheii in der.: rela-
tiv einheitlichen Sinn oder \7ert, den sie
fftr ihr eigeues 3ewusstseir* vor sich selber
haben und den sie in immer neuen Anlaufen
1. VTG, 66-67
2. See below Chapter V.
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und Zusammenhangen instinktiv oder bewusst
darzustellen streben.
Moreover, the continuity which an Individual Totality exhibits
in its development in time expresses itself in values. These
unities of meaning and value are not rigid, however, and they
do not exist in isolation. They exert constant influences on
other wholes and out of such interactions proceed some of the
most significant developments of nations and cultures. Such
interactions took place between the Greek and oriental worlds,
between the Germans and the Ancients, between tne Middle Ages
and Islam.
Within the larger totalities there are smaller units of
value and meaning. When these are integrated into the whole,
they give birth to a meaning of the larger unity which is
more than a mere aggregate of its parts. We observe such a
relationship when we study Christianity, as we shall see be-
low. In order for the smaller units to retain their individu-
al values in the whole, however, these single meanings must
participate in the meaning of the whole. There must be a
meaningful unity of development of mankind in order for in-
dividual value to be preserved. 2
Die Einzelsinne kflnnen bei ihrer vOlligen
VerflfJssung in das Ganze selber Sinn nur
sein und ]Dleiben, wenn es auch einen Sinn
des Ganzen, eine sinnvolle Sntwicklungsein-
heit der Menschen gibt.
1. GS, III, 71.
2. Ibid., 72.
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This passage is quite Hegelian. Troeltsch adds that every
historical period must view the meaning of the whole of his-
) tory as a whole even if one does not share Hegel's conviction
of having perceived M den Geist der L'enschheit als werdende
Sinneinheit
.
nl But Hegel's intellectualism is a constant
source of disagreement for Troeltsch.
Hegel hatte recht, diese "Vollendetheit zu be-
haupten, wenn er die Geschichte konstruieren
wollte; aber er hatte freilich unrecht dtamit,
dass er sie ueberhaupt konstruieren wollte.
2
The Wert- oder Sinneiniieit is thus not a construction of
the philosopher, hut must "be found in the objects of histor-
ical inquiry. Finding these units depends "auf unserer ganz
autonomen Fahigkeit zur JSrfassung verschiedenster Sinn- und
WertnBglichkeiten. "3 The word Sinn means not necessarily a
conscious purposing, but may mean a "noch vflllig unbewusster
Trieb- und Bedeutungszusammennang. Es (Sinn) ist zugleich
rein formal verstanden und braucht nicht jedesmal einen posi-
tiven Sinn und ¥ert zu bedeuten
.
no If, for example, we examine
the Marxian economic interpretation of history, the unity of
meaning in each stage of the dialectic is not necessarily an
object of conscious purpose for the individuals involved. And
yet, the Sinnzuaammenhang must be recognized. 4 Thus unity of
meaning and value may be found in many places; in a period of
t
1. GS, III, 73.
2. Ibid., 74-75.
3. Ibid. , 42.
4. Ibid., 43; cf. K. Marx, Das 31end der Fhilosophie
(SP) , S. 91.
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stagnation, in a society that is dancing on a volcano, or in
a band of robber s. 1
The function of meaning and value, we noted in. Chapter
One, constitutes one of the chief differences between histor-
ical and scientific method. Thus it is significant, says
Troeltsch, that Marx, e. g. , used the dialectic rather than
the purely causal principle in interpreting history. I'eaning
and value resist a merely mathematical and mechanical analysis
In its concreteness (konkrete Anschaulichkeit ) the Individual
Totality remains a unity of meaning in and for itself, which
no mathematical analysis can destroy. This is all the more so
because the unity of meaning and value is not dependent on any
mere subjective interests.
In order to ^et a more concrete understanding of the prob
lem involved here let us look at the history of Christianity
from the standpoint of this conception. Chr istianity did not
arise as a mere social function of particular §1lifta interests.
On the contrary, its meaning must be understood against the
background of the religious history of Jesus' time.^ The Sinn-
einheit of social institutions in that period does not explain
Christianity. The latter must be understood in terms of it-
self. Jesus' preaching, says Troeltsch, was a purely relig-
ious message and proceeded from his conception o: God and His
will for roan. The kernel of Jesus' message was as follows:
GS, III, 43; cf. K. Marx, Das Dlend der Philosophic
(BP) , S. 91.
2. GS, I, 25.

Aus alien Unsicherheiten der Ueberlieferung
lit der Orundg;edanke der Predict Jesu doch
einfach zu erkennen. 2s handelt sich urn die
ArJtttndigun-; der grcssen Entscheidung , des
Koinmens des Gottesreiches als des Inbcgrif-
fee der vollendeten Go ttesherrschaft , wo der
'Tille Gottes auf Xrden gescnieht, wie jetzt
Itt tfimmel, ohne Staide , ohne Leid und Scht;erzen,
und wo' die wahren ^erte der Gesinnung und
des reinen \7illens leuchten werden in der .
ihnen zukommenden Herrlichkeit
Here tnen v/as a Sinneinheit associated with a great personal-
ity. The gospel did not remain isolated, however, "but inter-
mingled with contemporary life. In so doing it proceeded
along a path of development by virtue of a dialectic all its
own. Consequently, it actSd upon and received influences
from a myriad of other Sinneinneiten . Troeltscn's masterpiece,
Die Soziallenren der christlichen Kircnen und Grup>-.en , traces
the development of the social conceptions within this great
historical totality. The sociological effects of Jesus * gos-
pel took three main forms, the church, the sects, and mysti-
cism. Baqh of these may "be regarded as smaller historical to-
talities within the Individual Totality known as Christianity.
In all three forms there is a common immanent Christian Sinn-
ginheit . Thus the church is an institution concerned chiefly
with grace and salvation and in this way Ccirries on .Tesus*
work of redemption. The church is able to receive the masses,
and to adjust itself to tne world because it can ignore the
need for subjective holiness, to a certain extent, for the sake
Tit
of the objective treasures of grace and redemption. x
The sects were voluntary bodies, composed of strict and
austere Christian believers who were bound to eacn other by
the fact that all had experienced 'the new birth 1 . These be-
lievers are limited to small groups, they emphasize the law
rather than grace, and live apart from the world. In varying
degrees within their own circle they set up the Christian
order, based on love. They live in preparation for and ex-
pectation of the coming Kingdom of Ciod. 1
The mystics transformed the world of ideas which aad
hardened into formal worship and doctrine and stressed a pure-
ly inward and personal experience. The basis of mystical
groups was purely personal, with no permanent form. Thus
mysticism tended to weaken the significance of forms of wor-
ship, doctrine, and the historical element .*
These three forms of t;ie christliohe Religiosity show
how smaller units of meaning and value can participate in the
meaning Of a larger whole. The above discussion uas also
shown how important meaning and value are for the understand-
ing of an Individual Totality. But the conception of immanent
meaning and value within an historical object is significant
from another standpoint, via., in comparing different cultures
and religions. Troeltsch holds that each religious development
T. GS, I, 967; ci . Eng. tr.
,
II, 993.
i
must be understood in and through itself,
M aus seinem eigenen
urafassenden schOpferischen und originalen Grundantrieb. " In
general, however, this principle is not observed. Consequent
ly students of comparative religion tend to fall into three
grea-t fallacies:
(1) dass sich das absolute Wertsystem aus
einzelnen Vernunftwerten von getrennt dar-
stellbarer Entv/icklungsgescnicnte zusam-
mensetze
;
(2) dass jeder einzelne Wert fur die geeamte
lich «& de* Mensohheit gelte und daher in seiner raensch-
lichen (lesamtentwicklung von Botokuden und
Kamtschadalen bis zum Paxiser oder Berliner
durch verfolgt v/erden kOnne und nttsse;
(3) dass jede solche Gesamtentwicklung ein
Gesetz ihrer Stufeniolge besitze, aus dem
die fur uns heute geltende Sntwicklungstendenz
der (Jegenwart erst erschlossen und damit diese
to&alttoe* selber geleitet werden k8n:,e. 2
The science of history is not ft comparative discipline like
comparative anatomy or zoology. Comparative historical analy
sis is only an aid to the better understanding of its object
in its individual uniqueness. ?or in spite of all analogies
and similarities the objects of history must be viev/ed from
the standpoint of their own immanent meanings and values.
Otto Hintze criticizes Troeltsch's conception of Sinn-
oder Werteinheit. Hintze holds that the general concept of
Individual Totality has significance as an historical object
without any consideration of meaning or value. ?or Sinnein-
heit he would substitute Lebenseinheit
. He believes that the
1. as, in, i9i.
2. Ibid. , 190.
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constituting of an historical object is an act of intuitive
and not of rational thought. Historians prooeed not logicall
"but analogically. The basic factoi is the individual person
who receives at the hand oi Troeltsch inadequate attention.
The individual person is the basis for all historical analogy
In the second place Sinneiruiei t has a tv/o-fold meaning;
it can be used nominal istic ally and realistically. rtEs kann
sich urn den Sinn eines Wortes handeln oder urn den Sinn einer
Sache. wl Thus '7hen Troeltsch seems to equate Sinn- with Wer
t
einiieit the equation is arbitrary. The meaning is expressed
already in the naming of an object, e. g. , the culture of tne
Renaissance or the irenca Revolution. Tnougn these concepts
include certain values, the emphasis on value snould be sepa-
p
rated logically from meaning. Especially ougnt one to keep
meaning and moral value distinct. 3 Thus Hintze says:
Die Kategorie der Individuality , die den
historischen G-egenstand konstituier t , ist
rein formal, ein blosser Akt der anschau-
lichen Abstraktion auf dem Gebiet des his-
toriscnen Lebens; sie ist nicnt inhaltlich
durch individuelle Lebens- oder Kultur-'erte
bestimmt
.
4
Wiiat seems to lie benind these remarks of Hintze is tne
conviction that cultural values do not belong to the lo^ic
of history, bat to its philosophy. Their presence in
Troeltsch' s logic of history is due to a carry-over 01
~T~. Op. cit.
, 203.
2. Ibid.
, 204.
tor;, 3. Ibid.
, 205.
4. Ibid. , 206.
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Rickert's theory of value. If we "base the study o^ history
upon certain "beliefs about values, we bind it to some particu-
lar ^e1 1anschauung . Hintze thinks that the exclusion Oi
'7ert«
einheiten f:om Geschichtslogik would allow, on the contrary,
a categorical structure of history which does not assume any
particular "^e1 1an s c iiauung , but which is aeaimliable to dif-
ferent philosophies. Troeltscn's view, he thinks, tends to be
prejudiced in favor of a particular metaphysics.
Hintze has raised a significant and difficult problem.
His objections, however, do not appear to be entirely cogent
.
Logic, to be sure, is not necessarily bound to any definite
theory of valuer, and axiology can indeed be distinguished
from the science of formal logic. And yet the two are not en-
tirely disparate. Rickert^ dictum, "Die Logik ist die Moral
des Denkens," is more than figurative. The primacy of the
practical reason reaches down into the root3 of logical theory
itself, and the nominalistic use of Sinneiniieit , for which
Hintze pleads, has already been provided for in Troeltsc.^s
conception of Vertretung . The logic of history, if it is ade-
quately to account for the distinctive qualities o: historical
events, like wholes of meaning and value, must be more than
purely formal, i. e. , Aristotelian. History requires a logic
of wholes which deals as well with material as with formal
truth. Since mea.nings and values are empirical facts of his-
tory, the philosophy of history cannot be divorced from all
<(
considerations of axiology and ethics; rather it must give
a coherent account oi them,
Hintze's position, that the logic and epistemology of
historical science are distinguishable from metaphysics, is
correct. Troeltsch does not keep tiiese distinctions clearly
before him. It is nevertheless true that some epistemologies
have specific implications for metaphysics, e. g. , neorealism
and absolute idealism. A correct epistemological considera-
tion of values may involve certain implications for metaphysic
The fear of metaphysics should not, hov/ever, obscure oar rec;..j
nition of the significance of values. To delete all investi-
gations oi values fro;: a study of Individual Totalities would
mean the exclusion of the most characteristic features of his-
torical events.
Teleology functions significantly in nistory. Kany of
the psychical aspects 01 historical causation are purposive.
Motives cannot be ignored. One v;ould violate the very data of
history to abstract all value from the considerations of that
data. Troeltsch' s position, then, that Sin:.- Oder .Vertoin -
heiten are found not only in single individuals but are imma-
nent principles in Individual Totalities, seems to be sound.
As Troeltsch says in ACR,
Die Kulturiniialte des Staates, der Gesell-
schaft, der Kunst, der V/issenschaft be-
deutet freilich samtlich objective, an
sich gttltige Werte und Ideen, die nicht
aus den natilrlichen subjektiven Begehren
hervorgehen, sondern ihm eine neue ho\-ere
.1
1
(
V/elt erOianen.
IV. Common-Spirit, Gemeingeist
The next problem to confront us in an Individual Totality
is the relation betaeen society and the individual, between
the objective and the subjective spirit, between the Gemein-
geist and the individual persons. This, says Troeltscii., is
the ha.rdest problem of historical science. It has analogies
in biology and psychology.
TTie im biologiscnen Organismus der Gecamt-
k^r^er und die einzelnen Zellen, wie im
persOnlicnen Seelenleben die Per sflnlichkeit
"'•<:
... und die psychischen Einzelelemente ein
spannungereiches Verhaltnis darbieten, so
ist das erst recnt in der historiscuen To-
talitat der Fall. 2
This relation says Troeltsch, presents an insoluble antinomy,
but it is nevertheless a primary phenomenon 01 history ( ein
Ur jlianomen ) . It is universal In its application and presence.
Es beschr&hkt sicn nicht auf Staaten
,
VOlker und Nationen, sondern umfasst auch
die losesten rein gedanklichen oder ge-
fttnlsmassigen Verbindung, genau so wie
der Begriff der individuellen Totalitat
0*1 N selbst, der damit nor in sein inner es
Geftlge verfolgt wird. 3
In consider in,;; this problem two fallacies must be avoided.
The first is to explain the Gemeingeist as a collection or
product of previously isolated individual consciousnesses which
come into accidental intercourse v/ith one another. The second
1. ACIt, 74.
2. as, III, 44.
3. Loc. cit.
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is to explain the Gremein;*eist as a mystical entity abstracted
from all individual consciousness . To do so v/ould iiean "ein
nicht scnon zugleich iremdes Bewusstsein in sich tragendes
Einzelbewusstsein and ein nicht aus und in Individuen be-
stehendes and sich bilden^s Gresamtbewusstsein. Tnus a Com-
mon Spirit is not a mystical entity which night exist inde-
pendently of persons. And yet, the concept saves as from
thinking of society as merely the accidental interaction of
individuals. It teacneb us that society is a real whole. Tne
Gemein^eist is a primary pnenomenon, ein Urphanomen .
This phenomenon constituted an important problem for He-
gel, vriiose treatment 01 tne Objective Spirit may throw some
light upon Troeltsch's discussion. In Hegel f s philosophy the
world ol spiritual institutions i3 the realm of tne Objective
Spirit. The lav/, morality, and the state are such spiritual
institutions. They are objective and are juut as much outward
objects as a stone or a star. However, they are al30 identi-
cal with the ego to which tney are tnus external. Stace says,
They are nothing but the obj ectii'ication of
ray single self, 01 me as a peculiar individual
with my personal eccentricities and caprices.
But tney are tne jbj ectii icati on 01 my uni-
versal self, my reason, of what I nave in com-
mon with all Humanity, and 01 tne universal
spirit of man. j'or example, the laws of the
state are not, or ought not to be, merely
the enbo diluent 01 the whims, tne prejudices,
T. GS, III, 4oT
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or trie interests, of any individual or class.
Hegel' They embody tne rational and universal life
of the community . These institutions are
thus, on tne one hand, objective and outward,
and, on the other hand, tney are clearly
spiritual, for they are tne manii'estation ef
mind, intelligence, purpose.*
Hegel's treatment of Objective Spirit2 includes ethics, poli-
tics .nd a philosophy of law. The highest expression of unity
between the Objective Spirit and the individual person is in
social ethics. '7ithin tne scope of social ethics there are
three main norms; the family, ^ c ivil society, • and the state.
5
Hegel gives a clear account of the objectivity oi customs,
laws, and institutions, but he does not deal adequately with
- the relationship betv/een the individual and tne objective
whole to wnieh he belongs.
In Hegel, as Hartmann says, tne Objective Spirit is a
being of a higher order than individual persons, a universal
spiritual substance, possessing its own mode of being and
llft« The individual spirits are related to it as accidents.
Not they, but it in them is the significant thing.
Die Inclividuen sind nur unvollstandige
Auspragungen seines 'Ye sens. Sie be-
stehen nie ausserhalb 3einer, sind ganz
getragen von ihm. Sie kttnnen sich wohi
verblendet von ihm 'abscneiden
* ,
aber
der 'abgeschiedene Geist' ist todge-
weiht
.
*
T! The Phiro~so~hy"of" Hegel (POH)
, pp. 322-523.
2. B f, ?434ir\
3. Ibid.
,
#513ff
.
4. Ibid., #523ff.
5. Ibid.
,
#535ff
6. PGS, 6.
(
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This view may seen to be one-sided and extreme; and yet
Hegel's constant insistence that the essential trutn 01 the
9 individual is the state, and that tne state is simply an's
true self, i. e., his universality objectilied, seems to
bear this out.
Hartmann's own view is essentially different from Hegel's
on the crucial point of the relation between the Common Spir-
it and the individual spirits. His vic.v is similar to that
of Troeltscn and can be set down in several propositions
;
(1) Geiormter Gemeingeist ist nicht Inbe-
griff individueller Geicter, obscnon er auf
deren Geraeinschai t beruht.
(2) Die Bevregung des Geueiugeistes in der
Geschichte ist nicht Gesamtneit privater
geistiger Bewegtheit, ob.^leich sie diese
als Piemen te enthalt.
(3) Die Dynamik gcBcnichtlichen Geistesle-
bens ist nicht einfacn ein Getriebensein,
weder durch TJinstftnde allein noch durch in-
dividuelles Bedttrfnis und Initiative allein,
obgleich beides jedcrzeit wirksarie ialctoren
sind. Sondern , in jeder dieser .Hinsicnten
ist das Ganze ebensoselir vor wie nach dem
Teile, ist Bedingendes und Bedingtes zu-
gleich, besteht nie anders ala in und pit
den Tei In omenten. So gibt es den Gesait-
geist stets nur 'mit* der Person, das ge-
schichtliche Schiclcsal nor 'mit* dem per^!5n-
lichen Schickoal, die geschichtlicn bew^jen-
de Macht nur 'mit 1 der individuellen Initi-
ative. 1
In all of this, however, tne Gemein;.;eist is an object of a
different order and existence from that oi the Hegelian Ob-
I* jective Spirit and from personal consciousness.
1. PGS, 250-259.
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(1) 3« c'i^t wo ill ein Bewusst3ein des ob-
jektiven Geistes, aber es ist kein noheres
Gemeinbewusstsein ueber dem der Individuen.
(2) Das Bewuaataein des objektiven Geistes
besteht nicht in ihm, sondern in una, den
Sinzelper sonen. Der objective Geist hat
sein Selbatbewuaataein nioht la a ten, son-
dern in uns.
(3) Da das Bewuastaein des Individuuna ihm
inhaltlich Inadftquat ist, so hat er sein -
voiles Selbatbewaastaein weder in sich
noch in uns. Jls giwt kein, ad&quatea Be-
wuastsein dea objektiven Geiste3. Bl ist
sein inneres Scnicksal, weder direkt n
aich aelber nocn mittelbar in uns ein Be*-
wusstaein seiner selbst haben zu kOnnen.
Troeltsch's view is not unlike tne general outline of
Hartman^s thought which we have just -resented. Neverthe-
less, Troeltsch does not carefully define Common Spirit. He
says, in fact, thqt it is a matter of comparative indifier-
ence how one defines and explains it conceptually. One may
conceive 01 it somewhat mystically as certain German Romanti-
cists did, i. e. , as a common spiritual substance pervading
the individual. One may conceive it, again, as a resultant
oi typical fundamental impulses, tne intellectual and the emo
tional. Schlelermacher traced it to an oscillation of reason
between the impulse toward identity and that towards differen
tiation. Gabriel Tarda traced it to inter-individual adapta-
tions and imitations, to the realisation of individual initi-
atives. Finally, we nay explain it, with tne aid of an anal-
ogy from biology, by a kind of organic vital unity and correla
A
tion of the group. That interests Troeltsch most is not the
explanation, but the fact of the Common Spirit. Certain fea-
tures of it .re clear, however.
(1) Trie variety of the sociological structures of the
successive typical cultural periods must not be exaggerated.
In the e ochs of maturity population, intercourse, and tech-
nical skill increase, and groups are mUcn more firmly based on
conscious and purposive agreement**
(2) Certain periods of history, like trie Middle Aces, are
not so instinctive and spontaneous as some believe. And yet
the epochs of maturity are ricn in common moods, hypotheses,
and conventions; filled with vague mass-impulses and tyrannical
dogmas; little guided, on the whole, by rational purpose, but
driven by passion and ieelin^. Conversely, a ^reat leveling
takes place through law, intercourse, and education. Troeltsch
looked upon the United States as a paradise of public opinion.
(3) A Common Spirit is a super individualism without which
no strong and hardy ethical direction of the stream of life is
possible. However, monistic conceptions oi Common Spirit are
a i ant ae tic delusion.
There never has been any Common Spirit but
that oi a group, family, race, class, profes-
sion, school, or sect, ana even the C lurch's
attempt to comprehend all these under a single
dome remained a fork of force and diplomacy,
1.
2.
3.
CT, 114; cf. DHSU, 49-50.
Ibid., 114-115.
Ibid. , 115-116.
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a faith and a dream, contradicted in tue
actual life of the times by the eternal strife
of ideas and interests. 1
(4) The present may have a universal spirit, which can
only be seen, however, in complete detachment
,
by strangers
and those who will cone after us. Most of our lives, say3
Tioeltscu, are lived not in a monistic, homogeneous circle, but
in a number of concentric circles, each of which has its own
ethical Common Spirit. 2
(5) The Common Spirits have each a different intellectual
content. This is like point three. "It is absolutely impos-
sible to conceive of them all as one community, and then to
credit this community ideally with a common intellectual con-
tent."'3 Each Common Spirit is like concentric circles which
touch other circles. One must not elevate any one of them
monistically into a universal "oasis or an all-determining
accent
.
It is always a matter 01 universal disvalue when one of the
smaller and less important Common Spirits is elevated to a po-
sition of monistic control over men's lives. Thus Troeltsc^i
viewed with alarm the contemporary spirit 01 nationalism. He
One can only demand for the most universal
community, which is that oi Hum, .nity , a mu
tual understanding and tolerance, and a
feeling of fundamental human obligation,
without any definite content. 4
1.
2.
3.
4.
at, 117-iic
Ibid. , 118.
Ibid., 119.
Ibid. , 121.
o
.
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called it "the most dangerous mollis tip exaggeration of the
idea of a Common Spirit. A common dome under whioh to
unite all Common Spirits is to be found only in some meta-
physical and religious element. I3ut this can today, sti^s
Troeltsch, not be done by the church. It must be accomplished
in soi-e other way. 2
(7) The category of the Common Spirit becomes, in
Troeltsch* a hands, more than a descriptive concept of the
inner nature of an Individual Totality. He makes it also a
normative category. jje relates it intimately to the problem
of cultural syntheses which we shall discuss below, and to
the whole field of metaphysics. 4 Thus trie Common Spirit has
become not Merely a logical and epistemological problem, but
a metaphysical one and serves an ethical and practical i unc-
tion. The historian thus not only contemplates history, but
makes it.
This whole discussion has given us a general idea of
what is neant by Oemeingeist
,
but no solution has been given
of the problem which Troeltsch raises concerning the relation
between Gemeingcist and >]inzelgeist . He seems to have taken
this problem out of the field oi the logic of history and
placed it in the realr of ethics and of cultural value H * in
the discussion of which we shall meet it again.
17 CT, 122.
2. Ibid. , 123-124. On religion and cultural values see
below ehapter V.
3. Ibid. , 124-125.
4. See below Chapter V.
<
V. Unconscious, das Unbewusste
In order to grasp adequately the function 01 ^gmelngelst
Troeltsch introduces another concept, der Be,;rifi des Unbe-
wussten . 1 The Common Spirit presupposes an unconscious ele-
ment or factor. Man is not conscious of the many thousand
things that go to make up tne Common Spirit. The individual
himself has many presuppositions, instincts, and impulses of
which he is unconscious or only half conscious. This mass of
unconscious elements is so great that the fully conscious ac-
tions of man are really exceptional. An understanding of the
u onscious factors in history differentiates the conception
of the development of the Individual Totality from any i-.ere
pragmatic or reflective study. Moreover, the Unconscious as
applied to history must not be confused with its use in ^sy-
cnology
.
Derm es ist nicht der schwierige 3egriff
des psychologischen Unbewussten, sondern
die tausendfach von der Ilistorie bestatigte
Tatsache, dass unsere Handlungen, Gefuhie,
Instinl:to, Strebungen und .'jntscniasse viel
mehr Voraussetzungei: in sich tragen als v/ir
wissen und eine viel grBssere oder gojiz an-
dere Bedeutung fur da3 Ganze und die Da-uer
haben, als uns selbst bewu^st war. 3s ist
nicht Bewus^tlosig^eit , sondern Uetoerschies-
sen des Gehaltes ueber das aktuell Bewusste
und Zurtickgenen des Bewussten in unbekannte
Tiefen, die sicn erst dem die ganzen Aus-
ifrirkungen ueoerscnauenden Historiker an-
nfthernd ofienbaren und ihra immer neue £ra.gen
xtellen. 2
1. GS, III, 45.
2. Ibid., 47.
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The unconscious operation oi historical factors is sig-
nilicant just because it is unconscious. Only after the. con-
clusion of a long x.eriou oi history can one often detect the
movement and development of certain processes and forces
which were previously hidden from view. The relationsnip of .
the individual to the Gonunon-6pir.it becomes clearer in many
instpjices after some previously unknown connection has been
carefully traced through the flow of historical events.
Troeltsch has emphasized an important factor here. As illustra-
tions of this point we may cite Marx's economic interpretation
of history ?;herein significant social relationships are brought
to light of which the participants had not the slightest con-
sciousness. The significant worl: of I'ax '"eber on the Protes-
tant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism also Dears this out.
VI. Creativity, das SchO^-crioC^e
Another important aspect of the life of the Individual
Totality is the spontaneity, originality, and creativity of the
individual person within the whole. Creativity is located only
in personality. All individuals are imbedded in a su^er individ-
ual setting from which they draw their traditions, tneir social
life, and other heritages. But after one has analyzed the so-
cial structure and the total environment Of the individual there
remains a Moment of Originality which is unexplainable . This
personal Originality has a revolutionary and determinative ef-
i ect u^on the whole, which is creative. Thus novelty emerges.
18
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The decisive role of the Me i
,
however, is not purely individ-
ualistic . It constitutes a creative synthesis which expresses
itseli in s^i. itual powers such as the great men o~ nistory
illustrate
.
The conception oi das Scnfl^ fsr ische is clearly opposed
to the causal principle of equivalence in natural science.
Troeltscn holds that for historical enquiry the logical con-
ceptions must be enlarged to include an apparently irrational
factor. Bergson has done this by making the logic of creative
evolution normative, and lias considered the physical world as
a benumbing of life which demands a corresponding benumbing
of logic. In this contention Bergson goes too far , but his
suggestion is significant.^ Troeltsciu is rignt in seeking the
creative forces history in the depths oi individual per-
sonality. His position on this point is closely related to
the tneorie3 of Leibniz, Lotze, and Kiclcert.
VII. Indeter,..in ism, I'Teiheit im Tillkursinne
Included in this conception of creativity is a further
concept, ?rcix:eit im Willkttr 3in;_e. Iroeltsch describes it as
follows: viiig 4w -e^: '
la kann nur bedeuten, dass in dem Kampf der
aufstrebenden original en und bcnOpfei iscnen
Tendenzen, ueber der en Herkunft keine weitere
Erkenntnis mOglich ist, mit den vorangehenden
Seelenvorgangen und Tendenzen sowie mit den
umgeijenden Bedingungen die Starke des 1'euen
r. GS", ifl, 43-49.
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abh&ngig ist von seiner SelbstzusamLienfas-
sung und Selbstdui chsetzung, von seinem
Anscir.-ellen zu der star Iter en Traclit in den
Vorgangen Ueberlegung und Selbstbesinnu.
von seiner Entscheidung fur sich gegen alle
abdrangenden Krafte. 1
According to this conception uistory is unpredictable and any
thought of universal law, be it naturalistic or dialectic,
impossible. The primordial depths of character out of which
the freest and most autonomous actions arise, cannot be con-
structed or deduced frora anything else, but can only be known
or inferred with reference to human action. This charaktero -
lo
;
ische Bestimmtheit is not a mystical and completed thing
or intelligible Din-?, an sich , but "etwas im Begehren, Denken,
und Sntscheiden sich selbst Erzeugendes, die Selbsterzeugung
der PersOnlichkeit , die PersOnlichkeit nur in dem Masse ist,
al8 sie aus dem Zusamnenstroiii der Ideen und Motive sich selbst
o
hervorbringt
.
Here, then, is creative pulsating personality acting
within a whole. Personality is fundamental in history.
Alle historischen Gesetzeszusamraenhange
und Sinnzusam :ennange muss en so gefasot
werden, dass innerhalb ihrer diese Selbst-
erzeugung der Persflnlichkeit aus den
dr&nfjenden rachten heraus mOglich wird.
Personality is the bearer of the uommon-3pir it , and the ulti-
mately decisive idea in history. It is free and indeterminate.
1 • GS
,
XXX, 50
•
2. Ibid., 50-51.
3. Ibid. , '61.
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The freedom of personality is not only r/lllkttr but it is
also subject to Zufall . Zufall , or chance, means that the
events of history have no single common root. All mixtures
of cultures, all conflicts, renaissances, and revolutions are
of this kind. There are also conflicts of Sinneinheiten with
wholes of natural causes which seen to have no common ground,
ttnder this conception of Zufall must be listed also the rise
of strong talents in human beings, famines, epidemics, and
changes in climate which disturb whole cultures and civiliza-
tions. Then, there are accidents like finding gold, the co-
incidence of bad crops with overpopulation, and the failing
of a tile upon the head of a passerby. Such contingent ele-
ments play a large role in historical processes. 1
All of these events point to the fact that there is no
unitary or steady movement in history. There are monotonous
ages like prehistoric times and there are chaotic eras where
all cultural content is in conflict and no fundamental tenden-
cy is present, as in the late periods of antiquity and perhaps
as at present. At such times. great and significant Sinnto -
talitftten are infrequent and their unitary bloom is short-
lived. One must, accordingly, recognize the lack of unity of
Mfcifrllfca vtljfclFrtafea MHk" ^Ha^:iMm.irji <n_ v. 2 tekturA rtf -hit-
certain st. etches of historical time.
We have now described some of the chief elements in the
1. GS, III, 51.
2. Ibid., 52.

Individual Totality. Troeltsch has correctly insisted that
the Individual Totality exists not in the subjective realm of
man's mind "but has a real objective status. To borrow a term
from contemporary psychology we may say that history presents
real Gestalten . These (testalten exhibit the several charac-
teristics which Troolt3ch has ascribed to them: "Ursprttnglich-
keit und Einmaligkeit , Vertretung, x7ert- oder Sinneinheit,
Cremeingeist , das TTnbewusste, das BohOpferische , und JTeiiieit
im Willkttrsinne
.
M The creative and spontaneous source of nis-
tory is found ultimately in the individual personality. Crea-
tion, of course, is no absolute creation among finite crea-
tures who emerge f ; on the stream of life and of consciousness,
but a creation which takes place in obedience to an imperative
ought which emancipates the self from mere natural and acci-
dental determination. Personality finds its true home in the
Historical Totality or corporate personality in which it lives
Besides combining so many aspects of structure and cre-
ativity, the Individual Totality also participates in a con-
stant flux of development, for the stream of history hurries
ever onward. Troeltsch believes that this developmental
process manifests a distinctive logic of its own which we must
examine before we can have a total view of the nature of his-
torical wholes.
1. Cf. below Chapter V.
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CHAPTER FOUR
The Logic of Historical Development
I. Preliminary Definition of Development
Troeltscn holds that the Individual Totalities are in a
constant process of development. The term development, how-
ever, is ambiguous and demands further explanation and defini-
tion. Considered historically as a dynamic principle it is a
modern conception. In ancient philosophy it received little
2
or no recognition. Christianity also did not re^a-rd the unity
and purpose of life as wrought throu^n the powers immanent in
historical process, "but conceived of the force as coming from
without. 3 Even as late as the 16th and 17th Centuries, when
mathematical and scientific inquiries had turned tnought into
new channels, physical changes were conceived as subordinate to
absolute and immutable laws or truth It was not until the
time of Hume and Kant that confidence in such absolutes was
shaken
.
Fro:: the late 13th Century until the present, nowever , the
idea of development in some form or other, together with the
jenetic method, has become supreme in scientific investiga-
tion. "Die genetische Methode gilt als das Selbstverstand-
IT GS, II, 692.
2. Troeltsch frequently overlooks Heraclitus, but see
GS, III, 184.
S. Ibid.
,
II, 296-297.
(
lichste des Selbstverst "ndlichen
.
1,1 This principle is not a
simple one and has various meanings. When applied to the con-
ception of being, it makes obsolescent any existence external
to becoming. Being must be understood in the "Lebendigkeit
seiner Bewegung." 2 Tnen applied to the conception of time it
results in the idea of real duration. Y/hen applied to histor-
ical Christianity, it conflicts with the orthodox conceptions
of revelation. 3 On the same basis it rules out any absolute
and immutable truth. It tends, furthermore, to make any so-
called peak of development in history a mere transitional form
and not an absolute value. Another characteristic tendency of
tiie evolutionary approach is its interest in the here and now,
and a corresponding rejection of other -worldliness . In the
sciences the principle of development is reflected in the Kant-
Laplace theory of the heavens, in the growing interest in his-
torical research, and in biology. 4 In philosophy Herder,
Goethe, Hegel, and the Positivists employed it, though in dif-
ferent ways.
This range in meaning and usage shows that the term devel-
op ent as applied to the philosophy of history requires specif-
ic definition. Troeltsch remarks:
So ist erklftrlich dass unter dem Namen
derselben Theorie und Lletiiode docn ganz
verschiedenartige und wider s^rechende
Betracatungsweisen nervortreten. Die
1. GS, II, 298.
2. Ibid. , 293.
3. Ibid.
, 300-302.
4. Ibid.
, 304-308.
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Anschauun:; einer inneren orcaiiisch gestal-
tenden Triebkraft der Gott-iiatur odcr des
absoluten Geistes and diese These einer
nur von aussen nerein, letztlich darcn den
Zufall bestiinmten Auslese, die trostlose
Ergebung in linen sinn- und ziellosen fort-
w&hrenden Wechsel, in dem nichts besteht
als das Gesetz des Techsels, und der op-
timistische Glaube an ein letztes Vblkom-
menheitsziel , in welchem das Mftgliche er-
reicht sein wird; der Aprior ismus einer
alles Wirkliche nur in der Evolution fas-
senden Theorie und der Emptrismus einer von
Fall zu Fall einsetzenden Beobachtun^ des
Fortschrittes von niederem zu hflheren Bil-
dung; alles das liegt in dem Be^rif: der
Bntwicklung verborgen und koramt je nach Be-
durfnis zum Ausdruck. Diese Ifetnode ist
nur ein Beispiel mehr dafflr, dass Fetnoden
unendlich fruchtbar und grundlegend fur den
ganzen Charakter einer wissenschaftlichen
E^ocne und doch in ihrem 7/esen und iiircr
fragweite aussert unklar sein kflnnen.
From the above we nay conclude that if tae principle of
development is to be applied to history and is to serve as a
determining factor in our understanding of Individual Totali-
ties, we must carefully define what we mean by it and distin-
guish it from its other uses. The problem of this chapter, ac-
cordingly, is to make clear what Troeltscn means by development
and to investigate episteroological problems involved in that
conception. The first task is to distinguish the idea from
mere physical and biological evolution and from the idea of
progress. The second task is to criticize some of the conce.
-
tions of development in the history of philosophy in order the
more clearly to trr.ee Troelt3Ch's own view. This procedure is
<
necessary because Troeltscn' s own exposition follows that meth-
od and because his own views are interwoven among the criti-
cisms of others. Like many writers, Troeltscn is much clearer
and more systematic in his treatment of others than in stating
his own position. His x.hilosopn>' of history thus lapses fre-
quently into History of philosophy. We snail, however , not re-
view here tne whole range of nis Historical criticism, but shall
select those chapters which seem most definitely to taring out,
positively and negatively, his own beliefs. In our presentation
we shall follow not Troeltscn' s order, which begins with Rickert
and then proceeds through Hegel, Karx, anci tne Positivists.
Rather we shall begin with He^el, and then discuss in turn Marx,
the Positivists, and Bickert. The third task of the cnapter
will be to present some epistemological and metaphysical con-
siderations Y/hich the autnor appends to his historical criti-
cisms. ->& do
A. Development and Evolution
In his article on "Historiography " Troeltscn affirms that
the principle of development must be taken in its parely nis-
torico-empirical sense, and must not be confounded with tne
idea of development in natural science or with that found in
.'letaphysics. The scientific U3e o: the term is distinguishable
from both of the others. It signifies the explanation of be-
98
coining "by the addition of infinitesimal mechanical change a. In
another essay he says:
Die pnysische Entwickiung handelt von der
Bildung relativ dauexndex und verwickelter
Systene raumlich-kOrp4#lichtf Vorgange und
misst deren Hohe an der Ausbreitung der
Beziehungen; die biologischc handelt von der
Kontinuitat der Lebewesen und misst die Hone
an den Leistungen far die Gesundheit und Er-
haltung der Art; die ^sychologische handelt
von der Bildung zusaamenhangender , urn ein
Leib-Ich gruppierter Bewusstseinserschei-
nungen samt den unbewussten Voraussetz angen
und misst die H5he an dem Masse, in welchen
sie bei Tieren und Menschen als Mechanismus
und Apparat fur hShere geistige iT&uigkeiten
dienen kann.^
In contradistinction to these uses of the term, historical
development denotes the progress whica issues from the essential
element 01 certain psychical efforts, tne working out of the
consequences that are latent in tne earliest beginnings of an
act* It denotes furtneri .ore , tne dynamical element in psy-
chical forces which do not exhaust themselves in a single act,
but which tend toward an end, a development akin to logical
evolution. Thus religions develop, morals develop, pnilosopn-
ical ideas develop. Moreover, development is exhibited in the
character of individuals and peoples, in tne forms of govern-*
,:ent, and in economic conditions. Hence it is closely related
to tne Historical Totality, for wherever this tendency appears,
it constitutes a principle that organizes the aggregates, and
1. ERE, VI, 720. In his o trier writings the sharp distinc-
tion betv/een the empirical and metaphysical conception
of development is not so rigorously carried out as here.
2. GS, III, 222.
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impels them from within. A
ties as talent B. Develo^ent and Progress
Modern thought Id s linked the principle 01 development not
only with evolution but also with the idea hi progress.
Troeltsch warns us that the conception of development as in-
tern 1 propulsion should not be ovei /orked. It clearly does
not mean infinite progress. In every particular case develop-
ment implies only a single concrete 1 pulse controlling a given
aggregate.* It manifests itself not merely in the fact of ad-
vance, but also in tne fact of exhaustion.
All progressive developments work also
toward regression, so as to make roo. : lor
fres.i movements. The conception in ques-
tion ha*, therefore
,
nothing to do v;ith
the conception of an unlimited aiid con-
tinuous progress found in the philosophy
of history.
*
The idea of an assumed progress runs counter to the con-
tingent nature of historic .1 process as we outlined it in chap-
ter one. There may at any time converge a series of mutually
independent causes which may lurther and amplify a course of
development, but which may iruotrate and completely arrest it.
Tiiere may emerge a higher and better synthesis, but this is not
guar nteed. Tne Sphere o: contingency includes influences of
dim te, atmosphere, fertility, geographical position, and nat-
ural wealth. It also embraces pnysiological events such as
T. m%, VI, 720.
in
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deatns, inbreeding, mixture of races, and food-supplic
.
Troeltsch also relegates to this sphere such individual quali-
ties as talent and genius, which sometimes occur "but sparingly,
sometimes, however, in amazing profusion. All of these con-
tingent factors, both conscious and unconscious, affect tne
development of the Individual Totalities.
C. The Heed of a Clear Definition of Development
Historical development is, accordingly, first adequately
apprehended when tne genetic and evolutionary contributions of
the natural sciences have "been taken into account. But what
marks tne cnaracteristic features of the iormer is the capacity
of men to express themselves in Sinntotalitftte
n
It is tnis
meaningful and teleological function of historical wholes which
marks the essential difference between historical development
and development in the natural sciences.
Jedenialls le^t das physikalisch-cua ische
Denken es nahe , in blossen Keihenbildun^en
und Kausalzusammennangen von JSinzelvorgang
au THinzelvor.iang zu denken, wahrend s,lle
weiteren Stufen in jev/eils hOherem L'asse
mit einer Durchformung und Beherrschung
disser Heinenbildun^ durch plastische, kon-
tinuierlica sich aus?/irkende Sinntendenzen
rechnen muss en.
Although these considerations are not metaphj sical
,
yet
they involve significant questions of epistemolo^y and of
1. ERE, VI, 720; cf. GS, III, 222; cf. also above Chapter
III, p.
2. GS, III, 222.
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ethics. And the metaphysical account of development which
Troeltsch correctly separates frem the strictly empirical must
do justice by the latter. The problem arises how the. histor-
ical process is related to the fundamental forces of the uni-
verse, to -ether with the further problem regarding the signifi-
cance of that process for the living will of each particular
age and the relationship between the ideals of the individual
and the Common Spirit. Moreover, there is the question of what
ideal values can be won and conserved from the process, and
what the goal and aim of the wnole may be. B • bo on as we raise
these pertinent questions we are no longer describing the de-
velopment oi totalities, but are seeking to underst0.no. and to
appraise them.
In his account of the empirical principle 01 development
Troeltsch seems to have created a parado::. The historical is
contingent, durational, unique, and creative. On the otner
hand, tne Individual Totalities are unities of meaning and
value which require norms and laws. But since history is
process through and througn, how are norms to be established?
How can one find the unconditioned in the conditioned, the ab-
solute in the midst of the Historical flux? Troeltsch' s posi-
tion is one which strives to rid the philosophy of History of
all its false absolutes, and yet to achieve a synthesis of
value and meaning for the individual person and for the Indi-
vidual Totality in the mid3t of tne process of its development.

These problems in one for* or another will engage us in the
remainder of this study. Tillicu, writing of Troeltsch, says:
Die Philosophic der aeecnichte aber ist
der Versuch, in dem Stron dieser liedingt-
heiten einen unbedingten Sinn aufsudecr.en.
Hier, wie nirgends sonst, muss die Ent-
scheidung ueber das Probleu des lielativis-
mus fallen und hier ist sie auch fur
Howe* Troeltsch gefallen. 1
The search for real absolutes which do justice to the mater i 1
content of the historical flow takes Troeltsch into tne rich
field of the history of ...hiloso^.hy where he finds many sug-
gestions for the solutions to these problems, but only a few
which seem adequate. We shall discuss in order four general
solutions of the problem, the Hegelian dialectic, the Marxian
dialectic, Positivism, and Rickert*8 philosophy of history.
II. Troeltsch 's Criticisms of Previous Positions
,3.1e id* A- Hegel 1 s Dialectic
Hegel's dialectic seethes with process. His was "die
2
erste grosse Iheorie der historiscnen Dyn:ss. ;,>.
"
" I:: di;,-
lectic of Hegel, says Troeltsca, there beats ths :.l .?:•„• of ais-
torical life. Hegel iiad a sense for the original, living, in-
dividual, and contradictory facts of history. Here he found
the pulse of history beating with greatness, wealth, passion,
and the fullnaa. 01 existence. Like Goethe he beheld the im-
mediacy of reality in its unspeakable richness, and gave it
1. Kant Studien
,
2j (1924) 3b5.
2. CIS, III, 241.
<
expression in his dialectic.
1 Contrary to usual interpreta-
tions, the primary thing which Hegel seeks is not the logical
and ethical progress of reason ( Vernunir t ) , but the effects and
expressions of a Reason in life which continually divides and
reunites, scatters and gathers, levels and builds up again."
However, at this point the real problem emerges. The
reality of opposites and struggles, of the contradictions of
life in its endless differentiations, is subsumed under the
unity, continuity, and teleology of reason, which gives to
o
everything its pulsating dialectic. All things are the ex-
pression of a single reason and hence, historically speaking,
every moment must possess the full meaning of historical life
in itself and must find its place in the dialectic of change.
The inner meaning of lite and of history must at once be in-
dividual and unique in each event and at the same time express
a basic identity in all its appearances. Hegel teaches the
living unity of events in the particularity of real and contra-
2dictory forms. This constitutes a problem.
Hegel hoped to solve the problem by applying the principle
of dialectic. The latter is the theory of the identity of op-
posites, a logic of motion, which proceeds in the movement of
becoming. Becoming received its first great modern philosoph-
3 <
ical expression in Hegel. It is a relative Aufliebung of the
1. GS, III, 245.
2. Ibid. , 24G.
3. Ibid., 247. On page 184, Troeltsch recognizes Kera-
clitus T importance, but does not ;ive him sufficient
recognition in relation to Hegel.

principle of contradiction, which was valid for only dead 'be-
ing, and belongs to the sphere of Yer stand . Dialectic views
the world of experience from a higher synthesis, viz., Yer -
nunf
t
. Hegel taught that the essence of spirit ( Geist ) was not
to be at rest, but to progress from one position to its- oppo-
site and thence to a unity which in turn progresses dialectical-
ly. Thesis, antithesis, synthesis; affirmation, negation, and
negation of the negations or reaffirmation - this is the law of
logic and of being. This law undergirds everything, human his-
tory and also the whole sphere of reality.
The essential factor in history is movement itseli , in
which at every point the individual and the universal concrete-
ly unite, proceeding out of movement and returning to it again.
This logic of history thus reveals the deepest meaning of logic
itself. 1
The spirit which manifests itself in this dialectic is not
an individual finite logical subject, but is the Universal
Divine Spirit himself, who proceeds out of himself in the form
of finitude and returns to himself, thus overcoming the mere
process of worldbecoming. He is himself a timeless and purely
logical process, which seems to the finite subject - one doec
not know juBt why - to be temporal. Troeltsch comments:
1. GS, III, 248.
2. Ibid. , 250.
ii
Daruit ist die strenge Einheit des Daseins-
grundes, das Gesetz der Bewegung und die
Klarheit des Welti^ieles auf dem ^Teg der
neuen dialektischen, gera,de in der Er-
kenntnist'heorie zugleich met physischen
Logik erreicht. Die Bewegungslogik grttndet
in einer Identit&tsphilosouhie , in der der
Allgeist mit dem bewegten Ausdruck seiner
selbst identisch ist und daher von jedem
Punkt seiner Sinzelrealisierung a,ui sich
selbst durch Analyse zurttckhehen kann.
It would be unfair, says Troeltsch, to call Hegel f s mode
of thought an apriori construction. He does not deduce the
materials of history out of apriori principles. On trie con-
trary, the dialectic is a purely formal a priori which is only
an Qrdnun^s- und Durchdringungsmittel for the empirical data.
Hegel has no desire to exclude the empirical and critical, the
pragmatic, and the psychological investigations from due con-
sideration; "but rather presupposes them and arranges the ma-
terials which they contribute ac ording to the dialectical
principle.
Das dialektische Geschichtsbild ist Rekon-
struktion gegebener, anschaulicher , und
konkreter Faterialien zu einem Ganzen,
nicht apriorische Deduktion des inhaltlichen
Geschehens und seiner Folgereihen aus der
Idee. Das ist ueberaus wichtig und ist
leider unendlich oft verkannt, oder misver-
standen worden.
There is another significant point concerning the Hegelian
dialectic which must not be overlooked, but which was neglected
by the Junghegelianer
.
Just as Hegel did not construct concrete
1. GS, III, 250-251.
2. Ibid.
, 253.
3. Ibid., 254.
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history apriori, so also he avoids all attempts to construct
the future. He restricted his method to what was already
known. The whole can be constructed only after the whole lies
before one. The fact that Hegel made no predictions shows how
nation* tlib£ a <xrv staJLltzs a ^ialeciicftlJtJiL 111* unity &t .milk i id,
truly he bound himself to the empirical.
Still another achievement must be added to Hegel* s' praise.
He does not seek to exclude everything irrational, individual,
accidental, or contrary to purpose from his theory. The whole
dynamic process is for him a development of conscious reason
out of its primordial opposition, out of unconscious reason,
out of the pure empirical data of existence.
Then again, he attacks the principle of causality and uses
in its place the principle of dialectic. This conception af-
fords him both continuity and flux and does no violence to the
actual movement of history, whereas the conception of causali-
ty cannot account for essential elements, lii.e flow, internal
ft j
m
mvm^tt "mm a. ^ttMMtjE, tinitgfc GflAtt&AAfklloA, H<5* ?.1*1' » iic-
unity, and the gradation of values.
Moreover, the dialectical account of history provides a
basis for the understanding of Spirit in masses, peoples
( VBlker ) , and group unities. Troeltsch says very acutely,
¥ie die moderne meciianistische Haturwis-
s ens chaft und der ethisch-rechtlich-po-
litiscne Iridividualismua untereinander
zusairimenhangen, so hangt auch die Dia-
lektik mit der lyfassung des Geistes als
1.
2.
3.
GS, III, 255.
Ibid. , 257.
Ibid. , 257-258.
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in liasStc | VOlkern und Gruppeneinneiten
sich bewegend zusammen.*
The state is the dialectical unity of tlie Gemeinschaft and In -
dividaum . 2 Out of the oppositions and struggles, moreover, of
nations there crystallizes dialec tically the unity of mankind,
which is only conceivable as the synthesis of Volker ind iv i du-
alitaten . The state is basic for Hegel and colors his concep-
tions of religion, art, and philosophy. Into his conception of
the state he crov;ded many other factors:
Staat und Gesellschaft , Macht und Kultur,
Uation und Recht, Keiigion und Weltleben,
einseitige Kraft und hamonische Fttlle,
Naive tat und Reflexion, Tradition und Ur-
sprtinglichkeit , Geschichtsfolge und System.
Having compressed so much into a single synthesis, Hegel*
s
simple formula of World History as "Fortschritt im Bewusstsein
der Freiheit," seems inadequate. The idea has a doable mean-
ing and combines apparently contradictory elements. Just as
his system as a whole unites contemplation and activity, de-
terminism and creative or iginality, universal necessity and
conscious teleology, so too his conception of freedom contains
a Janas.^esicht . On the one hand, freedom means the autono-
mous affirmation of an ideal and a striving for a common life
with other free beings. This is its Kantian aspect. On the
other hand, this first definition is auf,-;ehoben in the dialec-
tical necessity of Vermin ft , in which complete and selfconscious
T. GS, lit, 25-:.
2. Ibid. , 259.
3. Ibid. , 263.
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freedom means understanding the logical necessity of the dia-
lectical movement as a whole. This is his final Spinozistic
conclusion. ^
In this latter phase of the dialectic the dualism between
ought and the endless process which confronts it has "been
negated, and the process stands determined and complete. The
Marxian interpretation of the dialectic denied this completion,
and uses the dialectic as a tool with which to invade the fu-
ture. By so doing the historical process joes over into a
Kantian or Fichtean Sollen . 2 Hegel, however, confined the
whole dialectic within the "bounds of a Spinozistic philosophy
of identity.
The monism of Hegel is the key to the chief criticisms
that must "be "brought against his system. His philosophy re-
sults in a liionistic Universal^eschichte . In so doing it vio-
lates the principle oi* Individual Totalities. His violation
consists in the fact that his interest in the German State
tended to minimize the unique significance of the individual
person and tended also to dissolve the intrinsic meaning and
value of previous totalities, making them "but instruments for
the arrival of later stages of the dialectic. The German State
is a peculiar unity of the Hellenic city state, of tne Lutheran
state-religion, of individual humanity and liberal bureaucracy,
T. GS, III, 264.
2. Ibid. , 265.
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but also the incarnation of spirit ( Geist ) , 01 the state in the
objective spirit, of the incorporation of individual in man-
kind, and finally the incarnation of God himself.
1 As over
against such a view Troeltsch maintains:
Die Kistorie kennt keinen Allgemeinbe-
griff , aus dem sie Inhait und Reihenfolge
des Geschehenen ableiten k&nnte, sondern
nur konkrete, individuelle , jedesmal im
Gesamtzusamiiienhang bedingte, im Kern aber
unableitbare und rein tatsaehliche i^rscnei-
nungen. Die Historie kennt deshalb keine
mit tatsachlichen Allgemeinheiten zusammen-
fallenden Werte und liormen, sondern kermt
diese nur als allgemein gftltige odor Gul-
tigkeit beansprechende Gedanken, die stets
in individueller Vorm auftreten und ihre
Allgemeingftltigkeit nur im Kaiapfe gegen
da.s bio os Tatsachliche kund tun. 2
When we apply this criticism to a definite problem such as
the development of Christianity, it becomes clear just what is
meant
.
Auch die Gescnichte des Christentums hat
ihrerseits immer deutlicher die beirrenden
Stufenkonstruktion aufgegeben, die Ur-
christenturn, Katholizismus und Protestan-
tismus als Glieder einer logiccnen Reihe
betrachten. . . . Keine Periode ist ledig-
lich Durchgangsstuie
,
jede nat in ihrer
Gesamtlage ihren eigenen Sinn -and ihre
selbstgenugsane Bedeutung .
3
This criticism is directed against Kegels attempt com-
pletely to rationalize the process of history. 4 Everything was
1. GS, III, 268-269.
2. ACR, 29.
3» Ibid., 40. Troeltsch frequently quotes the saying of
Ranke, "Jede Epoche ist unraittelbar zu Gott."
4. GS, III, 273.
t
interpreted as spirit, expressing itseli in a monistic dialec-
tical movement. In history spirit is merely producing itself.
And the whole scheme of human events is nothing but Reason's
becoming self-conscious of its own concrete unity. This view
does violence to the material facts of history, as Marx and
other sociologists rightly pointed out. 1
An even more objectionable consequence of Hegel's monism
is that what appear to be changes, concretions, and individua-
tions are merely changes in the form of universal being or
spirit. Thus, volition, value, and individual reality are
sacrificed to continuity and logical necessity and become mere
appearances. Troeltsch confirms Lotze's attack on this posi-
tion. He says:
Der Verlauf der Qeschichte sei die grosse
furchtbare und tragi sche Schlachtbank,
auf welcher alles individuelle Gluck und
Leben geopfert werde, damit die Sntwicklung
der allgemeinen Idee der menscnheit von
Stat ten gene.*
Recht ei^entlich aber einen Stein statt des
3rote3 gibt uns diese Ansicht mit ihrer
Geringschatzung des individuellen Leben
a
gegenueber der Sntwioklung der Idee.
3
Troeltsch himself holds that human beings in Hegel's view ap-
pear to be only marionettes in a show of which they know noth-
ing. But he hastens to add that one receives this impression
only when one meditates not on the dialectic, which in itself
1. as, nr. 274.
2. MIK, III, 33.
3. MIK, III, 36.
4. OS, III, 275.
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is realistic enough, but on the metaphysical monism into whittll
Hegel co. r eased it.
Finally, the philosophy oi identity vitiates any attempt
at a satisfactory treatment of time, Hegel wavers between a
purely logical timeless process of the whole, on the one hand,
and on the other the concrete tine ( konkrete Zeitlich:eit) of
the finite appearances within the dialectic. 1 Were chrono-
logical time is often entirely set aside "by him in order to ex-
press the rhythm of the dialectical movement, but this fa then
aiifgehoben in the timeless Absolute. Troeltsch's criticism
here is fair only against a certain tendency in Hegel. He con-
sistently held to tae vie / that the absolute is not a merely
logical idea, but "die ewige an und fur sich seiende Idee (die)
p
sich ewig als absolute! Qeiot bet&tigt, eraeugt und geniesst."
In later philosc hies of history, thinkers substituted a less
rational and a more volitional (Schopenhauer's) conception of
the stream of life, as is apparent in JTietzsche, Dilthey
Simmel, and Bergson. In these men, however, we find tendencies
to a complete laclc of logical direction ( Gteuerlosi&keit ) or
iriat ion ^lisni. 3 Troeltsch does not think we are warranted in
going so far as this. Mis own thought, however, tended to go
more and more in this direction.
In summing up Troeltsch' s relation to Hegel, the following
1. dS, III, 276. The use oi the word concrete here is
clearly not the Hegelian meaning of the term, for in
Hegel it means the completely related.
2. EPW, #577.
3. GS, III, 276.
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may "be said:
Unangetastet bleibt dei Kern der letz-
teren (d. h. Dialektik) selbst, die Idee
der historiscxien Dynamik rein fur cich,
die Auilttsung des Individuellen und des
Allgemeinen inei^ander, die Einsenkung der
pragmatischen Kausalitaten and persttnl.lchen
Zv/ecksetzungen in eine tiefere Schicht der
eigentlicnen Lebensbewegung , die sich in
beiden nicht erschBpft und nit den blossen
reflej^tierenden Verstand nicht aul'gefangen
und zergliedert werden kann. 1
What must be rejected in Hegel can be traced to the embedding
of the dialectic in an epistemology and a metaphysics of
identity.
B. Marx's Dialectic
After the death of Hegel the universal hold of his system
upon the minds of contemporary thinkers broke down. This down-
fall was due to two things: 1) divisions which arose out of the
internal structure of the system, and 2) the ascent of reionns
both in politics and in the natural and mathematical sciences.
"Die veranderte Atmosphere hat es erstickt, night die Logik von
innen ueberwunden
.
H ^ Hegel's influence lived on, expressing it
self in art, literature, and historical science, but the inner
essence of the triadic logic was discarded. Farxism, alone, of
all the Ge i s t e s i i s s en s c haf t e
n
,
preserved the principle of the
dialectic intact.
1. GS, III, 276-277.
2. Ibid., 514.
<
The dialectic was, however, basically altered. Its pnilo-
aophical foundations and its spiritual weaning were concealed
and ruined ( verdorben ) , "but it maintained its fundamental op-
position to the ncchanicc-l and atomistic conception ot causal-
ity, and it preserved its constructive power to account for
the concrete movement ( Bewe^thsit ) of reality, furthermore,
like Hegel's, this philosophy was an attempt to reconstruct
universal conception of historical development together with a
normative cultural standard for botn the present and the fu-
ture.^-
Jfapy Marxian epigones have not understood the dialectic
at all, and nave made 01 it a medxanicai theory of causality.
The unity of being, movement, and goal was dissolved into a
"Kantische rdchtung auf den ethiscnen Sndzweck."
Dann konnte man ueber ILaus&litat una lele-
ologie, Deter, .inismus und "reiheit disi.u-
feoned t tieren, die - in Wahriieit nicht voriianaenen -
Beziehungen zu Kant und vichte aufsuchen
und j&arx zum Kantianer stempeln oder fort-
entwickeln. T Tan konnte weiterhiu die von
Haxx in Stile Kegels und Feuerbachs kon-
struierte Urgeschichte aus Spencer, Korgan,
Darwin oder ahnliche Theorien erganzen und
ersetzen, um inn auf die HOhe der Jtorscnung
und der rein kausalen iintv/icklungserkernit-
nisse zu bringen.*
But all such attempts are false to the true Karx. Troeltsch
shares with him the attack on mechanical causality and a
1. GS, III, -315.
2. Ibid. , 315-316. For an account of the opposition to
dialectic sec .footnote on page 316.
301
I
naturalistic conception of development
.
x
Troeltsch has a high regard for Marx's interpretation of
history. Though a product of the decay of the Hegelian school,
the theory has undeniable signii icance . Its highest achieve-
ment is the critinue of capitalism. Barx recognizes the his-
torical nature of capitalistic society. His was an "Entdeckling
und Analyse der modernen kapitalistischen Gesollschaft selbst
'At >.<;- <:a •.. i it u . }>1&.. 2
als einer vflllig 3ingul&ren hiatorischen 3rscheinun^. " Marx
was able to combine sociology with philosophy in such a way as
to "bring out clearly the essential inner unity of historical
processes
.
Moreover, Marx shared the tendency of the left-wing He-
gelians to investigate immediate concrete and sensible ex-
perience in contrast to the verbe;;rif - li elite Spiritual! tat des
Systems and also the tendency to seek historical goals which
seemed to be rationally necessary for future society instead of
concluding with a mere contemplation of the completed Progress
of the Idee . 5
Bei Hegel ist eben der Progress vollendet,
wahrend er bei Marx vor seiner wichtigsttn
Lei stung erst steht. Deshalb geht bei Marx
1. See a ve page8 24ff«; 33, III, 328. Troeltsch holds
"dass die jetzt so haufige Zusammenstellung von Wktx und
Kant nur einen Sinn hat, dass bei beiden das rationale
und revolutionare Ideal des 18. Jahrhunderts als ge-
meinsaLx zutage tritt. Im uebrigen i3t keine Vereini-
gung moglich und besteht nicht die leiseste Bertinrung .
GS, III, 150 n.
2. GS, III, 313.
3. Ibid., 319. See Ibid., 53 for Troeltscii' s contempt of
mere contemplation.

f«uerl|ac die Dialektik an diesem Punkte ueber zu
einen Kantischen oder Fichtischen Sollen. 1
Hie above quotation reflects a marked practical motif in
Marx, one that is also shared "by Troeltsch though in a dif-
ferent form.
Er wollte ueber Hegel hinaus zu neuen
Zielen, aber zu wirklich praktischen
Zielen. 2
Er hungerte, wie uebrigens Hegel selbst,
nach Realitat und wollte die Dialektik
ebenso wie ihre Fortillhrung zur revolu-
tionar en Umgestaitungen der Dinge ledig-
lich aus der realen Lebensbewegung selbst
heraus gewinnen. 3
Marx himself writes in his "Elf Thesen ueber Feuerbach"
:
Die Philosophen haben die Welt nur ver-
schieden interpretiert , es kommt aber
darauf an, sie zu verandern . 4
Some critics have held that there is fundamentally no
philosophy of history in Marx, but only a social theory. 5 The
decisive factor in history is always the economic complex,
particularly the "relations of production" ( Produkt i onsvernal
t
-
nisse ) . Thus it would seem that Marx's historical materialism
is only a sociological, not a metaphysical conception. This
is, however, going too far. Marx wavers between sociology and
economics on the one hand and metaphysics on the other.
The term materialism in Marx has led to gross misunder-
standing. Troeltsch is right when he says that in Marx, as in
1. GS, III, 265.
2. Ibid. , 320.
3. Ibid., 321.
4. Ueber historischen Mat eriali sinus . (UHM)
,
I, 53.
5. Hartmann, PGS, 9.
ail
N 91
9ifT .^Toe^j XbIoos i
ma 1
1
.eveworl ,ai
i aolncnooa
Feuerbach, we are dealing not with a materialistic, "but with a
realistic dialectic. 1 This realistic metnod negates all philo
sophical apriori constructions and superempirical realities.
It gives a material interpretation to the ideas of right, and
of the Hegelian system retains only the bttrgerliche Gesell -
8 chaft.
An Stelle aller PhiloaoUiie trat also
lediglich ihr verb! ei bender Rest, die
realistiscn verstandene Dialeictiis:.^
This dialectic does not proceed out of the spirit, and
does not receive its laws from the unfolding of spirit, but
creates its own spirit, which expresses itself as an image of
the real processes of history.
^ie der Mensch selbst das Srzeugnis des
realen Prozesses ist, so sind auch alle
seine politischen, etnischen, religiftsen
Schttpfungen lediglich Wirkungen realster
sinnlicher und interessenhafter Srlebnisse
und 3 3olange sie noch in eine transzendente
w'elt hinueberpro j iziert werden, lediglich
mystisch-phantastische Reflexe eines rein
empirischen Gescnenens und ISrlebens.
And yet, says Troeltscn, tnis is not really materialism. Mate
rialism for Marx means the destruction of all independent ide-
ology and mystical conceptions (Begrif i grays tile ) together with
the construction and deduction of all spiritual worlds out of
the underlying economic and social processes. The materialist
element is really a polemic against mere ideology* 4
1. GS, III, 321, 325.
2. Ibid. , 323.
3. Ibid., 324.
4. Ibid. , 32G.
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Marx's theory of historical development had a decided
anti-religious effect, but anti-religion and materialism are
not necessary essentials for his socialise. In an essay en-
titled, "Atheistische Ethik" Troeltsch points out that the con-
nection between Socialism and atheism is really accidental.
Die Beobachtungen des schweren wirtschaft-
lichen Gegensatzes und das Geftlhl einer in
fit, der Satur des kapitalistischen Systems
liegenden Verdaraniung zum lilend, die kurz-
sichtige, heute beliebte Verwendung von
Religion und Kirche lm Dienste des Besitzes
und der bestehenden Ordnung mag atheistische
fcedanken annehmbar und glaubhafter rnachen,
als sie ohne die Emplindung einer derartigen
ITotlage waren; es mag Zweifel und Bedenken
hier und dort hervorrufen und insbesondere
sehr ungflnstige Bedingungen fur die Pflege
des religiflsen Lebens schaffen. Aber eine
prinzipielle atheistische Gesamtanschauung
entsteht hieraus allein nicht. 1
Moreover, Troeltsch makes positive use of Marx in his work on
the Soziallenren . The Marxist method, he says, is gradually
transforming all our historical conceptions including our ideas
of past and future. However, the Sozialle.hr en claims to have
shown that everything specifically religious and especially the
great peaks ( Knotenpunkte ) of religious development are an in-
dependent expression of religious life.
Jesus, Paulas, Origenes, August in, der hi.
Thomas, der hi. Franz, der hi. Bonaventura,
Luther, Calvin, sie kOnnen in ihrem Pftlle
und Denken nicht aus Klassenkar.rpfen und
flkonomischen Inter essen hergeleitet werden. 2
1. GS, II, 531-532.
2. GS, I, 975.
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On the other hund, it is clear -hat in the causal connection
out of which their peculiar forms of religious thought gained
stimulus, force, movement and aim, social and economic forces
were at work, though this was not always apparent, and their
significance varied greatly. Thus, one would have to say that
whereas: all attempts to make Christianity into a changeful re-
flection of economic and social history are a foolish fashion, 1
yet the understanding of religious event;; is considerably
widened by giving attention to thi3 cooperative (mitwlrkend )
element.
It is clear froa the above discussion that the Marxian
dialectic basically altered Kegel's principles of development.
These differences may be summarized and criticised under sev-
eral heads.
1) "Die Verblndung dor rein roal I a t i s c'n-de ter* : V* , 212
;2ntwicklung nit rcvolut lonarer Prophetic und absoluter 7orde-
rung." In making thi3 shift Marx succumbed to a teleologies!
conception of history. Although he regularly condemned tall
teleology as mystical ideolojy, yet his dialectic is clearly
teleologioal. jiTom Ur^o^uniamua the dialectic pusses through
a period ox* class struggles to the ideal ef a classless so-
ciety.*5
T", OS, I, 977. Troeltsch's criticism and acknowledgement
ef the Marxian interpretations of early Christianity
are jiven In this same work, S. 2-15.
2. as, in, 354.
3. Ibid. , 334-336.
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2) "Die Dialektik ist naturalisiert
.
n± This does not mean
that the dialectic has "been made a natural law analogous to the
laws of natural science. But on the other nand it is no longer
the idealistic principle of Hegel's logic. 2 The stages of in-
dustrial society are not instances of the application of a uni-
versal psychological lav/ or a general tendency of development,
but concrete, individual, historical, and unique facts which
operate in history. Marx seeks for his facts only in tiie so-
cio-economic iieid^j e 9f
3) "Die Dialektik ist oekonomisiert .
"
3 This factor needs
hardly any further elucidation. It lies at the basis of his
Unterbau-Uobor bau theory, which was the most interesting of his
doctrines. 4 This is the view
dass die Ideenwelt auf deia Orund nicht nur
der Geme inscnaft uebexhaupt, wie Peuerbach
lehrte, sondern auf dem Grunde Okonomisch
und technisch bestimmt gepragter und von
bestimmten, damil zusarazaenhAngenden Inte-
ressen erftlllter Gemeinscnaf t aufruht, dass
alles Hecht, alle politiscne Tneorie, alle
Sitte und aoaiaie Ideaibildung odor Ethik^g©
schliesslicxi aber auch alle Philosophie,
Kunst, Literatur U2id Religion von diesem
Untergr"unde her gef&rbt, mi tbestimmt , be-
wusst oder unbeivusst geleitet ist. 5
It is a curious commentary on this ty^e of historical exposi-
tion to note that the ideology of the ruling classes is de-
scribed as Heucheiei and Selbstbetrup;
,
6 whereas the ideology
E GS, III, 333.
2. Ibid. , 339.
3. Ibid., 340.
4. Ibid., 347.
5. Ibid., 343.
6. Ibid., 347; ci . Laidler, EST, 202.
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of the proletariat seems to be exempt from such errors.
Troeltsch is right in denying the economic deteminicia of the
superstructure of society, and Marx himself adnitted that the
economic was not the only factor.
4) The trans format ion or the logical contradictories of
dialectic into class struggles.^ This is closely allied to
the above point. Men create the superstructure of life in the
service of social conflicts, not out of love for spirituality. 2
The excessive abuse of this type of explanation has already
been criticized above. Troeltsch points out that even if the
class struggle should eventus,te in a revolution, the latter
could not possibly of itself accomplish the spiritual and so-
cial trans format ion of society which Marx predicted. The con-
temporary anarchy of values in Germany supports this thesis.
To limit the dialectic to class struggle means the overthrow
of any intelligible conception of dialectic.
Marx's writings -Iiave been much more successful as means
of party agitation than as a solution for tne problems of the
value. He makes a productive use of the principle of Histor-
1. GS, III, 350.
2. Ibid., 351.
3. Ibid., 353.
Bine Dialektik, die nicht mehr mit lo^ischen
oder logisc.i verkieideten ethiscn-reli ittsen
Gegensatzen arbeitet, ist faktisch ueber-
haupt keine eigentliche Malektik nehr.3
philosophy of history. And yet, his theory has constructive
4.
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ical Totalities, as he says in Das Blend der Philosophie , "Die
ProduktionsverMltnisse jeder Gesellschaft bilden ein Ganzes."1
Like Hegel he shows the development from within oi these
wholes
.
Die Historie hat, wie bei Hegel, einen zen-
tralen Gegenstand, eine grundlegende Sin-
heit der Forschung; das ist die soziologische
Gruppe oder das Yolk. Nur erscheint die
Gruppe "bei Y.arx nicht als vernunftgeeintes
Ganzes Oder als Staat und Rechtsinstitution,
sondern als oekonpmisch bedingte Struktur
der Gesellschaf
t
Marx ist wie Hegel und fast alle Modernen
von einer solchen ins Unbegrenzte auf-
steigenden Sntwicklun^ des Ganzen als
Ganzen grundlegend ueberzeugt.3
On the other hand, this monistic economic interpretation
was not successfully carried out. The dialectic was too nar-
rowly conceived and contained contradictions. Its scientific
elements have "been taken up into sociology, where tne Unterbau-
Ueberbau theory has furnished a very fruitful approach to many
problems. But the grand universal historical construction has
spent its force mainly in practical revolutionary propaganda. 4
The critical function of Marxism, however, is still relevant.
1. 91. Some hold that the wholes in Karx's philosophy of
history are only economic ones, hut it may he replied
that this overlooks the whole Unt erba
u
-Uoh erbau con-
ception oi the dialectic. And yet, Troeltsch is right
in insisting that Marx appeals too much to the eco-
nomic determinism of the wholes.
2. GS, III, 354.
3. Ibid. , 356.
4. Ibid., 309-370.
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C. The Historical Dynamic of Positivism
The Marxian dialectic which we nave thus examined was a
realistic criticism of historical development along economic
and social lines. In its emphasis on collective unities and
dialectical development Marxism repudiated the abstract me-
chanical and purely inductive conception of causation as we
find it in natural science. 1 This latter mode of thought,
however, maintained an almost independent existence alongside
of dialectic, and in many quarters entirely replaced it during
a large part 01 the nineteenth Century. Its most popular form
of philosophical expression was sound in Positivism.
Like the Kegel-Karx point of view, Positivism construes
the historical object as the social group, the cultural to-
tality of a people (Yolk ) or 01 an era. 2 This social wnole,
however, is construed quite diflerently from the Hegelian or
Marxian totality, especially as relates to the idea of develop-
ment. Positivism described the group as a statistical summa-
tion of individual elements. The whole is a compound; it is
not an objectively existing totality. Trier, is no identity3
which runs through all the individual elements and which gives
it a necessary unity or the basis for an internal logical or
historical development as was the case in Hegel and Marx. The
model according to v/hich the Positivists operated was natural
T. CtS, III, 371.
r
3. Ibid.
,
373.
3. Ibid. , 374.
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science. Its method was taken oyer into sociology and domin-
ated the latter r s whole range of researches.
There were two concepts which were especially important.
The first was a merely chronological conception of time,
1 and
the second, that the causal relations are purely scientific.
This causal genetic point of view held that the changes in the
group were due to the change in position of small units of na-
ture and of mind out of which the wholes are constructed. As
Troeltsch says:
Es gibt nur die kleinsten, erst der
analysierenden Tissenschaft zug&ng-
lichen Wirkungen, aus denen sich die
relativ zusamraenhangenden und dauer-
haften Komplexe aufbauen, und die Sum-
mierung kleinster Ver&nderungen , durch
deren Gesamtwirkung sie sich verandern
und gegebenfalls schliesslich in eine
andere Dauerform umbilden.*
That the universal, collective, over individual "Ensemble"
or "Komplex" should be prominent in historical study is recog-
nized 33 essential, but these overindividual characteristics
are only the iirst impressions which history presents. The
wholes must be dissolved into smaller units like those found
in biology and, where possible, analogous to the basic units
of physics.
History for tne Positivists, says Troeltsch, is not under-
stood in its own terms. On the contrary, development means the
explanation of apparent wholes of process as the sum of the
I"! OS, III, 374 7
2. Ibid. , 378.
<
116
smallest effects, i. »* , as mere recombinations of previously
existing elements. These are repeated and thus provide for
the prediction of the future. Teleology is spurned while ne-
cessity is praised. Thus we have only empirical generaliza-
tions, but no purpose in the whole. The net result is a posi-
tivistic and practical determinism. On thi3 principle the
appearance of really novel and unique historical forces is
ruled out. 1
Basic conceptions like humanity, progress, and universal
history which Positivism discusses have no metaphysical "basis
but are assumed to be aspects of natural law. The ideals of
humanity and progress are particularized and identified with
specific concrete historical movements , but are taken to have
no metaphysical foundation. Thus American democracy, English
parliamentarism, and the French Revolution all in turn serve
as embodiments of the essence of humanity. 2 There is, however,
no real deduction or grounding of these principles.
When we turn to specific men, like St. Simon, Comte, Mill,
and Spencer, we find these above-mentioned tendencies and prin-
ciples exemplified in detail. It will not be necessary to
analyze the thought of each man in turn, but it will suffice
to point out the difficulties which Troeltsch finds involved
in their common assumptions and presuppositions. In the first
I
1. GS, III 379.
2. Ibid., 382; cf. ITaturrecht una Humanitat in der '.Telt -
politik
.
by the same author
.
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place, the conception of a dynamic world is a "mitgebrachte
Kategorie," and Comtek "Dreistadiengesets" is purely an as-
sumption1 which can nowhere "be adequately grounded. In the
second place, the whole naturalistic method is internally in-
consistent; for a) it tries to make a unity out of isolated
units, and "b) it makes mind completely dependent on the physi-
ological organism and hence condemns all so-called progress to
the fatalism of natural phenomena. In the third place, Posi-
tivism has a contradictory conception of mind. On the one
hand, it makes mind the leading and organizing principle, and
p
on the other, it relegates it to the weakest part of the brain.
These fundamental difficulties are not mitigated "by Spen-
cer^ attempt to combine Darwinism with Nineteenth Century
Liberalism, for even in Spencer the same associationistic con-
ception of mind prevails, thus ruling out any basic unity in
personality and any unifying principle in the Historical Totali-
ties. Moreover, the biological interpretation of mind as a
means of adaptation to the environment is not adequate to ac-
count for the empirical iacts of history. ¥0 real inner logical
or psychological development within the wholes of history can
take place on so narrow a basis. The contributions which the
Positivists made to historical thought were largely negative,
and do not interest us here. Troeltsch's final appraisal of
tl GS, III, 407.
2. Ibid., 403.
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this general standpoint is well expressed in a criticise which
he made of Spencer T s conception of evolution:
In fahxhiit ist jener all^emeine Evolutions-
begJflfi , soweit er sich von den Hegelschen
Gedanken gelflst hat, ueoerhaupt kein Snt-
wicklungs-, 3ondern ein blosser Veranderungs-
begrif i .
*
The problem of finding an adequate philosophical formula
of development has not been solved thus far. But certain defi
nite conceptions have been ruled out because they did not ade-
quately account for Historical Totalities and for their inner
processes. Tillich summarizes this attack of Troeltsch as
i ollows
:
Das absolute Zeitalter Kegels fallt ebenso
unter dieses Gericht wie die organologische
Beruhigtheit der deutschen historischen
Schule. Die Dynamik der Geschichte treibt
aus jedem Ruhepunkt einer absoluten Position
heraus. Aber sie fttnrt auch nicht zu einen
kunftigen Ruhepunkt. Die utopische Absolut-
heit des Marxisi.ius wird ebenso aufgelflst wie
das immanente iilntwicklungsziel des Positivis-
mus .2
D. Troeltsch' s Criticism of Rickert
When we turn our attention from Hegel, Marx, and the Posi-
tivists to Rickert, we confront a man who determined in many
ways the direction oi Troeltsch 1 3 thougnt. While under the in-
fluence of Lotze's teaching during his student days, Troeltsch
>
1
- Kant Studien , 27 (1922) 269-270; cf. GS , III, 662.
2. Kant Studien, 29 (1924) 356.
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had accepted in a general way the conception of individual
causal '.ty1 which the former presented in his discussions on
history. This principle was the foundation of Rickert's
philosophy. In our previous discussions we have seen how
Troeltsch expanded individual causality to include the Individ-
ual Totality. 2 The word Individual as used in Rickert'and in
Troeltsch does not indicate an opposition to society or human
types, but, as we have seen,^ merely to abstract universal
laws. "Individual" represents the uniqueness, creativity, and
Sinmal igkelt of historical objects, be they epochs, tendencies
of culture, states, peoples, masses, classes, or individual
persons .
4
In many ways Rickert'e fornal presentation of this prin-
ciple seems adequate to describe the structure of Troeltsch*
s
Historical Totalities. But when it comes to describing the
temporal and developmental dynamic of the wholes, it seems in-
complete and inadequate. Rickert's whole netnod is static be-
cause he has no proper conception of time. He knows or ac-
knowledges, says Troeltsch, only the Kantian mathematical con-
ception of tine and not the time of concrete duration. 5 This
is, perhaps, his basic fault, for without an adequate concep-
tion of time historical objects are inexplicable. 6
T. GS, III, 119; if, Lotze, MIK, VI-VIII.
2. See above Chapter Two.
3. See above Chapter Three.
4. as, III, 120.
5. Ibid. , 236.
6. Ibid. , 237.
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Closely related to time, through the dootrtne of schema-
tism, is Kant-
,
conception •* cause. Rickert is like Kant on
this point, says Troeltsch. Rickert •» whole treatment of time
and cause seen completely Kantian, and thus his otherwise
fruitiui conception of Individuality lacks dynamic develop- •
ment. 1 It was too formal and lifeless.
Das htagt mit der Crundrichtun? auf >le»Mden Raumdingen analoge GegenstXndlichPeit
e~-e^t
U
ic-?r
ht K^«SJ8?tines
1?„ ?ff J^trftclungsbesrirfes schon in derempxrischen Forschung T.ll.tlndigV RiekSrt
Oder Vo^lfSS ^""elle 'iegenstande
1*1tilchen und kausalen Reihen verbinden- «kann weiterhin umfassende individuellegenstande nach dieser gleicnen ReHl mit!'einander verbinden; aber inner ist es ^f-issung in Stadlen und fiederrerblnduLdxee« Stedien. So macht er sich eelfst denj-inwurx, dass seine Methode nur zu 'ferti^
°^ ekte« i-«nre.r3u
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Troeltsch received f.om Rickert also his em^asis on the
T»l»e structure of Historical Totalities. Ibis dependence we
sketched above
-under Sinn- oder ^1^1 trn « Rickert
seemed unable to explain, however, how we can pxoceed f10m the
formal or absolute system of ideal values, which he constructed
to the actual values of history and vice versa. Riokerti sayE
Troeltsch, does not secure his system of values out of history
lt-elf. and hence it is not apparent what relation such norms
2. Ibid.
, 237.
3. £ee above, page
OSI
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can have to the historical process. As a result three basic
difficulties emerge:
1. "Das Rickertsche Wertsystem, soweit es wlrkiich auf
rein formale, apriorische und vernunftnotwendige ^/erte zurflck-
geftlhrt ist.tsfgegen die Gescnichte nicht bloss indifferent,
sondern dem Flusse und der Unendlichkeit des Werdens geradezu
entgegengesetzt
.
nl Through a purely formalistic means,
Rickert tries to satisfy two needs; the apriori systematics of
value and the historical movement itself. ^ The result is noth-
ing "but the old Kantian opposition "between sense and reason,
feeling and transcendental necessity, pathology and autonomy,
which leads to anti-historicism ( Antihistorismus )
.
4 Moreover,
this method of valuation gives us no principle of historical
selection or of organization within the Individual Totalities. 5
History becomes nothing else than an "Arsenal von Beispielen
fur die Werttheorie .
"
6
2. Rickert' 8 approach is too contemplative. Troeltsch
says that Rickert' s Wert system is simply a norm ( Mass stab ) , but
not a fformunp;3prinzip for the empirical historical unities; it
affords no principle of selection among values in history but
merely contemplates them from without. The norns are thus not
T. (JS, III, 151-1527
2. Ibid., 153.
3. Ibid
,
153-154.
4. Ibid. , 154.
5. Ibid. , 155. .
6. Ibid., 156.
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indigenous in history, "but external to it and produced by pure
reason. The Mas 3 stab is but an Inbe- ;rif
f
of certain ideals to
which nothing in empirical history can correspond. Thus while
Rickert seems to concede a great deal to history in his logic
of history, he takes it all back again in his theory 01 value
and of historical norms. 1
3# This point leads to a third criticism. Pox Riexert the
decisive thing is not the object, but the interest which se-
lects the object out of the continuum of its .arlebnisy/irklich-
keit. 2 The object is discovered and formed through the par-
ticular method which is employed. The historical object is ex-
tracted from its living whole purely through a process of ab-
straction and in no wise on the basis of the inner composition
and peculiarity of the object, i. e. , not from the anschaulich-
seelische Realitat itself. The subject thus creates its own
object. 3 This is a wrong method, says Troeltsch. The historian
must ground his investigation more firmly in the actual object.
As in the case of time and causality, so too here, the
Kantian influence predominates. 4 The principle of development
requires a less external and a none internal method of investi-
gation.
Das Ineinander von Gegenstand und Methode
kann der Methode nur gerecht werden., wenn
auch dem Ge L"enstand, und hier vor allem
1. GS, III, 156
2. Ibid. , 231.
3. Ibid. , 230,
4. Ibid. , 232.
I
der inneren Bewegtheit cles historisexien
Lebens, sein voiles, ganz realist isches
Kecht wircl.
Thus it becomes clear that for Rickert development is an
arrangement of the investigator, who presents the facts as if
they served the realization of values. On the other hand, for
the historian, development is an inner movement of the object
itself in which we must intuitively submerge ourselves or
o
lecognize that one is actually submerged in it. To understand
the inner movement of history involves understanding the na-
ture of time. But Troeltscn's criticise of Rickert on this
point we have already mentioned. Suffice it to say that
Troeltsch conceives of development by means of a more concrete
conception of time. Though in general he builds on the logic
of history which Rickert developed, he nevertheless goes beyond
the latter in that he emphasizes more the contingent and cre-
ative character of Individual Totalities; above all, he makes
the principle of development the decisive historical concep-
tion. In so doing he tries to bridge the gap between a formal
system of values and individual reality,^
B. Troeltsch' s Conception of Development
From Troeltsch' s criticisms of Hegel, Marx, the Positi-
vists, and Bickert we may glean the following propositions with
T. as, III, 233.
2. Ibid.
,
234; cf . 151
3. Ci . Tillich, op. cit., 356. See also GS, III, 642 ff.
where Troeltsch discusses h'ergson at length.
up t r f*
9io bn& i'nsgnijnc© 9fw ©ion essxw^n^xrcs on j*»
124
regard to historical development.
1) Historical development denotes a dynamic psychical
process which tends tovvard an end, a development akin to log-
ical evolution.
2) Historical develops ent does not mean universal prog-
p
ress; on the contrary, development is contingent.
3) Historical development is a teleological irocess
which expresses itsell through the internal unity of meaning
3
and value of the Individual Totality.
4} Time in historical development must "be conceived of
as concrete duration, and not as mathematical physical time.^
5) Any monistic Univer salgeschichte must be rejected in
favor of a view which gives due consideration to the intrinsic
value of every Individual Totality. "J'ede Epoche ist unmittel-
bar zu Gott." 5
6) The irrational, individual, accidental, and dystele-
ological facts of history must be admitted and accounted for. 6
7) Historical development should not only include a sur-
vey of the past (Ht;gel), out should also taice account of fu-
ture goal3 (Marx).^
8) The economic interpretation of h> story, though in it-
T. See above page 90; cf. 32RE, VI, 720; GS, ITT, 657.
2. See above pages 91-93; cf. GS, III, 382.
3. See above pages 92,113; cf, GS, III, 77, 112, 132.
4. Cf. GS, III, 184, 135, 642-643.
5. See above page 100; cf. GS, III, 121, 132.
6. See above page 91ff»
7. See above -age 106; cf. GS, III, 77, 132.
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self inadequate to account for all the data of history, lias a
valid place as one method of historical research.
I 9) Historical development tai.es ^lace in and through real
unity and identity in the wholes or totalities. These are not
fictions, as the Fositivists contended.
10) The process of historical development is not a mere
product of the investigator's mind, but must "be recognized as
an objectively real process independent of our mnda
.
11) The philosophy of historical development is not mere
contemplation from without, hut should constitute a Zormun^s -
prinzip for values in history.'*
These are the general conclusions which may he drawn from
the previous sections of this cnapter. They are principles
which the writer "believes Troeltsch to hold. To these eleven
propositions, however, we must add sever:.! other which are de-
rived fiom Troeltsch' s more systematic presentation of his own
view. 5
1) Historical development is grounded in human personali-
ty. This grounding is two-fold. 7irst, there is the develop-
ment of the embryonic tendencies and ideas of personality in
their interplay with environmental factors. Secondly, person-
ality has the capacity to adapt permanent or changing natural,
r T, See above page 109; cf. GS, III, 756.
2. Gee above page 114; cf. GS, EEC, 142.
3. See above page 122»
4. See -.love pa;;e 121; cf. GS, III, 70, 113-114.
5. These additional points are based on an essay entitled,
M Hi3torie und Erkenntnistheorie
,
rt GS, III, 655-693.
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social, and historical conditions in accordance with its pur-
poses. Both of these activities are teleological , hat con-
sciousness plays a larger role, says Troeltsch, in the first
than in the second. Nevertheless, it is in the activity of
both together that the clue to the understanding of historical
development is won, for the Individual Totalities partake both
of conscious and of unconscious elements, and express purpose,
meaning, and adaptation.^-
2) Although the inner logic of the developing totality
rests finally upon the goal or purpose of these wholes, which
exjjress conscious forces, nevertheless, unconscious factors
often interrupt the historical processes. Men are often swept
off their feet by unanticipated consequences of their own ac-
tions, "oreover, the later effects of human tendencies and im-
pulses often clash with contradictory earlier ones which are
2
still influencing the activities of the whole. The unconscious
and the conscious elements are not always equally balanced, and
the former often prevent the proper expression of the latter. 3
3) The concept of development must taire into account boti,
the universal and the inner continuity, the unity of the move-
ment of the whole and the fluid inner unity. Hegel's dialectic,
says Troeltsch, expresses the first of these two factors; 3erg-
1^ GS, III, 657; zzo above, Ch. Ill, p. 71.
2. Loc. cit.
3. Ibid., 658.
i
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son's conception of duration and movement the second. But
Hegel reduced the logic of this movement to universal move-
ments of pure theoretical thought, while, on the other hand,
Bergson shows only the flux of everything and the dissolution
of every individual living being into universal activity, with
out any division or structure of the process. History has no
real unity or form on this "basis. Troeltsch*s criticism of
Hegel here seems unfair, for Hegel is much more empirical than
this view credits him with "being. There was a tendency in
Hegelian thought, however, toward Spinozism which did not give
ample recognition to the individual and unique facts 01 life.
A synthesis of Hegel and Bergson is thus desirable.^
4) Historical development cannot "be understood as a mere
subform of cosmic evolution. 3 The attempt to solve historical
problems by making history subsidiary to some universal evolu-
tionary process goes at the problem backwards. In order to ex
plain the developmental tendencies of Individual Totalities it
is not necessary to make such a deduction. Indeed, the tenden
cies of Individual Totalities are the basis for the universal
laws and make our formulations of them possible, not the re-
verse. There is no objection to trying to find the place of
history in the universal cosmic process, but the latter can
1. GS, III, 659; cf. 141. Hegel's conception of the con
crete universal and of dialectical process is not ade
quately ciccounted for at this point.
2. Ibid., 660.
3. Ibid., 661; cf. 662, 664-665.
((
give us no clue as to the logic or the former.
This "brings us "back to one of the central problems of our
discussion, viz., whether the process as Troeltsch has de-
scribed it is a mere pragmatic arrangement of the facts, a
transcendental logically constructed product of thought, or
whether a real unity and connection has been intuited and '
grasped.^ Accordingly, our problem is an epistemological one.
Troeltsch flatly rejects the Neo-Kantiaii idea of the produc-
tion of the object through thought. His own view appeals to
Leibniz and Malebranche.
Troeltsch holds that Leibniz conceived of the ego as a
monad, which by virtue of the unconscious or its identity with
universal consciousness participates in the whole content of
reality, including external things and other selves ( das
Fremdseelische ) . The monad carries these potentially ( virtu -
ell ) in itsell , and under certain circumstances it is able to
relate all of these things to itself. Moreover, by logical
means it is able to supplement and enlarge far beyond consciou
experience the intuited relationsnips which they contain.
3r hat die endlichen Geister durchstrflmen-
den Lebenszusammenhange als innergSttliche
,
in der ontologiscnen und teleologiucnen
Einheit des gflttlichen Lebens begrttndete,
kontinuierliche Bewegungen zugleicn schauen
und denken kflnnen, wenn er aach den Auf-
trieb allzu eng in der Vollendung des Wis-
1. GS, III, 667.
2. Ibid., 672.
3. Ibid., 673.
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sens und die Kontinuitat allzu naturalist icon
in der matnematlschen Folge der Differentiale
gesenen hat.
The monad signifies the identity of the finite and the in-
finite spirit together with the finiteness and individuality
of the former. What is of interest to Troeltsch in this con-
ception is not the bizarre mathematical aspects of the monad
or its windowlessness ( Pensterlosigkeit ) , hut the part icipat ion
of the finite in the infinite. It was with the same motif, says
Troeltsch, that Malebrancne held to the participation of the
finite mind in the inner life of the absolute spirit. The
unity of becoming and all process are explained not by the
causal principle (in its empirical linear sense and its series
of effects), but by participation in the fundamental life-unity
behind all phenomena. Thus also is explained our knowledge of
other selves, their content, goals, and values. All these are
known in God.
"ITichts ist aussen, nichts ist innen," und
es ist "Kern der ITatur mitten im Herzen,"
aber nicht bloss der Kflrpernatur, sondern
der allee Jremdseelische zugleich umfas-
senden Gottesnatur .
*
„^ Jit is on this basis tnat Troeltsch hope3 to overcome the
difficulties of and to unite both the Hegelian and the Berg-
sonian points of view ("der Streit der Lebensanschauer und der
?ormdenker H ) . The conceptual forms which were received in in-
T. GS, III, 675.
2. Ibid., 676.
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tuition and expanded in thought are tne inner connections
( Zusaruiaenhfln^e ) of the divine spirit. Troeltsch hold3 that
tnis conception must not "be confused with tne Spinozistic
identity of thought and tiling. But wnen he describes this re-
lation as "die wesenhafte und individuelle Identitat d,er end-
lichen Geister mit dem unendlichen Geiste und eben damit die
intuitive Partizipation an dessen konkretem Gehalt und bewegter
Lebenseinheit , ** it is difficult to avoid a monistic interpre-
tation. Intuition is for Troeltsch the key to the solution of
these problems. And yet, it would seem that there are only
two possible alternatives present; either the intuition is an
immediate participation in the divine nature or the intuition
is only _of God. In the first case, we would nave a monistic
knowledge relationship which would cormit us to a metaphysics
of identity. In the latter case, it would be problematic
whetner the intuition cave as real knowledge or not, and the
intuition would require further verification. There seens to
be a confusion in Troeltsch^ own conception
,
for, although he
speaks of participation, he also speaks of occasional causes,
and 3ays explicitly that intuitions are not immediate. 2 He
continually strives to avoid a philosophy of identity.
Troeltsen admits that we must not try to prove too much by
this principle of participation; for the monad remains a finite
E GS, III, 577.
2. Ibid. , 634.
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monad. Even though it has its ground and essence in God, yet
it remains a finite "being and its knowledge is very limited.
Moreover, the limitation is not merely quantitative, as would
"be the case if the monad participated in only a section of
God's mind, "but the limitation is qualitative and the. identity
of monad and God is conditioned.^" This i3 apparent because;
1) all intuition depends on the real interaction of the monad
with its environment. 2) Knowledge is dependent on the sense
organs and the general conditions of the "body. 3) Human logic
is obviously limited in its capacity to overcome contrr.dic-
tions and antinomies. 4) All human thought is ultimately cir-
cular
. Troeltech * I position here seems to be at once monistic
and dualistic. On the one hand there is the Identitatacharak-
ter of our knowledge and on the other hand knowledge is an-
thropological. He says:
Hinter allem und am Ende von alleia steht
die Metalogik, in welcher unsere anthro-
pologic^ bedingten logischen Mittel und
der gflttliche Lebenszusammenhang auf vfll-
lig unbekannte Weise auaammehntngenT*
In spite of these theoretical difficulties, Troeltsch in-
sists that this is the only proper solution of the problem of
knowing other selves and Individual Totalities. And on our
ability of knowing other selves depend the possibilities of
common thought, philosophizing, and action. 3
T; as, IHT6777
2. Ibid., 678.
3. Ibid. , 678.
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Das Er ends eel ische kann nur erkannt werden,
weil wir es vernOge unserer IdentitAt mit
dem Allbewusstsein anschaulich in uns selber
tragen und es verstehen und einprinden kflnnen
wie uns ex eigenes Leber*, indem wix es doch
zugleich als ein fxemdes, einex eigenen l!o-
nade angehflriges emplinden.*
Just how Txoeltsch could affirm this aftex he had admitted that
the relation between the transcendental subject and the psy-
chological subject is vflllig dunkel , remains a mystery. ^ But
it is on the basis of such an e-istenology that he proceeds
to affirm that the concepts of development are nothing but the
"Selbsterfassung der lnnexen, gescnauten und durch die Ver-
mittelungen miterlebten, wexdenden Sinnzusammenhange des Ge-
schehens selbst. n 3 Ultimately, it seems to remain an act of
faith that the whole stream of living history is embedded
somehow in the reality of God, a God who somehow combines the
positive qualities of Hegel's and of 3ergson's philosophies.
Behind all of the latex writings of Troeltscn there is
the background of his earlier positive religious metaphysics.
In one of his essays, "Die christliche Weltanschauung und
ihre Ge jenstrflmun^en , ** published in 1894 he grounds his theory
of development in a Selb str.it teilun^ Gotte s. "Denn Gott 1st
ja selbst das Sein, das Zentrum, das Absolute in diesem ewigen
Fluss und Werden relativ sich bedingender 3egebnisse und 3nd-
lichlieiten. w4 In this essay he also affirms that in all
T. GS, III, 534.
fe, Ibid. , 681.
3. Ibid. , 686.
4. GS, I, 311.
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change there must be an abiding truth, This "ist eine Forde-
rung jedes idealen Glauben3, auf die verzichten auf den Sinn
der Welt verzichten heissen wttrde." 1 The certainty amid the
flux of human history concerning the meaning and the abiding
truth ot existence is affirmed in religion, in "belief in
eternal truth, which is Imparted by God himself. 2
This religious certainty was given up by Troeltsch at
least theoretically in his later years. In the concluding
chapter the significance of this change will become apparent.
What is of immediate importance is to point out that the
Individual Totalities which appear in constant development
,
and which are nevertheless unities of meaning and value, re-
quire further validation. How are the unities of value to be
criticized and changed, and what place does the individual
have in the ; rocess of the whole? In the construction of fu-
ture experience what are the cultural syntheses which should
be effected? We have seen how Troeltsch has rejected several
types of developmental interpretation and has affirmed a tele-
ological temporal development within the limits Of Individual
Wholes. The remaining task of our study is to investigate the
principles which lie behind the crertion of cultural syntheses,
as Troeltsch calls them.
I 1. Oil *i 311,
2« Loc. cit.
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CHAPT3R FIVE
The Cultural Synthesis
I. Development and. the Cultural Synthesis
Troeltsch's conception of historical development requires
that the study of history cannot he concluded properly with
the present, but involves decisions and constructions for the
future. Life requires that ;/e not only review the past, "but
also seel: to direct the course of the future. In his essays
published under the name of Christian Thought
,
he constantly
refers to this function of philosophy. He speaks of "the prob-
lem of controlling and dominating the immense stream of histor-
ical life, a stream Y/hich grows continually more rapid and more
extended, and not merely of constructing theoretically its suc-
cessive stages and its laws of movement. But this means....
that History requires us to come to grips with the idea of an
abiding system of values which shall give us our standards . ''^
We shall try to show that Troeltsch fails to ^ive an adequate
foundation for such an abiding system of values, and that, ac-
cordingly, his principle of Individual Totalities breaks down
at a crucial point.
1. CT, 42.
(
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A. The Practical Nature of the Philosophy of History
•T*ntThere exists, says Troeltsch. no purely contemplative sci-
ence, whether about the objects of nature or about history;
whether in the motives of a particular science or In its re-
sults, there is always a practical interest. Spinoza's pure
contemplation led to ethics, and Kant*s theories of pure reason
limited knowledge so as to make room for faith. There is thus
a very practical problem which confronts the philosopher, for
the logic of history without a construction of the future is a
mere torso. Such a construction must take account of both zhe
logical and the empiric- 1 elements of the developmental process.
Unless empirical history is secured by logical foundations it
is like a house without a foundation. Logic alone, however,
would give a mere ideal; it would present only the general out-
lines sketched by a dreaming soul or a sovereign will. All of
our knowledge of the pest must serve as the foundation of un-
derstanding the present and of constructing the future.^
B. Problems of a Cultural Synthesis
Historical development must eventuate then, according to
Troeltsch, in a cultural synthesis. That such a synthesis can-
not be deduced from a rationalistic monism, the previous chap-
ter has clearly shown. 4 History knows no universal concept out
T. GS, III, 70.
2 . Lo c . c i t
.
3. Ibid., 77
4. See Chapter Four.
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of which it can deduce the content and succession of its
events, "but knows only concrete, individual, and unique facts.
1
The author holds that all universal norms and values arise only
as ideas which require validation in the empirical data the; -
selves
.
The individual in history is a problem, an Aufgabe or a
Sollen . Each center of activity in history is an ought for
Troeltach and contains a universal which must be evolved. The
recognition of this fact shows that the purely presentative and
research aspects of history must be supplemented by a handelnde
Oescliichtc
,
or, what is the same thing, a study of the individ-
ual constantly forming and reforming himself. 2 Ought in his-
tory brings together the philosophy of history and ethics.
All philosophers are forced to face the problem of ethics. But
this cannot be purely a study on its own account. It is a
practical necessity. In his essay on "Historiography" Troeltsch
writes :
The chaos of value-judgments , the perplexing
impression made by which is but intensified
by the perpetually fluctuating course of
history, can be transcended only by grouping
the questions together and finding tneir
answers in a complete system of values .
Such a system of values, however, is neither
more nor less than Ethics.
4
As discussed in Chr istian Thought ethics presents two main
aspects, the morality of conscience and the ethics of cultural
T. acr7~297
2. C-S, III, 78.
3. Ibid., 79, 81.
4. ERE, VI, 722.

values. m^
Besides the specific problems of ethics the construction
of a cultural synthesis requires finding norms by which we can
understand historical epochs and appraise concrete values.
Troeltsch holds that since all values are immanent in history
the norms of criticism must also he derived from history.
1
These norms are a priori and spring up out of the spontaneous
creativity of history itself. 2 The a priori is necessary "both
for the understanding Of the epoch in which one finds oneself
and for the cultural synthesis. 3
This then leads to the problems of religion. Is Christi-
anity absolute? Here we shall have to examine the religious
a priori Qi Troeltsch and his general religious philosophy,
for behind all of his ethical and valuational discussions lies
a religious metaphysics.
The cultural synthesis at which Troeltsch arrives is
called der Euro^aismus . With it we shall conolude our investi-
gation of his philosophy of history,
II. Philosophy and the Norms of History
To be historical and to be relative are identical. 4 Mod-
ern historical ci iticisiu hs,s dissolved all dogmas into the flux
of process until no absolute values seem to remain intact. 5
E GS, III, 117.
2. Ibid. , 157-168,
3. Ibid. , 172.
4. Ibid. , 52.
5. ACH, 3-4.
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This, however, says Troeltsch, does not condemn us to an abso-
lute relativism or skepticism, as many suppose. Skeptical
relativism is due to three tilings: 1) The detailed treatments
of historical problems are often so analytical and abstract
that they tend to destroy the sense of the whole movement of
history. 2) By explaining everything out of the previously
riven (analogous to the methods of natural science), some his-
torians invite a skeptical attitude tov/ard value:;. 3) The
hypothetical nature of a scientific investigation which aims
to 'ive no judgment of right and wrong in history often leads
to a disregard of all values and hence to belief that one
event in history i3 as good as another, or that all are equal
-
ly indifferent to norms. Troeltsch believes that this rela-
tivism is not necessary, but that norms do exist in history
and that one can arrive at an adequate basis of judgment. Rel-
ativism for him means only that all historical appearances a.re
dependent on a whole which is itself not a material absolute,
and that only from the point of vie?/ of one*s place in the
p
whole can an evaluation take place. There is no absolute,
changeless, and unconditioned timeless value in history. Such
norms may lie beyond history in a realiu "das nur der Ahnunj
und dem G-lauben zuganglieh ist."3 History does not exclude
norms; on the contrary its essential work is "gerade die Her-
T. ACR, 53-54.
2. Ibid. , 57.
3. Loc. cit.
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vorbringung der Normen und der Kacipf um Zusammenj assung dieser
Ebrmen
.
Troeltsch here lias emphasized an important point. V.o con-
crete value in history is final. All of our values are histor-
ically conditioned and are in need of constant revision.
Whether the ideal values and the system of values by which we
judge the present and malce plans for the future completely
transcend history or are in history remains to "be examined be-
low. The fundamental proposition stands that all of our values,
like Christianity itself, in all the moments of their history
are purely historical appearances and possess all the limita-
tions of individual events. Troeltsch does not deny the fact
of norms in history, "but does he give them an adequate founda-
tion?
A. The Significance of the Individual Totality
The material philosophy of history must confine itself to
the cultural environment (Historical Totality) of the philoso-
pher. The latter must "be so steeped in the whole process and
inner continuity of this whole tliat his construction will ap-
pear to arise logically out of the whole past of his Totality.
3
History, we have learned, cannot be regarded as a process in
which a universal and everywhere similar principle, though con-
1.
2.
5.
ACR, 57~5S.
Ibid. , 51.
GS, III, 75.
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fused and obscured, is operating; nor is it a continual re-
combining of elemental psychical powers which indicate a gen-
eral trend toward a rational end or goal of evolution. His-
tory is rather
an immeasurable, incomparable profusion of
always-new, unique, and hence individual
tendencies, welling up from undiscovered
depths, and coming to light in each case
in unsuspected places and under different
circumstances
The fundamental concept here is the Individual Totality.
All the cultural values are limited in Troeltsch's view to
Historical Totalities. The latter stand over against each
other as autonomous wholes. One totality cannot prescribe the
norms for the others. Thus we remain in the realm of the his-
torical particular even in our creations of the future. This
occurs
in the more radical sense of a molding of
universal tendencies into historical cre-
ations of culture - a molding which is
peculiar, unique, and sai generis ; and
here the whole spirit of an epoch, which,
at the least, strongly influences such
creations and coordinates them in a cer-
tain unity, is of itself a full individual
system of thought in harmony with the
whole set of conditions of the epoch.
If the stream of history is to be dammed, then, it must
be within the Individual .Totality in which we find ourselves.
But we do not live, says Troeltsch, in just one whole; we live
1. CT, 13-14; cf. Chapter III.
2. CT, 83.
0*1
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in various social complexes wnicn "r.re in the last resort con-
centric and each of which ha*; its own intellectual content. "1
However, these complexes cannot be elevated into a universal
form or a single all-determining accent. A universal concept,
like Humanity , would not be very definite and hence cannot be
a concrete value. The social complexas in which we live are
some particular cultural sphere, a national community, a fam-
ily, besides many other special associations and social cir-
cles. M In all these complexes we live simultaneously, without
difficulty and without confusion. whether these historical
wholes can be transcended is the essential problem :;hich we
have to face. In his later writings Troeltsch maintained that
the norms of value as well as the concrete values chosen are
limited within the bounds of the Individual Totality. In his
earlier writings, however, he held to a type of Platonism
which though recognizing the uniqueness and Sinmali^keit of
historical events, yet preserved a universal validity and ab-
soluteness for some values.
B. Troeltsch' s Platonism
When trying to understand Troeltsch' s solution to the
problems here presented, we are limited by the fact that he
nowhere gives a consistent or complete account of his own posi-
T. GT, 121.
2. Ibid., 123.
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tion. His criticisms of others are usually brilliant, but his
own position is difficult to appraise. B Ton von Httgel quotes
Friedrich Meinecke as saying of him:
His friends ... .have been driven to confess
that his positive leading ideas and aims
stood in a certain disproportion to the
amazin_ riches of his speculative histor-
ical outlook; and that his weighty speech
would often curiously ebb away when, at
the end of impressive reproductions of the
life and thoughts of others, he was put to
develop his own position in a firm, clear,
and unambiguous manner.
*
Although much in Troeltsch's view is obscure, there seems
clearly to be present in his thought a shift from an earlier
more rationalistic and Kantian viewpoint (we might also say
Lotzean) to a later intensely anti-monistic and even anti-
rationalistic point Of view. Perhaps the clearest expression
of his earlier standpoint is found in an essay which appeared
in the Harvard Theological Review in 1912, entitled, "Empiri-
cism and Platoni3m in the Philosophy of Religion." In this
essay, written in honor of William James, he discussed two
points, 1) the contrast between James* ideas and the European
philosophy of religion, and 2) the positive value of James'
views. The two systems of thought, said he, have much in com-
mon. Both set out not from given theological norms of truth,
but from the whole field of religious phenomena. Secondly,
1. CT, xxii-xxiii, quoted from Deutsche Nation
,
"Ernst
Troeltsch und das Problem des Histor ismus , " March,
1923. I have not been able to consult this article
first hand.

the £oal is not determined by outside authority or dogma.
Thirdly, there is no assumption of a miraculous supernatural-
i MB . *
The characteristic differences must be sought within the
sphere of common presupposition. James is "distinguished from
others solely by the fact that to him the presupposition pre-
sents itself as the only vital working hypothesis at present
available, whereas we see in it the demand of reason, asserting
itself as soon as the constraint of inherited prejudice is
p
withdrawn.
The fundamental characteristic of Uluropean philosophy of
religion is its Platonisr.i. "Its consistent aim is to transcend
the merely actual through the demonstration that, seething and
developing within it, is a rationally necessary conceptual ele-
ment. "3
The leading ideas of the Platonic tradition to which
Troeltsch then subscribed are as follows : 1) that "conscious-
ness, as a finite concretion of the universal cosmic conscious-
ness, and taken together with the necessary presuppositions
which are a , riori and potentially contained in it, is the
source of religion."^ 2) The a priori is the kernel of the re-
ligious phenomena. 5 3) The essence of religion actually ap-
pears as a constantly changing and mobile phenomenon. This
T; Harv . Theol . Rev. , 5 (1912) 402.
2. Ibid. , 403.
3. Ibid. , 404.
4. Ibid., 407
5. Ibid. , 407-408.

essence never lies quite in "broad daylight and consequently
the problem remains whether it is ever realized completely.^"
4) The consciousness, from which the investigation of religion
sets out, is more than mere fact, "being a compound of both
the necessary and the contingent. Such a way of thinking
gains its final security only when it firmly anchors the in-
dividual consciousness, of itself always contingent, in the
holding-ground of 'consciousness in general 1 ."2
Troeltsch holds that James' radical empiricism is radical
anti-Platonism. He is opposed to all apriorism, to every
rational theory of knowledge, and to any presupposition in fa-
vor of necessity and synthesis. 5 Troeltsch says that James 1
way to normative and valid knowledge is by means of biological
evolutionism and idealized utilitarianism. "Knowledge is
guaranteed solely by practical faith and determined solely by
the degree of its verification in practice. For him the in-
dividual is everything; and the individual is an element in a
continuous stream which makes everything relative." 4 In this
scheme logic is only a labor-saving device. "The ethical and
other necessities, the values and ideals, are the more or less
provisional condensation of experience concerning what en-
hances, steadies, and harmonizes life."^ Like the Platonists,
1. ~Karv . Theol . Bev., 5 (1912) 408,
2. Ibid. , 408-409.
3. Ibid. , 409.
4. Ibid. , 410.
bos*
James starts from consciousness out this latter is stream de-
void of all apriori unity and devoid of all connection be-
tween contingent consciousness and consciousness in general. 1
^JUrthermore , the worth of religion and the recognition of it
defend upon its actual working, "nat upon the demonstration
that it is derived from any 'source 1 , whether psychological, or
zoological, or ontological. The result is that no idea oi re-
ligion is in fact possible."^ This leads to the next point,
namely, that while the European philosophy of religion, "from
its premise of a unitary essence, seeics to comprehend the his-
torical stages of evolution as teleological , James knows the
varieties only as psychological variations, in every case de-
pendent on general psychical condition and on nervous consti-
tution." 3 Moreover, any standard of discrimination and grada-
tion as rationally necessary does not exist. Rather "does the
standard emerge in the vital movements and adjustments which
contribute to tne self-preservation and self-expansion of the
race." 4 Here the idea of lvalue for life takes the place of
truth or validity, and ontology is left peculiarly vague.
The basic difference between the Platonism of tne Europe-
an tradition and the empiricism of James is the contrast
between the inner majesty of the absolutely
necessary and valid, on the one hand, and
practical vitality and concreteneos , unim-
T. Harv. Theol. Hev. , 5 (1912) 412-413.
2. Ibid., 413.
3. Ibid. , 414-415.
4. Ibid. , 415.
5. Ibid. , 416-417.
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paired "by scientific abstractions or by ideas
of unity or law, on the other. The one view
inclines to monism and pantheism, the other
to untiring activity and to living interac-
tion between God and the soul. The one finds
its demonstration in its intuitive apprehen-
sion of the necess ry and the universally
valid, the other in the spiritual power and
effect of the mystical state.
Troeltsch says that "for myself I can only accept the a
priori
,
transcendental philosophy. It seems to me closely
bound up with the recognition of all logical validity . »• He
goes on to affirm that a doctrine of values in the field of
ethics and aesthetics is not to be constructed without the
idea of an element unqualifiedly valid, issuing from the na-
ture of consciousness. "In religion a relation to a whole, to
an absolute, to something possessing inner necessity, is al-
ways indispensable." 2 Thus Troeltsch is here a substantial
Platonist. 3 ifevertheless , he admits the significance of
James' point of view and confesses that "the i:..pressiOii of
James 1 presentation, living, unprejudiced, saturated with re-
ality, grows on me." 3 What must be done is to "adapt into
Tlatonism the element of truth which Pragmatism holds." 3
This synthesis of Platoiiism and Pragmatism can be ef-
fected, he believes, in the following way. The transcendental
method starts from a purely psychological analysis and seeks
the point where the apriori element of consciousness asserts
Harv . "Theol . Rev
. , 5 (1912) 418.
2. Ibid., 419.
3. Ibid., 420.
6i
itself. Such an analysis must proceed in purely positive and
empirical fashion, and can "operate, provisionally, with the
fundamental assumptions of empiricism and pragmatism. But all
that is a purely provisional description and analysis of the
phenomena. § "James, "by retaining, as he does, in such an
analysis the conception of the religious object as a residual
datum, indicates the point at which the transcendental analy-
sis can start and penetrate deeper. "^ in this essay Troeltsch
does not make this penetration, and we shall investigate his
analysis of this problem later.
The issues now lie clearly before us, and the general na-
ture of Troeltsch' s solution is here indicated. Though the
discussion above is limited to the field cl religion, the
fundamental problem is the same for the whole sphere of ex-
perience, including history. Troeltsch is seeking an element
in consciousness which will serve as a center of validation
and as the logical basis for etnics and a system of values.
Such a center of validation will aid him in constructing the
cultural synthesis Which carries on the ,/ork ox historical
development. This center of validation ne calls an a priori.
It is not going too far to assert that the whole case of
Troeltsch* s philosophy of history rests on the solution of
this problem of an a priori.
3^ Karv. Theol. Rev ., 5 (1912) 420.
2. Ibid. , 420-421.
3. See below, pages 153-162.
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C. Inner-historical Horns
That Troeltach rejects all absolute universal Material
norms in history hardly needs repeat ingi On the contrary, all
norms muat be found in historical reality itself. 1
*)er individuelle imaancnte Wert eines his-
torischen Gebildes muss daher auer it ateto
an si oil aalbst genieseen so in. 2
Bat how can the concrete hiatorical life be judged?3 Here
there emerges one of the basic philosophical problems with re-
gard to the Individual Totality. The latter is a unity oi
meaning and value. But what shall be the criterion of judging
it" In this field, aays Trosltsch, Kant was a pioneer, but
unfortunately his method applied mucii nore to the natural sci-
4
ences thai: to history. As in the discussion of the philosophy
of religion so too in the field of history there are several
possibilities. The lollowinj quotation brings out clearly
what issues Troeltsch confronted in his thought on this probleri.
Gcht man von Idee und Kassstab auo, so
gerftt man in einen gesohichtslosen Rati-
onalisnus und verliert die Besiehun^ zur
eiiipirischen Historic und ihrer Praxis.
Oeht iran vom Kiotorisch-Individuellen aus
und bleibt man dadurch im liklfUmg mit der
"•or&chung, so drohen grenaenloser Helativis-
mus und Skeptiasisrius. Suoht man beides in
unstreichen '^ntwicklungsbe^
;
n^orn, so brecaaa die beiden Bestandteile
immer wieder aueeinandor. JTimrat man den
Standcrt resolut in £eg*aw&rti£er i^it-
scheidur:j und 'reataltunj, so verliert man
F, 04, It!. 111.
2. Ibid., 117.
I: Rftfc: M
3M.
nur ali«u lsicht Geschichte und Idee zu-
gleich. linpfindet man die vollen Schwierig-
lon «clc< iceiten des Pruble-is, dann wird es qu&lend
und man wendet sich gerne zu den Autoritftten
und Offenbarungen der Kirche zurllck, wie es
alte und neue Roniantiker aus begreiflichen
uarai.lv
,
. Grunden getan haben und wieder tun werden,
Oder man v/endet sich von den historisciien
Abendland ueberhaupt ab zu dem geschichts-
losen Orient, seiner liystik und seinem :iir-
-
vana, wie das Schopenhauer unternomnen hat
und wie es seitdem so oft als Unterschied
raltn. uncj yorzug der viel tieferen Orients ge-
feiert wird.l
The alternative which Troeltsch accepts is to seel: for a
hidden Produktionskraf
t
of the spirit in which autonomous rea-
son can give rise to norms and ideal3 which are required for
history. The kind of norm which will satisfy the require-
ments will be spontaneous, a priori, certain, without being
timeless, universal, and absolute.
Sie bedeutet zugleich, dass solche Kass-
3t&be selbst als individuelle Setzungen
aus jeder grossen Ge3antsituation heraus
neu gebildet und gefunden werden mtlssen.3
The historical norm must be an apriori spontaneous creation
which is self validating.
Das letzte Geheimnis dieser Vorg&nge ist
der Glaube an die darin offenbare und
zwingende momentane Yernunft und die
Kraft des 7'illens, einen solchen Glauben
zu bejaiien. 4
Such a norm, says Troeltsch, is a criticism of previous his-
1. GS, III, 162. See also the following discussion
where the merits of these alternatives .are discussed,
188*164.
2. GS, III, 154.
3. Ibid., 156.
4. Ibid. , 157-168.
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tory and a creation of the future. 1 It is a practical deci-
sion which is sovereign and distinctive, which is grounded in
itself, and which cannot he deduced from anything el.sc. nat-
urally, such norms differ among different thinkers, for each
has a different historical background upon which to dra.w. For
each thinker the decision to choose a certain norm is an act
of faith. ^ And this a,ct of faith is a product of intuitive
thought
.
4
1. Intuition
The inner -historical norm is distinctly intuitive. We
have met Troeltsch's appeal to intuition before in our dis-
cussion of development. 5 He bases a great deal on this con-
cept. By means of intuition he tries to ground the cultural
norm in the life of the Absolute.
Die Bildung der Massstabe . . . . ist also Sache
des Glaubens in dein tiefen und vollen Sinne
des Wortes; die Betrachtung eines aus dem
Leben herausgebildeten Gehaltes als Ausdruck
und Offenbarung des gdttlichen Lebensgrundes
und der inneren Bewegung diesej Grundes auf
einen uns unbekannten Gesamtsinn der Welt
hin, die Ergreifung des aus der jeweiligen
Lage erwachsended Kultur ideals als eines
ReprAsentanten des unerkennbaren Absoluten.
If we can show that intuition is not an adequate princi-
ple for the creation and validation of cultural syntheses, then
1. GS, III, 159.
2. Ibid.
,
170, 172.
3. Ibid. , 175.
4. Ibid* , 176.
5. See above Gh. IV, pages 128-131.
6. GS, III, 175.
itu
the whole future of historical development within the Individu-
al Totality is jeopardised. Intuition as a principle raises a
good many difficulties. In itself no clear conception attaches
to intuition. It resembles an immediat 3 experience of whatever
kind that is present to consciousness . Intuition is at once a
participation in the divine life, and yet it is not immediate.
TSpistemologicaily there seems to be a constant shifting be-
tween monism and dualis:.:. As used by Troeltsch the word in-
tuition usually lias a rational connotation though this is not
carefully worLed out, yet when associated with the religious
a priori or the historical a priori, intuition seems to be
anti-intellectualistic
.
The intuition of cultural norms in Troeltsch seems to pre-
suppose a synoptic view of historical facts. It is the focus
point of all our knowledge of the past and our constructions
of the future.
Immer erst in der Beruhrung zv:i 3 c lien Ver-
gangenen und Gegenwftrtigen bildet sich der
eigentliche letate entscheidende iiassstab,
der zugleich die Zukunftsgestaltung in die
unbel:annto endlose Zukunft hineintreibt*
Besides being based on a synoptic view of tilings the in-
tuition points to a metaphysical ground which is the final ba-
sis of all tilings . However, Troeltscn is vague as to the ex-
plicit nature of the world ground and how it functions in the
intuition. TTe are assured, that the intuited norm is free
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from any mere romanticiWR* There are guarantees of triis: 1)
Such thinking i3 saved from romanticism by the fact that the
philosopher is scientifically trained, and a scientific know-
ledge of nature will keen the norm within reasonable bounds.
2) The philosopher is also conscious of the fact that climate,
geography, and anthropology , as well as mind, are determining
factors in history. 3) The logical requirements of unity and
consistency are also important ("die logische .rorderun.j der
Vereinheitlichung und Verkntl^fung jedes Zusamnenhanges in sich
selbst.") 4) The formal demands of certain ethical principles
are also a guarantee .--
These guarantees show that the intuition is not the sole
criterion of the cultural synthesis, but that a number of fac-
tors have to be taken into account. This would make intuition
but the psychological form of the experience whicn had its
validation elsewhere. There can be no doubt that any decision
about trie future will be an act of faith and necessarily hypo-
thetical. Such a view, however, would be departing from
Troeltscn's position; for him the intuition is no mere hypoth-
esis. What he is seeking is some element in consciousness
which is a priori. He wishes to validate experience at its
source. But intuition of itself is not an adequate criterion
of truth; it may give us insights, though these are in no
sense final. They are acts of faith concerning the Absolute.
bm xiirw To sin
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To must conclude, then, that intuition fail3 to valid it a the
cultural ayntneais and on this point tho }irineipl* of Individu-
al Totalities lc seriously challenged.
2. The A Priori
that does Troeltoch roan lay an a priori? He first devel-
oped the conception in connection with hie philosophy of re-
3 ision ;nd later tvilisd it to history. It is for hin the ba-
«lc problew of all knowledge. Heine: Jann writes that it is
Troeltech'o greatest problen, Hjn goraucau ;,lo dan c*eheinnio
dor ^irkliciuxit, d.e Yexbindung dieses IrraUo.nal-Individaei-
len rait dera A; xiorisch-ftational-AlI;;e: eiaea hexsustellc-n."^
Knudson holds that *im Urn jeligieue Aprlorlsxi of troeltech
we have a justification ox religion fron tae standpoint of rea-
son.,.. There is not only a logical or theoretical reason, but
there is also a raoral reason, an aesthetic reason, and a re-
ligious reaaon; in other words, there is a reason that embraces
all the structural interests of the huiian mind.'*2 Troeltsch
dealt with the i>robla."i of the a priori frequently, but devol*
oped hla o-r-i vi r/ rtioularly in throe essay® t •Psycholo&ie
und Br&enataistneorie In der Religions viii senschaft," (I.K)4),
-rtv.o dee rel-.j> •: :. #ri t " (1909), and •Logos und
rythoa An -dor Theolegle uad Hei l^ie^eoiilleee^ile » " (1913). 3
Ehudson points out that in the first of these essays Troeltech
!H 215-52X67
2, I>T, 34>3i\; cf. 08, III, 180.
3. The first theee was published in Tubingen. The
last two saay be found In 05, CI,
531
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is quite rationalistic in his interpretation of the a priori;
in the second essay he "brings out a special sense of it which
is not rationalistically construed, but which Troeltsch still
insists is consistent with reason. The third essay seer.s to
"be anti-intellectualistic.^ Troeltsch' s thought thus 3eems
constantly to have moved in the direction of antirationalism.
This I think can "be definitely shown along severo.l different
lines, one of which we are to discuss here. 2
According to Knudson's interpretation, Troeltsch' s first
interest was to show that religion "is rooted in human nature,
and not only in human nature, but in reason itself. "3 The
apriori character of religion is guaranteed "by its inevita-
bleness, by the feeling of obligation immanent in it, and by
its structural relation to a rational world-view. "^ As de-
veloped in his second essay, Troeltscii holds, says Knudson,
that "the religious a priori is unique, distinct from tne in-
tellectual, the moral, and the aesthetic. It is not an intel-
lectual principle nor an appendix to morality, but something
peculiar, realized only in experience itself. It is not,
therefore, a 'rational' a priori in the same sense as is the
theoretic 1 a priori.... There is, consequently, a question
whether the word 'rational' 3hould be applied to the relig-
t T. SPT, 105f.
2. See also below on the historical a priori, pp. 157ff.
3. SPT , 1 2-103.
4. Ibid. , 103.
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ious a priori." 1 Farther on Knudson says that when Troeltsch
is emphasizing the unity of man f s rational nature, he speaks
of the a priori of reason, hut when he wishes to set forth the
distinctive qualities of the great interests of life he says
that each of these has its own a priori. "The religious a
priori, for instance, has its own completely anti-intellectual
peculiar ity . •* However, the attempt to satisfy "both the in-
tellectual and the nonintellectual elements in reason leaves
his thought In a state of unstable equilibr ium. ** Knudson'
f
exposition and criticism correspond with the facts. One may
go further, however, and affirvi that Troeltsch* s thought moves
steadily in the direction of irrationalism. The rational in-
terpretation of the a priori to which Knudson refers is clear-
ly present in the first essay. In the second there is also
still an intellectual emphasis. Here he says:
Uun gene ich freilich immerhin auch in
dieser zweiten Faasung des Apriori ueber
Kant nicht unerheblich hinaus. Indem ich
die synthetische I<unktion desselben im
Aufbau der einneitlichen Persflnlichkeit
betone und damit diese letztere auf einen
hinter dm Ablauf dex Seelennatur und
ihres Wirkuhgszusammenhanges liegenclen,
j ene Aprioris au3strahlenden Vernunftkern
zurttckfuhre, gelange ich zu der Metaphysik
des noumenalen Charakters. 4
And yet, even here he emphasizes the nonrationa.1 factors and
speaks of the religious a priori as an Svidenzgei'uhl . 5
1. SPT, 105.
2. Ibid., 107.
3. Ibid., 108.
4. GS, II, 758.
5. Ibid., 7G0.
5 c. I
<
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The third essay, whicji appeared four years later, is pre-
dominantly anti-intellectual in its interpretation of the re-
ligious a priori. Troeltsch says that we must understand re-
ligion "in seiner vflllig antiintellektualistischen Eigentttm-
lichkeit." 1 The norms of religion must "be purely religious.
Er muss verzichten, die Religion an ob-
Jektiven, ausserhalb ihrer liegenden und
eben darum sich nicht beruhrenden Uormen
zu messen, und muss die Sntscheidung aus
der im Streitialle sich mit innerer Kraft
aeussernden Subj ektivitat entnehmen 1
One must admit, however, that in spite of these irrationalistic
interpretations, Troeltsch always returns to his transcenden-
talism and insists that religion is grounded in the activity
of reason itself.*^
In all this the real nature of the a priori is left vague
and indeterminate. Hot content v/ith a merely rational a priori,
the author seeks for am anti-intellectual element in experience
which is self-evidencing. Reason alone doe.: not seem adequate-
ly to account for what i3 unique in experience itself. The
unique quality of religious experience leads Troeltsch at times
to lean strongly towards Schleiermacher ' s a priori of feeling.
^
Since Troeltsch did not give any definite content to this a
priori, Rnudson's criticism that he leaves it in a state of
unstable equilibrium seems just. Some critics, like Traub and
Jelke, have insisted that Troeltsch is able by his anti-intel-
T. GS, II, 820.
2. Ibid. , 830.
3. Ibid., 820.
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lectualism to arrive not at something real "but only at some-
i
thing phenomenal. The validity of religion lies in the unity
of reason, and any nonrational element in consciousness must
be brought before the bar of reason if its claims are to be
vindicated. An anti-intellectual a priori is a datum, a prob-
lem for further investigation.
When we turn from the religious a priori to the historical
a priori, the difficulties cited above are even more apparent.
Troeltsch constantly insists that here the a priori is not the
mere Kantian conception, but a spontaneous power arising out of
the creativity of trie individual.
Das bedeutet eine nicht weiter ableitbare
spontane Kraft des Geistes und eine Ueber-
fuhrung durch den inhaltlichen Sinn, der
fur seine Begrundung nicht weiter einen
Sinn usw. braucht.
Such an a priori is a simple fact of life, and the recognition
of it a decision of the will. Without such a recognition by
the will, says Troeltsch, there is no valid a priori 2 This
decision of the will is something quite different from Kant's
conception, for the a priori in Kant is not immanent in experi-
ence, 2 An a priori deduction of it is not possible. 3
At this point, however, Troeltsch comes dangerously close
to the pragmatism of James which he was contesting in his es-
say on Platonism, for he now speaks of an intuitive feeling of
1. Cited in~Rintelen, op. cit., 355 n.
2. GS, III, 179.
3. Ibid. ,130.
vai
necessity to which the will must bend; and the "Recht dieser
Anerkennung (kann) nur durch die Fruchtbarkeit des Gedajikens
nachtraglich bestatigt werden."* Thus the a priori turns out
to be nothing more than an Svidenz.efuhl
, which had already in-
fluenced his interpretation in his essay "Zur Frage des religi-
flsen Apriori."2 This feeling is described as follows:
Das Evidenzgefuhl ist nichts anders als das
Geftthl, das eine solche gelungene Sinstel-
lung begleitet, muss aber sein wirkliches
Recht erst durch die Leistung des gefundeden
Gedankens zum Verstftndnis des wirklichen be-
statigen.... Sein endgftltiges Recht ent-
scheidet erst die Leistung, die so zustande
kommt .
Here we have a logical circle. The a priori is not strict-
ly rational and yet it is the norm of historical values and
the epistemological foundation of the cultural syntheses. Its
final justification, however, is to be found in the experience
of which it is to be the basis. The a priori is hence not a
self-evident principle, but rather a mere hypothesis, and the
Svidenz,~effthl , far from being the foundation of historical
judgment, in any logical sense of that term, appears to be in
the same predicament as any other datum of experience. More-
over, if the final arbiter is the fruitfulness of the deci-
sions of the will, as Troeltsch says above, then, by applying
Occam's razor, we may dismiss the a priori entirely. If we
T. GS, II F, 180 .
2. Ibid., 130-181; cf. 179, 182-185, II, 760.
o. IbJ-d.
,
130-1 81,
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1 Hp ftpfll ujS"
: awoII o'i e& beoi^o;
159
appeal to tiie coherence of experience as our final test the
3ame conclusion follows. The a priori is either the validating
ground of experience in itself or it is an unnecessary concep-
tion. '.Te agree with Heinenaun wnen he says:
Mit anderen Wort en, das Apriori hat hier
nicht nur seinen Vernunftcharakter sondern .
auch seine Swigkeit und Allgemeingftltig-
keit aufgegeben, es 1st verfltlssigt und
verlebendigt , verzeitlicht und reduziert
sich auf das "Geftlhl, sich in die eigent-
liche Hauptbev/egung des Geistes, die in-
tuitiv herausgeftthlt ist. w ^
There are at least two other objections which may be made
to the a priori. The first of these is that Troeltsch 1 s a
priori tries too exclusively to validate experience at its
source. He tries to ground logical validity and historical
norms by finding an ultimate unanalysable element in human na-
ture. But this method is too genetic and psychological. The
origin or source of experience is not the locus of validity,
for this is found only in the unity of all experience, that is,
in reason.
An even more serious objection is that the a priori as ex-
^iained by Troeltsch tends towards an atomistic view of experi-
ence and of the self. Instead of clinging tenaciously to the
fact that the v/hole self is involved in religious and other
valuational judgments, Troeltsch seems to hold that besides
reason there are otner centers of validity for our several ex-
periences. Such a theory comes dangerously close to the old
T 1TWP, 216; cf. GS, II, 819-821.
SI
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faculty psychology with its compartriental theory of the mind.
Besides, there ie here a too rigidly formalistic and abstract
conception of reason. In his reaction against what he feared
was too monistic in Hegel, Troeltsch overemphasized the unique
and individual aspects of consciousness. Pom and content are
too radically divorced from each other. The result is that
instead of a unity of consciousness, the latter is split up
into island universes of experience.
The difficulties of Troeltscn's a priori become clearer
when we note the shift of ground which he makes in striving to
give objectivity to historical norms. Were the a priori really
adequate, any further grounding would be unnecessary. But the
real foundations of objectivity are found in a metalogical
monadology. He affirms that thought must stand in some secret
unity with reality and be bound with it by some common ground.
The unity and meaning of the whole, however, can only be sur-
mised or guessed ( g:eahnt ) ; it cannot be scientifically con-
structed. Ifct out of the All can we secure the individual, but
out of the security of the individual can we guess the All in
its living and active totality of meaning."*-
Damit stehen wir dann allerdings beim
Letzteri, bei dem Gottesgedanken, der als
irgendeine vorausgesetzte Orundvorstel-
lung der Dinge hintex alien Denken liegt.
Jedenfalls gibt es ohne ihn oder irgend-
ein Analogta zu ihm keine Massstabbil-
dung. 2
1. GS, III, 183.
2. Ibid., 183-184.
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Thug, for Troeltsch, the norms of history are ultimately
grounded in the living depths, movement, and change of the
divine will. 1 Though holding that we are in contact with the
Absolute, he affirms that we can never grasp what the nature
of the contact is. He does suggest, however, that God is im-
manent in our thoughts.
Das eigentliche Wagnis alles nicht bloss
formalen Denlcens besteht darin, dass fix
einen aufblitzenden Vernunftgedanken als
Ausfluss der gOttlichen Lebendigkeit zu
betrachten, zu erfassen und durchzu-
fuiiren wagen.2
Accordingly, all genuine universality and objectivity i3
grounded ultimately in an intuitive grasp of the divine will. 5
This intuition is inspired by our contact with history and is
tested by our comparisons in practical experience, but the lo-
cus of certainty and objectivity is God.
Troeltsch confesses the thoroughgoing individualism of
this view, for the truth which we have received in intuition is
limited to the great Individual Totalities in which we live.
Furthermore, each individual person Is immediate to God and
creates his ideal of himself and of the future out of his own
history and out of his own inner relationship to the divine
life. 4 Here the values believed in seem to be so conditioned
by the Individual Totality in which we exist, that we are shut
1. GS, III, 184. Troeltsch' s temporal is t ic conception of
God is well expressed on page 185.
2. Ibid. , 185.
3. Ibid. , 187.
4. Ibid. , 188.
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out from any universal values for mankind as a whole. The In-
dividual Totality seems to he a monad without any windows. The
junction of the intuition is to give us a sense of assurance
and reality in the midst of the unique and contingent stream of
history of which we are a part. It is a pure act of faith, when
Troeltsch says that "trotzdem ist dieses jedesmalige, sich aus
sich stets erneueinde Individuelle allerdings in ein univer-
sales eingebettet . b1 Far from giving a true objectivity to
value by an appeal to the activity of God, the a priori of his-
tory presents "but a fleeting standard of judgment in the uni-
versal flux and development of the historical whole. "7e are
forced to conclude that as a principle of validation, the a
priori fails completely, and the principle of Individual To-
talities thus breaks down at a crucial point.
D. The Problems of Ethics
To a large extent we have already x^resented Troeltsch'
s
fundamental principles of ethics in a general way. Tney invite
further elucidation, however. The problems of ethics are 01 two
general types and deal with the morality of conscience and with
the ethics of the cultural values.
1. The Morality oi Conscience
The morality of conscience has its root3 in Kant. 2 But the
etnical consciousness is more complex than Kant allowed. 3
T. GSTlII, 199.
2. CT, 45.
3. Ibid.
,
43-49.
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Sthics is an action, says Troeltsch, and all actions are reali-
zations of ends. Hence the unity of ethics can only "be de-
duced from the end. 1 This end is the attainment of a free
personality •whiflh has its foundations in itself and possesses
a certain unity of its own." 2 Hence personality is the deci-
sive idea.
Personality, the author holds, must be acquired and
achieved. Freedom and creation constitute the secret of per-
sonality. Creation takes place in obedience and in devotion
to the imperative * ought
'
, but this is only its formal aspect
of self-determination from within. 3 In its entirety it also
includes particular ends. 4 Personality has thus to develop
itself in a double direction, once towards itself and its
neighbor, and then in the form of corporate individuals. Kant
laid down the general principles of morality to self and to-
wards one* s neighbor and crowned his conception with the prin-
ciple of the dignity of human beings. However, in the second
kind of personality, the Group, the "natural consciousness of
the group is transfigured into an ethically founded devotion to
a moral-supsr-individual whole. "^
This whole must be considered as a community which ought
to be. "The group starting from its natural basis, is thus to
develop into a sj^ecial moral community through the union and
T. CT, 50.
2. Ibid., 51.
3. Ioc. cit,
4. Ibid. , 52.
5. Ibid. , 55.
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interconnection of its members." 1 Like the individual's, so
must also the selfishness of the group be overcome. Other
things to be overcome are the nere herd-instinct and- the mere
cooperation of interests. But such a transfiguration requires
both continuous criticism of the unity of the group and a con-
tinuous moral ennobling pf it. The whole, in order to achieve
this goal, must be obligated to purity and dignity. 2
Troeltsch contends that the same principles apply to the
relations of the groups, or collective personalities, toward
each other, as apply to the relations of single persons with
one another. 3 In principle we have to do with the "same de-
mands of justice and of kindness, of recognition and of educa-
tion, of respect and of support. "3 Thus there arises the ideal
of Humanity. But with the ideal there is also introduced the
problem,
may we expect that the historical stream of
life can be defined and shaped for us in
the light of these ideas which follow from
the formal nature of moral obligation. 4
This morality, Troeltsch points out, begins with a con-
trolling of mere nature from which it springs but with which
it struggles.
In its essence it is a perpetual struggle
and a perpetual creation. The very con-
ception of this morality means that it can
never be simply victorious. Victory would
be the end of struggle and freedom. 5
1. CT, 55 -56.
2. Ibid.
,
55.
3. Ibid. 57.
4. Ibid. 58.
5. Ibid. 62.
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But, moreover, the in3tinct3 and needs have their own inde-
pendent justification in the nature of man as it struggles for
food, room, life, and more life. 1 Troeltsch "believes that
there is no hope at all for the complete realization of the
moral ideal. T>Tc are always "bound to history and foredoomed to
compromise. Only at one point can history be transcended; and
this point is not the Totality as a whole, "but only the in-
dividual.
He alone transcends history.... The King-
dom of God, just because it transcends
history, cannot limit or shape history. 2
For concreteness of presentation the ethical problems
within the historical flux find in Troeltsch a brilliant ex-
pression. 3ut one feels that here, as on other occasions,
too sharp a distinction is rr13.de between the rational formal
aspects of ethics, wit.i its ideals, and^material demand
s
A so-
cial ethics. If the individual with his ideals can transcend
history and thus change the course of his own conduct, there
seems to be no reason for denying that the ideal and the im-
perative demands of the Kingdom of God might not direct the
Course of the development of the Totality as a whole. Cer-
tainly it has done so historically. When Troeltsch insists
that formal ethics are outside of time or history, 3 he is mak-
ing the problem unnecessarily difficult and is creating an
I" GT, Go.
2. Ibid. , 68.
3. Ibid., 79-30.
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unnecessary hiatus between conscience and value. Here his
conception of time is at fault, for he conceives of formal
principles as timeless, i. e., as outside of all time, wnereas
they are more accurately described as valid for all time.
Both conscience and value in ethics should be considered as
parts of one total system of ethical principles.
2. The Ethics of Cultural Values
Besides the formal morals of conscience, the ethical con-
sciousness presents man with value. The essence of these
values, says Troeltsch, is "that they are obligatory values or
objective ends - that is to say, actual values of a universal
validity." 1 The chief question here is, what are the substan-
tial ends which must be affirmed in order that such unity of
personality and spiritualization of a community can be devel-
oped?2
Since these values are entirely historical creations, they
divide themselves among the great cultural realms of the fam-
ily, the state, law, economic control of nature, science, art,
and religion. 3 "Each of these different great realms has its
own historical development, and each of its great historical
manifestations is an individual creation, corresponding to the
definite conditions of the period" in which it finds itself. 4
Troeltsch holds that just as the morality of conscience leads
T. CT, 71-72.
2. Ibid., 78.
3. Ibid., 80.
4. Ibid., 80; cf. GS, III, 202-203.
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history into the sphere of the timelessly valid, so conversely
the latter conducts us bad: into history and development,
especially into the real of the Individual. 1 The cultural
values are a full individual system of thought in harmony with
the whole set of conditions of the epoch. 2 History reveals a
number of attempts at a deduction of a system of values, but
all of them are helpless "in the face of the fulness and vigor,
and also of the tensions and cross-purposes, of cultural val-
ues in real life." 3
In his article on "Historiography," where the author givew
some consideration to the axiological problem, he says that we
are confronted with a circle:
We must interpret history by the degree in
which it approximates to ethical values,
and at the same time we must derive these
ethical values from history. 4
Such a circle, if radically followed through, would lead to the
worst kind of relativism, wuere it actually does drive Troeltsch
eventually. However, this circle is not hopeless if, contrary
to Troeltsch, we assign reason its proper concrete inner-his-
torical x unction. To be sure, no set of material values is ab-
solute, but, on the other hand, values can be formed in the
light of a system oi theoretical principles which, lie behind
all of our formulations. It is the conformity to formal law
T. CT, 82; cf. GS, III, 200.
2. Ibid., 33; cf. GS, III, 203.
3. Ibid., 92.
4. ERE, VI, 722; cf. CT , 94-96.
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which gives validity to the material value of ethics and un-
less the system of formal laws is regarded no cultural synthe-
sis will even he possible. The material values of history
viewed without any regard for formal backgrounds may seem ex-
ceedingly relative, but it is conceivable that two apparently
contradictory material values may be expressions of a coherent
underlying system of ethical principles. In fact, this is re-
peatedly the case. As conditions change, the same theoretical
principles may require actions, which, if considered merely
abstractly, seen irreconcilable.
In his Christian Thougnt , Troeltsch offers no rational so-
lution of this problem, but falls back on religious faith.
Here too, it is faith that ultimately decides;
and here, too, it is likewise faith that jus-
tifies. It is not by any peradventure that
the religious idea of our Western sphere of
culture culminates in this doctrine. 1
The only idea of which Troeltsch seems to be quite certain is
the idea of personality. In the form of freedom it determines
everything in the morality of conscience, and, in the form of
object, everything in the ethic of values. 2 And yet, though
this conception is important, the whole principle of personality
is limited, says Troeltsch, to our Western world, and is, in our
sense, unknown to the Far last* He can only believe that for
us it is the truth. 3
1. CT, 98.
2. Ibid., 09.
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The axiological circle, to which we reierred above, is
transcended "by an appeal to metalogic. 1 Intuition la the
final vord.
In Wahrheit ist doch aber auch fur uns ein
solcher intuitiver Blick die LBsung des
Zirkels und schon der Anrang der ganzen
Problemstellung.2
The objectivity of ethics is thus "involved in a deep subjec-
tivity and founded on personal resolve." 3 A spiritual aona-
dology solves the problem, says Troeltsch. Heinemann describes
this monadology as follows:
Es ist eine geistige Monadenlehre , die
sich nur dadurch von Leibniz unterscheidet
,
dass die Monaden aufeinander wirken und
dass die selbstandige Geisteswelt prim&r
wie bei Sucken religiflsen Bedttrfnissen
dienen soli.
4
Troeltsch himself appeals directly to Leibniz. The monads
participate in their common life-ground which works through
them. 6 The individual person is the locus of the activity of
the divine monad and the locus of both the factual fullness of
life and the commands oi the 'ought'. 7 What is relative has
meaning only if through it there operates a living and creative
Absolute.
Sie setzt voraus einen Le&ens^rozess des
Absoluten, in v/elchem dieses selber von
1. GS, III, 203.
2. Ibid., 694; cf. ERS, VI, 720,
3. CT, 107.
4. NWP, 212.
5. as, III, 20.).
6. Ibid. , 210.
7. Ibid. , 211.
•>.c
JMt jedem Punkte aus in der die;jem Punkte
entsprechenden Weise ergriffMl und ge-
staltet werden kann.l
Thus, basic in Troeltsch's whole position is a religious con-
fidence in the unity and meaning of reality. To achieve the
feeling of unity with God and the infinite power "behind his-
tory is the highest goal of human wisdom, hut this is more, he
admits, than philosophy of history. 2
1. Religious Monadology
Troeltscn's religious monadology is fundamentally a per-
sonalistic world view. Ultimate reality is conceived to he a
personal pluralism with the finite monads metaphysically
grounded in the Absolute Person. This monadology is, in the
second place, more than merely an intellectual construct. The
monads are empirically conceived as the concrete centers of
historical experience. Moreover, the monad is a concrete uni-
versal, a universalizing particular, preserving unity and iden
tity in the midst of changing expeiiences. Finally, the intui
tions v/hich the monads experience are conceived synoptically.
However, this view presents several obvious difficulties.
The participation oi the finite in the infinite is only vague-
ly described. Epistemologically viewed, the participation
seems to be at once dualistic and monistic. Troeltscn's meta-
logic seems to be an unnecessary confusion of epistemology and
T. OS, III, 212.
2. Ibid.
,
113, 695.
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metaphysics . Moreover, th© nature o.-' the divine life is not
clearly outlined, nor do we have a satisfactory explanation of
intuition and (Jod's relation to that intuition. Though a uni-
versalizing particular, the monad's inner relationsnips within
the finite monad of form and content, reason and the affective
life, are not clearly explained. Indeed, the v/nole conception
of reason is much too rigid and attract, finally, as has
"been pointed out, there is no clear criterion of truth for the
measurement of values, while personality itself is left in the
unstable position of "being not universally valid as a basic
concept, but only a product of Western thought. Such a view
gives very little assistance as a way out of historical skep-
ticism.
Troeltsch's thought moved constantly in the direction of
individualistic relativism. This tendency can be illustrated
conclusively in his treatment of the absoluteness of Christian-
ity. The development of his thought on this question is clear-
ly outlined in the last volume which came from his pen.^ In
his earlier book, Die Absolutheit des Chr is tenturns und die He -
lisi ons^eschichte , ^ he stated the problem as follows:
not whether Christianity was as a matter of
fact universal, or at least implicit in all
religion, but whether it possessed ultimate
truth, a truth which might easily depend
upon a single instance of itself. 3
1. CT, 9-35.
2. Published 1902.
3. CT, 16.
iVl
So far as Christianity was concerned, its claim to universal
validity could only be felt and believed, In the first in-
stance, and must be confirmed retrospectively through its genu-
ine ability to furnish a solution of the various problems of
life. 1 Such a point of ultimate validity lie believed himself
to have found in Christianity's faith in revelation and in the
kind of claim it makes to truth. 2 On this basis he compared it
with other religions, fhat is peculiar about the former is the
purely human character of its religious ideal, which appeals to
the simplest, the most general, the most personal and spiritual
needs of mankind. Moreover, it depends for its evidences upon
an over-helming manifestation of God in the persons and lives
of the great prophets.
It was not a theory but a life - not a so-
cial order but a power. It owes its claim
to universal validity not to the correct-
ness of its reasoning nor to the conclusive-
ness of its proofs, but to God's revelation
of Himself in human hearts and lives.
In nis Soziallehren (1912), he made a number of statements
about the abiding characteristics of Christianity. 4
1. Das christliche 3thos allein auf Grund seines per-
sonalistischen Theismus hat einen metaphysisch be-
grflndeten, durch keinen Naturalismus und keinen
Pessimi3mus zerstOrb-ren rersBnlichkeits- und In-
dividual itatsgedanken.
2. Der christliche Hthos allein hat auf Grund seines
1. CT, 16-17.
2. Loc. cit.
3. Ibid., 20; cf. ACR, 103, 92, 106, 122, 127, 146.
4. GS, I, 973-979. For English translation see STCC, II,
1004-1005.
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Gedankens von einer alien zugewandten und alle in
sich vereinigenden gflttlichen Liebe einen ./irklich
uner schtttterlicher?. Sozialismus
.
3. Eur das cliristliche 3th0 3 ueber-vindet das' Gleich-
heits- und Ungleichheitsproblem, indem es weder in
Sinne der Auslesc die Gewalt und den Zufall verherr-
licht, nocn 1m Sinne der egalitaren Doktrin die
Wirklichkeit vergewaltigt . Hs nimmt die Verschie-
denlieit der Lebenslagen, der Kraft e und der' Fahig-
keiten als einen Ton Gottes unerforschlichen Allien
gestifteten Zusammenhang hin, den die inner e Hebung
der PersBnlichkeit und die gegenseitigen Verbunden-
heitsgeftthle in einen ethischen Kosmos verwandeln.
4. Das christliche Ethos leistet kraft der Christlichen
Persflnlichkeitssciiatzung und Liebe etnas, -was keine
noch so gerechte und rationelle Gesellschaftsordnung
v*llig entbehren kann, well in ihr immer unberechen-
bare Leiden, NOte, und Krankheiten uebrig bleiben,
die Karitftt.
5. Das christliche Ethos stellt allem sozialen Leben
und Streben ein Ziel vor Augen, das ueber alien
lelativitaten des irdischen Lebens hinausliegt und
im Verhftltnis zu dem alles nur Annaherungswerte dar-
stellt. Der Gedanke des Gottesreiches der Zukunft,
der nichts anderes ist als der Gedanke der endgttl-
tigen Verwirklichung des Absoluten.
These conclusions are an acknowledgement of the validity
of a per3onali3tic metaphysics and an identification of it with
Christianity. Even in his later discussions he did not with-
draw from the practical standpoint here evolved. Prom a the-
oretical point of view, however, he made certain modifications:
My scruples arise from the fact that, whilst
the significance for history of the concept of
Individuality impresses me more forcibly every
day, I no longer believe this to be so easily
reconcilable with that of supreme validity. 1
Troelt3ch was more and more impressed by the historical eondi-
1. CT, 21-22.
i
tionedness and individuality of Christianity , tooth in its sev-
eral forms in church, sect, and mysticism, and as a whole.
A religion, in the several forms assumed by
it, always depends upon the intellectual,
social, and national conditions among which
it exists.
*
On the other hand,
a study of the non-Christian religions con
vinced me more and more that their naive
claims to absolute validity are genuinely
such. I found Buddhism and Brahmanism
especially to be really humane and spir-
itual religions, capable of appealing in
precisely the same way to the inner certi-
tude and devotion of their followers as
Christianity, 2
The author then confesses that in his Per Histor ismus und
seine Probleme he encountered the same difficulties in connec-
tion with the development of political, social, ethical, aes-
thetic, and scientific ideals, as he had in the field of re-
ligion .
Indeed, even the validity of science and
logic seemed to exhibit, under different
skies and upon different soil, strong
individual differences present even in
their deepest and innermost rudiments.
What was really common to mankind, and
universally valid for it, seemed, in spite
of general kinship and capacity for mutual
understanding, to be at bottom exceedingly
little, and to belong more to the province
of material goodg than to the ideal values
of civilization.
^
1.
2.
3.
Of, 21-22.
Ibid.
,
22-23.
Ibid. , 23-24.
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The effect of these considerations upon his earlier vie?/s
TroeltRch summarizes as follows. The Christian religion
stands or falls with European civilization The individual
character of the latter and al30 of the former comes more into
the foreground, while the idea of supreme validity falls into
the "background. 1 As for the conception of personality, it is
part of our de-orientalized Christianity. 2 ¥hat remains of
Christianity's primary claim to validity is the fact that only
through it have we become what we are and "that only in it can
we preserve the religious forces that we need." 3 Such a view,
we may add, vitiates practically all of the demands of the re-
ligious a priori and the majestic conclusions of his Sozial -
lehren . What is this, we may a3k, but Troeltsch's Platonism
surrendering to James' empiricism and then empiricist" surren-
dering to the historical flux?4" Our life, says Troeltsch, is
a compromise, a compromise every day to be renewed at every
fresh turning of the road.
Even here, however, the author gathers together the scat-
tered forces of belief and maintains that Christianity must,
in some degree, be a manifestation of the Divine Life. The
evidence for this is our own inner experience; this is the
criterion of its validity. But then, it is only valid for us. 5
1. CT, 24.
2. Ibid. , 24-25.
3. Ibid., 25.
4. Ibid.; cf. 123, "History within itself cannot be
transcend 3d.
"
5. Ibid.
, 26.
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It is final because we have nothing else. 1 Christianity is
the truth, hut a truth for us, 2 a truth which is final only
within the Individual Totality in which we find ourselves.
And so it is of all the other values.
III. Der Europaismus
Since Cnristianity is so closely related in Troeltsch's
thought to the whole spiritual and cultural development of
European civilization, 3 it is well to close with a brief ex-
position of "Curopaisuus . This concept is the constructive as
pect of his thought which combines the Individual Totality of
the past and present with the future development of the same.
It is the cultural synthesis. In order to obtain a clear con
ception of it, we must differ entis,te it from the idea of Hu-
manity. The latter may be an ethical ideal, but it is not a
spiritual unity, and accordingly has no unified development. 4
A real historical object is possible only in so far as it
meets the requirements of the Individual Totality and of the
principles of development which we have explained above. 5
Es gibt fur un3 nur eine V/eltgeschichte
,
des Europaer turns
. Der alte Gednnke der
Weltgeschichte muss neue und bescheidenere
?ormen annehmen.^
1. CT, 26.
2. Ibid., 34.
3. Ibid., 30.
4. GC, III, 706.
5. Ibid., 707.
5. Ibid., 708.
dVL
Suit
177
The European world rests on the basis of the ancient
world and cannot "be separated from it, 1 Moreover, the criteri-
on according to which history can oe most successfully divided
into periods will be the socio-economic-politico-jur istic sub-
structure. ^ This method concedes more to Marx's economic in-
terpretation than any of Troel tech's earlier writings, and
less to Hegel. According to this method, the beginnings of
modern times are placed in the epoch of the amazing expansion
of Europe, of the rise of modern national states, of capitalist
economy, of colonial expansion, of spiritual autonomy, and of
scientific thinking. It was the period of the practical ap-
plication of the mind to material tasks.
Die eigentliche Keuzeit ist doch erst ge-
boren aus dem Brucu mit dem Absolutismus
und dem Konfessionalismus .
3
In the Suropaismus of the future, there will be, however,
several lines of influence from the developing past which
reach farther back than the period just alluded to. The first
of these is the Jewish Prophets and the Bible. 4 A second
great element is classical Hellenism. A third significant in-
fluence is ancient imperialism; and the fourth is the V/estem
Middle Ages. Prophetlea contributed the transformation of
national religious ideals into an ethic of humanity. Its com-
T. GS
,
III, 716.
2. Ibid., 756; cf. above, Ch. IV; cf. also GS, IV, 7.
3. Ibid., 732-753.
4. Ibid.
,
765*7 <6.
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bination with Christianity gave to prophet ism and the Bible an
enormous influence in the western world. Classic'! Hellenism
was the source for free artistic education and culture. An-
cient imperialism formed the basis for civil government and
contributed the idea of the closed military and bureaucratic
e:\pire-state , and also a world religion. That which the Middle
Ages contributed is threefold; 1) its inwardness, 2) its striv-
ing for infinity (Unendlichkeitsdrang) , and 3) its political
and social institutions
.
1
That the concrete cultural synthesis will be Troeltsch
does not venture to outline. In the closing chapter of his
Christian Thought he expresses the belief that the World T.?ar
"has not proved a turning-point in history, but simply one epi -
sode among; others . There are four alternatives which present
themselves for the future of Europe: 1) the renunciation of
idealism, 2) an exclusively spiritual solution, 3) a single
world-empire, and 4) a League of Nations. 3
Per Histor isnus und seine Probleme was to have been the
first volume of a two volume work. Of the second volume only
that was published which constituted the five lectures which
compose Christian Thought. If these lectures are a fair indica-
tion of the positive thought of the proposed second volui.e,
then the conclusion seems evident that Troeltsch did not think
T. GS, ill, 765-767.
2. CT, 150.
3. Ibid.
, 151-158.
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his way out of the inescapable skepticism and relativism which
he m fighting so hard to avoid, and the principle of Individ-
ual Totalities has not completely Tindioated itself.-
Tir kennen in Wahrheit nur uns solbst und
verstehen nur unser eigenes Sein und des-
halb auch nur unser e eigene Entwicklung. . .
.
Bind Reise um die Welt mag der kurzeste "#eg •
sein, zu sich selbst zu kc-mmen. Wit kommen
auf diesen 'i7ege aber doch immer nur ver-
gleichend und lernend eben zu uns selbst.
1. GO, III, 709.

CHAPTER SIX
Conclusions of the Dissertation
I. Troeltscu presents and successfully defends the prin-
ciple of Individual Totalities in history as over against the
atomistic principles of the natural sciences.
II. Troeltsch does not adequately relate time and cause
in the natural sciences to time and cause in historical sci-
ence, leaving too sharp a cleavage between science with its
conception of mechanistic law and history with its idea of
development
.
III. In his interpretation of historical development as
a creative, teleological , and temporal process within the lim-
its of Individual Totalities, Troeltsch has effected a suc-
cessful synthesis of Hegel, Bergson, Marx, and Rickert.
IV. Troeltsch* s attempt to solve the problem of the epi-
s temological relationship between the individual person in the
Individual Totality and the rest of reality by an appeal to in-
tuitional monadology (metalogic) is not successful because in-
tuition is not a self-validating principle.
V. Troeltsch fails to find an adequate foundation for
norms in interpreting history and in constructing a cultural
synthesis. This is due chiefly to four causes:
A. A too abstract conception of the nature of reason
ioiajjIonoC
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and Its relation to tho materials of experience and to time.
B. An overemphasis on the unique al^nlflo nco rn&
status of orch cultural Individual Tot: 11 ty.
C. An appeal to lntuttlon which is not an rdequnte
principle for the validation of historical norns.
D. An appeal to the historical a priori which fa51s
to ground tho v3uos Of the cultural synthesis rnd eventu-
ates in a rtero 'fri-*pngqQffl?il«
VI. The tendency of Trooltsch's thought is constantly in
the direction of historic?! rel tlvism.
VII. Trooltsch'o religious person lism ltofcot to scepticism
in that the concept of personality is held, to be not univer-
sally valid rmd basic but only true for Western thought*
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SUMflARY
The problem to which thia investigation lias been devoted,
is the nature of Individual Totalities in ILrnst Troeltsch's
philosopny of history. In the introductory Chapter we indi-
cated that such a study involved raising four questions- 1)
:.hat are Troeltsch's principles of historical research and his
methods of historiography? 2) What are the structure and
function of tne Individual Totality? 3) How are we to con-
ceive oi the process oi development in the Individual Totali-
ty? 4) How are the norms of interpretation and the values of
the cultural synthesis to be validated in the light of the
principle oi the Individual Totality? These four questions
constituted the general outline of our study.
We noted also in the Introauctory Chapter that the prob-
lems of the Individual Totality in history developed gradually
in Troeltsch's mind after years of historical research and that
his discussion oi them represent his maturest thought. Then we
noted the views of a number oi critics whose discussions bear
on this question. Chief among these were Hintze, Liebert,
Tillich, Heinemanri, Lyman, von Hugel , and von Rintelen.
In the Second Chapter we ^resented Troeltsch's principles
of historiography. Historiography begins as an empirical sci-
ence interested in the problem o, causation. The latter, how-
v nitUUP
ever, raises a number of epistemological and metaphysical
questions which involve us in the whole discussion of the
philosophy of history. We then proceeded to show what sharp
differences exist between the study of nature and the investi-
gation of history indicating the fleeting character of histor-
ical processes over against the closed mathematical and causal
system of nature. The case for naturalism we found transcend-
ed in three ways : l) "by a consideration of metalogic, 2) by a
consideration of psychology, and 3) "by a consideration of the
philosophy of nature. One of the chief aid3 in Troeltsch'
s
solution of the problem was the position ol Rickert who pro-
pounded the principle of individual causation. We showed
wherein Troeltsch accepted Kickert and wherein he went beyond
him. In the investigation 01 history we showed how Troeltsch
appealed to the principle of contingency and its basic sig-
nificance in understanding, the unique quality of historical
events. At the end of th# chapter v/e pointed out that
Troeltsch's conception of physical cause was Kantian and that
therefore he was not able to reconcile history with science
under a common point, of view* Like cause, so too time was
left in a state of abstraction, for Troeltsch did not relate
coherently the physical time oi the sciences to the concrete
duration of history.* Then we showed how this difficulty has
been overcome in some recent conceptions o~ modern science.
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In Chapter Three we described some of tlie chief enarac-
teristics of the Individual Totalities. We dealt in turn with
t..'.e following: Originality, Representation, Unity of .I'eaning
and Value, Common-Spirit , the Unconscious, Creativity, and
Indeterminism, Wt traced the relationship of tne Individual
Totality to Hegel's Objective Spirit and explained Troeltsch's
treatment of the relationship between the individual person
and tne Common-Spirit by an appeal to Jfartmann' s outline of
that problem. We agreed with Troeltscn that the Individual
Totality hae an objective status in reality and that history
presents us with genuine C-estalten . Then we noted that the
creative and spontaneous sources of history are found im in-
dividual personalities and that the latter are the bearers of
the Common-Spirit and the basis for the unity of meaning and
value which the Individual Totality exhibits.
Chapter four was devoted to an investigation of the logic
of historical development. Here we first traced the various
and sundry meanings and applications of the term development,
showing that the contrariety of usage necessitated a clarifi-
cation of the concept if the term were to be applied to his-
torical process. After showing the differences "between his-
torical development and evolution and progress, we presented
four of Troeltsch's studies in the field of philosophical
criticism, viz., Hegel's dialectic, Marx's dialectic, the
theories of the Positivists, and the position 01 Rickert. We

noted that Troeltsch had a high admiration for Hegel "because
of his sense for the original, living, individual, and con-
tradictory facts of history. What Troeltsch rejected, in Hegel
was his tendency toward the Epinozistic philosophy o.f identity
We noted further that Troeltsch found much in Harx with which
he wits in agreement, especially his realistic analysis of the
capitalist system and his projection of development into the
future. What vitiated Marx's position was his exclusively
monistic economic interpretation of the dialectic. Turning
from Hegel and Marx to the Positivists we showed how Troeltsch
rejected almost completely the whole Positivistic historical
dynamic "because it violated the principle of Individual To-
talities by its social atomism and by its inadequate concep-
tion of time. Then we tool: account of Troeltsch' s criticism
of Packer t, indicating how the conception of the Individual
Totality is dependent on Rickert s s work, "but that the latter
failed to account for the temporal and developmental dynamic
of historical wholes. Riekert's Kantian conception of cause
and time, when applied to history, Troeltsch rejected. More-
over, his system of values was too formal, contemplative, and
subjective, llext we outlined Troeltsch' s own creative, tem-
poral, and teleologic 1 conception of development. At the
close of the chapter we showed that the epistemolo
_^y upon
which Troeltsch "built his views wax closely related to Leibniz
monadology, hut that the appeal to intuition was not an ade-
quate epistemological principle.
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p«z The last chapter we devoted to the question of the cul-
tural synthesis. He tried to show that Troeltsch failed to
give an adequate foundation for an abiding system of values
in history and that accordingly the _rinciple of Individual
Totalities breaks down at a crucial point. Our line of argu-
ment was first to 3how the practical nature of the philosophy
jv history and the problems which arise from a consideration
of cultural syntheses. The crux 01 the matter lies in the
relationship of philosophy to the norms of history. Here the
unique status of the Individual Totality is significant. It
is the locus for controlling and damning the stream of his-
tory. '7e then proceeded to show that Troeltsch' s view re-
garding historical and cultural norms changed fro.;: an avowed
Platonism of his earlier years to a more skeptical individu-
alism. In trying to find inner -historical norms Troeltsch
rejects all absolute universal material norms in history and
appeals to intuition and the a priori. The principle of in-
tuition, we tried to point out, leads to insuperable diffi-
culties and must be supplemented by other _,rincip>les. Like-
v.'ise, the a priori fails to serve as an adequate principle of
validation. "7e traced the evolution of its use arid meaning
in Troeltsch* s religious and historical writings and found
that it eventuates in mere subjectivism. Turning to the con-
sideration of ethics in the Individual Totality we found that
personality was the basic principle. We noted, however, that
681 I
personality was regarded not as a universally valid conception
but was true only for Western thought. Then we pointed out
that Troeltsch ultimately falls back on a religious solution
of the problem and appeals to faith. But his religious per-
sonal i sin tends toward skepticism in that personality is not a
universally valid principle. In his later writings he held
that the Christian religion stands or falls with European civi
lization. Accordingly, we outlined the structure oi der j^iaxo—
,;aisi"ius which constitutes his idea of the cultural synthesis,
but found that Troeltsch avoided any concrete presentation of
it. We finally drew our study to a close with the conclusion
that on the crucial problem of validating thought and value
the Individual Totality had not vindicated itself.
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rBrief Autobiography
Walter G*orge Muelder was born in Boody, Illinois,
March 1, 190^,j bhe second child of Reverend Epke Hermann
Muelder and Miniie Horlitz Muelder. The parents were both
horn in Geripany but came to America while still in their
childhood, Waltir received his elementary education in
Peoria and in S n Jose, Illinois, and his secondary edu-
cation in Son Ji>se, Illinois, and in Burlington, Iowa. Then
followed (1923-L925) two years study in the Burlington Jun-
ior College.-. Prom 1925 to 1927 he attended Knox College,
where he received the B. S. degree in 1927. The next three
years were spens in Boston University School of Theology
(1927-1930)/ at the end of which he was granted the S. T. B.
degree. At this ti^e he was also awarded the Frank D. Howard
Fellowship from the School of Theology end an American Ger-
man Exchange Fellowship from the Institute of International
Education in Ke» York City. The next year (193Q£19S1) was
soent primarily st the University of Frankfurt *flrMain,^&er--
many. From 1931 to 1933 he has been enrolled in the Boston
University Graduate School. During the academic year 1951-
1932 he was tiie Fellow in Systematic Theology and in 1932-
1933 the Borden Parker Bowne Fellow in Philosophy*
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